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Berkeley and Cartesianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Daisie Radner
Daisie Radner*
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Buffalo
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Extract

A fair question to ask of any philosopher is: What problems is he trying to solve or to circumvent? The relevance of his work to his readers depends upon how live those problems are for them; the merit of his work depends upon his success in dealing with them. The problems which concerned Berkeley were problems inherited from Cartesianism—problems arising from the dualism of mental and material substance, the Cartesian conception of causality, and the representative theory of ideas. How can mind and matter interact if they are two substances totally different in nature and like can only act upon like? How can matter be a cause at all if it is inert and a cause is by nature active? How can ideas represent material substance and its modes if representation is a matter of resemblance and ideas, being modes of mind, are unlike anything material? All such problems are circumvented if one denies the reality of material substance, if one claims that there are only minds and their ideas and that ideas are neither caused by nor representative of independently existing material objects. This, of course, is Berkeley's position.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 4: New Essays on Rationalism and Empiricism , 1978 , pp. 165 - 176
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1978

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References

1 For a discussion of Cartesian responses to these problems see Watson, Richard A., The Downfall of Cartesianism,1673-1712 (The Hague, 1966).CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Watson's, “Berkeley in a Cartesian Context”, Revue internationale de philosophie, 17 (1963), 381–394.Google Scholar

2 Reply to Objections, I, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Haldane, Elizabeth S. and Ross, G. R. T. (New York, 1955), II, 10Google Scholar; Oeuvres de Descartes, eds. Adam, Charles and Tannery, Paul (Paris, 1897-1912), VII, 102.Google Scholar

3 Des vraies et des fausses idées, Ch. 5, Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld (Paris, 1775-1783), XXXVIII, 198; hereafter cited as Oeuvres.

4 The Works of George Berkeley, eds. Luce, A. A. and Jessop, T. E. (Edinburgh, 1948-1957), II, 194–197Google Scholar; hereafter cited as Works.

5 Three Dialogues, Ill, Works II, 247-248.

6 Principles, 7, 22, Works II, 43-44, 50; Three Dialogues, I, Works II, 190.

7 Foucher, Simon, Critique de Ia Recherche de Ia vérité … (Paris, 1675; New York: Johnson Reprint, 1969), 50–57.Google Scholar

8 Principles, 8, Works II, 44; Three Dialogues, I, Works II, 206.

9 Thus God's idea of pain, for example, shows him how he must modify the mind in order to make it feel pain.

10 In the Second Dialogue Berkeley offers two objections to the vision in God (Works II, 213-214). The first, that ideas, being passive, cannot be in God, who is active, seems to work equally well against his own view of ideas in the mind. The second, that it makes the material world serve to no purpose, is not so much against our seeing bodies by ideas in God as against our seeing bodies by ideas as opposed to seeing them directly.

11 Alciphron, IV, 14, Works Ill, 159.

12 By Cartesian ideas I mean here either the idea-acts of Arnauld or the divine ideaarchetypes of Malebranche. Occasionally for Descartes ‘idea’ meant essence; essences are not essentially representative.

13 Three Dialogues, I, Works II, 204.

14 Arnauld, , La Logique, ou l'art de penser, Part I, ch. 5, Oeuvres XLI, 142–143Google Scholar; Régis, PierreSylvain, Cours entier de philosophie ou système generale selon les principles de M. Descartes (Amsterdam, 1691; New York: Johnson Reprint, 1970), I, 7.Google Scholar

15 Entretiens sur Ia métaphysique et sur Ia religion, II, 4, Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche, XII, 53; hereafter cited as O.C.

16 Cf. Malebranche to A. Ville (December, 1690?), O.C. XIX, 564.

17 De Motu, 53, Works IV, 45. Cf. Régis, Cours entier de philosophie, I, 156.

18 Arnauld to Malebranche (May, 1694), O.C. IX, 1035-1036. See also Défense contre Ia Réponse aux VFI, Oeuvres XXXVIII, 393-394, 584; Régis, Cours entier de philosophie I, 194.

19 Principles, Intro., 12, Works II, 32.

20 Malebranche to D. de Mairan (June 12, 1714), O.C. XIX, 884.

21 Bracken, Harry M. has argued that for Berkeley the relation between properties (hard) and object (die) is not a part-whole relation but an intentional relation like that between letters, suitably combined, and their meanings. (“Substance in Berkeley”, in Steinkraus, W. E., ed., New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy (New York, 1966), 85-97.Google Scholar) Here I maintain that the sign-thing signified relation holds not between part (property) and whole (object) but between one property or set of properties and the rest. This is in fact how Berkeley uses his “sign“ language when speaking of a single object (rather than, say, a cause-effect chain). See, for example, Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, 140, Works I, 228.

22 Des vraies et des fausses idées, Ch. 23, Oeuvres XXXVIII, 312.

23 Principles, 49, Works II, 61.

24 Three Dialogues, II, Works II, 216.

25 Ibid., 217.

26 Alciphron, VII, 6, Works Ill, 293-295; De Motu, 17, 22, Works IV, 35, 36; Siris, 234, 243, 250, Works V, 112, 116, 119.

27 Principles, 152, Works II, 111.

28 Three Dialogues, Ill, Works II, 231.

29 Philosophical Commentaries, 548, Works I, 69.

30 Philosophical Commentaries, 499, Works I, 63.

31 Alciphron VII, 19, Works III, 315-316.

32 Philosophical Commentaries, 699, Works I, 85.

33 Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, IX, 2, O.C. X, 96; Réflexions sur Ia prémotion physique, 23, O.C. XVI, 132.

34 Eclaircissements, XV, O.C. III, 213-214.

35 Principles, 69-71, Works II, 71-72; Three Dialogues, II, Works II, 219-220.