1 In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1982), 73. More recently, the following works by Gilligan on related issues have also appeared: ‘Do the Social Sciences Have an Adequate Theory of Moral Development?’ in Norma, HaanBellah, Robert N.Paul, Rabinow and Sullivan, William M. eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry (New York: Columbia University Press 1983), 33-51;Google Scholar ‘Reply,’ Signs 11 (1986), 324-33; and ‘Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of the Self in Relationship,’ in Heller, Thomas C.Morton, Sosna and Wellberry, David E. eds., Reconstructing Individualism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1986) 237-52.Google Scholar Throughout this paper, all page references inserted in the text are to In a Different Voice.

2 Frigga, Haug ‘Morals Also Have Two Genders,’ trans. Rodney, LivingstoneNew Left Review 143 (1984), 55.Google Scholar

3 These sources include: Flanagan, Owen J. Jr. and Adler, Jonathan E. ‘Impartiality and Particularity,’ Social Research 50 (1983), 576-96;Google ScholarNel, NoddingsCaring (Berkeley: University of California Press 1984);Google ScholarClaudia, Card ‘Virtues and Moral Luck’ (unpublished paper presented at American Philosophical Association, Western Division Meetings, Chicago, IL, April 1985Google Scholar, and at the Conference on Virtue Theory, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, February 1986); Friedman, MarilynCare and Context in Moral Reasoning, MOSAIC Monograph #1 (Bath, England: University of Bath 1985)Google Scholar, reprinted in Carol, Harding ed., Moral Dilemmas (Chicago: Precedent 1986), 25-42Google Scholar, and in Meyers, Diana T. and Kittay, Eva Feder eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1987), 190-204;Google Scholar all the papers in Meyers and Kittay; Kerber, Linda K. ‘Some Cautionary Words for Historians,’ Signs 11 (1986), 304-10;CrossRefGoogle ScholarGreeno, Catherine G. and Maccoby, Eleanor E. ‘How Different is the “Different Voice,”’ Signs 11 (1986) 310-16;CrossRefGoogle ScholarZelia, Luria ‘A Methodological Critique,’ Signs 11 (1986), 316-21;Google ScholarStack, Carol B. ‘The Culture of Gender: Women and Men of Color,’ Signs 11 (1986), 321-4;CrossRefGoogle ScholarOwen, Flanagan and Kathryn, Jackson ‘Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited,’ Ethics 97 (1987), 622-37.Google Scholar An analysis of this issue from an ambiguously feminist standpoint is to be found in: Broughton, John M. ‘Women’s Rationality and Men’s Virtues,’ Social Research 50 (1983), 597-642.Google Scholar For a helpful review of some of these issues, cf. Jean, GrimshawPhilosophy and Feminist Thinking (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1986), esp. chs. 7 and 8.Google Scholar

4 This term is used by Virginia Held to refer, in general, to the division of moral labor among the multitude of professions, activities, and practices in culture and society, though not specifically to gender roles. Cf. Rights and Goods (New York: The Free Press 1984), ch. 3. Held is aware that gender roles are part of the division of moral labor but she mentions this topic only in passing, p. 29.

5 Gilligan, ‘Reply,’ 326Google Scholar

6 Research on the ‘gender difference’ hypothesis is very mixed. The studies which appear to show gender differences in moral reasoning for one or more age levels include: Haan, NormaBrewster-Smith, M. and Block, Jeanne ‘Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-social Behavior, Family Background, and Personality Correlates,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10 (1968), 183-201;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMedJames, FishkinKenneth, Keniston and Catharine, MacKinnon ‘Moral Reasoning and Political Ideology,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27 (1973), 109-19;Google ScholarNorma, Haan ‘Hypothetical and Actual Moral Reasoning in a Situation of Civil Disobedience,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975), 255-70;Google ScholarConstance, Holstein ‘Development of Moral Judgment: A Longitudinal Study of Males and Females,’ Child Development 47 (1976), 51-61Google Scholar (showing gender differences in middle adulthood but not for other age categories; see references below); Langdale, Sharry ‘Moral Orientations and Moral Development: The Analysis of Care and Justice Reasoning across Different Dilemmas in Females and Males from Childhood through Adulthood’ (Ed. D. diss., Harvard Graduate School of Education 1983);Google ScholarJohnston, Kay ‘Two Moral Orientations - Two Problem-solving Strategies: Adolescents’ Solutions to Dilemmas in Fables,’ (Ed. D. diss., Harvard Graduate School of Education 1985).Google Scholar The last two sources are cited by Gilligan, ‘Reply,’ p.330.Google Scholar

Among the studies which show no gender differences in moral reasoning at one or more age levels are: Turiel, E. ‘A Comparative Analysis of Moral Knowledge and Moral Judgment in Males and Females,’ Journal of Personality 44 (1976), 195-208;CrossRefGoogle Scholar C. B. Holstein, ‘Irreversible Stepwise Sequence in the Development of Moral Judgment: A Longitudinal Study of Males and Females’ (showing no differences in childhood or adolescence but showing differentiation in middle adulthood; see reference above); Haan, N. etal. ‘Family Moral Patterns,’ Child Development 47 (1976), 1204-6;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBerkowitz, M. etal. ‘The Relation of Moral Judgment Stage Disparity to Developmental Effects of Peer Dialogues,’ Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 26 (1980), 341-57;Google Scholar and Brabeck, Mary ‘Moral Judgment: Theory and Research on Differences between Males and Females,’ Developmental Review 3 (1983), 274-91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Walker, Lawrence J. surveyed all the research to date and claimed that rather than showing a gender-based difference in moral reasoning, it showed differences based on occupation and education: ‘Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning,’ Child Development 55 (1984), 677-91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This ‘meta-analysis’ has itself recently been disputed: Haan, Norma ‘With Regard to Walker (1984) on Sex “Differences” in Moral Reasoning’ (University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Human Development mimeograph 1985);Google ScholarBaumrind, Diana ‘Sex Differences in Moral Reasoning: Response to Walker’s (1984) Conclusion That There Are None,’Google Scholar Child Development (in press). The last two sources are cited by Gilligan, ‘Reply,’ p.330.Google Scholar

7 Haan, Norma ‘Two Moralities in Action Contexts,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978), 286-305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also cf. Haan, Norma ‘Moral Reasoning in a Hypothetical and an Actual Situation of Civil Disobedience,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975), 255-70;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Nunner-Winkler, Gertrud ‘Two Moralities? A Critical Discussion of an Ethic of Care and Responsibility versus an Ethic of Rights and Justice,’ in Kurtines, William M. and Gewirtz, Jacob L.Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1984), 348-61.Google Scholar

8 Gilligan, ‘Reply,’ 326Google Scholar

9 Broughton, ‘Women’s Rationality and Men’s Virtues,’ 636Google Scholar

10 Gilligan’s work arose largely as a critical reaction to the studies of moral reasoning carried on by Lawrence Kohlberg and his research associates. For the reaction by those scholars to Gilligan’s work and their assessment of its importance to moral psychology, see Kohlberg, Lawrence ‘A Reply to Owen Flanagan and Some Comments on the Puka-Goodpaster Exchange,’ Ethics 92 (1982), 513-28;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Kohlberg, LawrenceLevine, Charles and Hewer, AlexandraMoral Stages: A Current Reformulation and Response to Critics (Basel: Karger 1983), 20-7, 121-50.Google Scholar

In philosophy, themes related to Gilligan’s concerns have been raised by, among others: Stacker, Michael ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,’ Journal of Philosophy 63 (1976) 453-66:CrossRefGoogle ScholarWilliams, Bernard ‘Persons, Character and Morality,’ in Rorty, Amelie O. ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California 1976),Google Scholar reprinted in Williams, BernardMoral Luck (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982), 1-19;Google ScholarBlum, LawrenceFriendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980);Google ScholarMaclntyre, Alas-dairAfter Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 1981), esp. Ch. 15;Google ScholarStocker, Michael ‘Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship,’ Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), 747-65;Google ScholarFlanagan, Owen ‘Virtue, Sex and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections on the Moral Psychology Debate,’ Ethics 92 (1982), 499-512;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSlote, Michael ‘Morality Not a System of Imperatives,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982), 331-40;Google Scholar and Sommers, Christina Hoff ‘Filial Morality,’ Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 439-56CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Greeno, and Maccoby, ‘How Different is the ‘Different’ Voice?’ 314-15Google Scholar

12 Gilligan, ‘Reply,’ 325Google Scholar

13 For a discussion of this historical development, cf. Nicholson, Linda ‘Women, Morality and History,’ Social Research 50 (1983) 514-36;Google Scholar and her Gender and History (New York: Columbia University Press 1986) esp. chs. 3 and 4.

14 Cf. Eisenberg, Nancy and Lennon, Roger ‘Sex Differences in Empathy and Related Capacities,’ Psychological Bulletin 94 (1983), 100-31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Cf. Eagly, Alice H. ‘Sex Differences and Social Roles’ (unpublished paper presented at Experimental Social Psychology, Tempe, AZ, October 1986), esp. p.7.Google Scholar Also cf: Eagly, Alice H. and Steffen, Valerie J. ‘Gender Stereotypes Stem From the Distribution of Women and Men Into Social Roles,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46 (1984), 735-54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 The stereotypes of men are not obviously connected with justice and rights, but they are connected with the excessive individualism which Gilligan takes to underlie the justice orientation. Cf. Eagly, ‘Sex Differences and Social Roles,’ 8.Google Scholar

17 Eagly argues both that people do show a tendency to conform to shared and known expectations, on the parts of others, about their behavior, and that a division of labor which leads people to develop different skills also contributes to differential development; ‘Sex Differences and Social Roles,’ passim. It follows from Eagly’s view that if the genders are stereotypically ‘moralized,’ they would then be likely to develop so as to conform to those different expectations.

18 Eagly and Steffen have found that stereotypic beliefs that women are more ‘communal’ and less ‘agentic’ than men, and that men are more ‘agentic’ and less ‘communal’ than women are based more deeply on occupational role stereotypes than on gender stereotypes; ‘Gender Stereotypes Stem From the Distribution of Women and Men Into Social Roles,’ passim. In this respect, Eagly and Steffen force us to question whether the gender categorization which pervades Gilligan’s analysis really captures the fundamental differentiation among persons. I do not address this question in this paper.

19 In correspondence, Marcia Baron has suggested that a factor accounting for the actual emergence of ‘mixed’ perspectives on the parts of women and men may have to do with the instability of the distinction between public and private realms to which the justice/care dichotomy corresponds. Men have always been recognized to participate in both realms and, in practice, many women have participated, out of choice or necessity, in such segments of the public world as that of paid labor. The result is a blurring of the experiential segregation which otherwise might have served to reinforce distinct moral orientations. Marilyn Friedman of wisdom. That the genders do not, in reality, divide along those moral lines is made possible, though not inevitable, by the conceptual limitations of both a concept of care dissociated from considerations of justice and a concept of justice dissociated from considerations of care. Support for this partial explanation requires a reconceptualization of care and justice - the topic of the next part of my discussion.

20 Book I, 322-35. A thorough discussion of the Greek conception of justice in the context of friendship can be found in Hutter, HorstPolitics as Friendship (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1978).Google Scholar

21 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 13 and elsewhereGoogle Scholar

22 Ibid., 129

23 The Politics of Reality (Trumansburg. NY: The Crossing Press 1983) 9

24 Ibid., 10

25 For an important discussion of the relevance of justice to the family, cf. Okin, Susan Moller ‘Justice and Gender,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987), 42-72.Google Scholar

26 For insightful discussions of the distinctive modes of thought to which mothering gives rise, cf. Ruddick, Sara ‘Maternal Thinking,’ Feminist Studies 6 (1980) 342-67;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and her ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction: Some Reflections on Mothering and Peace,’ in Trebilcot, Joyce ed., Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1983) 231-62;Google Scholar also Held, Virginia ‘The Obligations of Mothers and Fathers,’ in Trebilcot, ed. 7-20.Google Scholar

27 This point was suggested to me by L.W. Sumner.

28 John Broughton also discusses the concern for justice and rights which appears in women’s moral reasoning as well as the concern for care and relationships featured in men’s moral reasoning; ‘Women’s Rationality and Men’s Virtues, esp. 603-22. For a historical discussion of male theorists who have failed to hear the concern for justice in women’s voices, cf. Pateman, Carole ‘“The Disorder of Women”: Women, Love, and the Sense of Justice,’ Ethics 91 (1980), 20-34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29 This discussion owes a debt to Francesca M. Cancian’s warning that we should not narrow our conception of love to the recognized ways in which women love, which researchers find to center around the expression of feelings and verbal disclosure. Such a conception ignores forms of love which are stereotyped as characteristically male, including instrumental help and the sharing of activities. Cf. ‘The Feminization of Love,’ Signs 11 (1986), 692-709.

30 Cf. Royko, MikeBoss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: New American Library 1971).Google Scholar

31 Claudia Card has critiqued Gilligan’s work for ignoring, in particular, the dismaying harms to which women have historically been subjected in heterosexual relationships, including, but by no means limited to, marriage (‘Virtues and Moral Luck,’ 15-17).

32 Discussion in part III of my paper draws upon the insights of Card, Claudia ‘Virtues and Moral Luck’ and Benhabib, Seyla ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: Visions of the Autonomous Self,’ in Meyers, and Kittay, eds., Women and Moral Theory, 154-77.Google Scholar

33 This part of my discussion owes a debt to Claudia Card.

34 Cf. Kant, ImmanuelGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Beck, Lewis White (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1959), 46-7, 53-4.Google Scholar

35 For a helpful discussion on this topic, cf. Walker, Margaret ‘Moral Particularism,’ unpublished manuscript presented at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, March 1987.Google Scholar

36 I am grateful to Larry May, L.W. Sumner, Marcia Baron, and Christopher Morris for a helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. Earlier versions were presented to the Society for Women in Philosophy, Midwestern Division (USA), Madison, WI, October 1986; Society for Value Inquiry, Chicago, IL, April 1987; Seminar on Contemporary Social and Political Thought, University of Chicago, May 1987; Third International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, Dublin, Ireland, July 1987; and Annual Conference of MOSAIC (Moral and Social Action Interdisciplinary Colloquium), Brighton, England, July 1987.