Aboriginal perspectives are often not viewed as persuasive or reasonable in contemporary political and legal discourses, and Aboriginal people are compelled to articulate their claims in the normative vocabulary of the majority. Many see this as an injustice. Part I of this essay argues that some incarnations of the idea of public justifiability, a cornerstone of political theory, provide a normative justification for that injustice. Part II argues that the idea is at work in the Canadian courts, even as judges attempt to create space for Aboriginal views. The ambivalent stance of the courts is explored through a case study.

The sociopolitical landscape of modern-day Cameroon is the result of maneuvers instituted by the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). The purpose of this study is to help put in perspective the roots of “identity blurring” that is often cited, rightly or wrongly, as one of the reasons why international law cannot apply to minorities and indigenous peoples in Cameroon. On the one hand, we discover that the Berlin Act produced a profound change in the civility of the peoples of Cameroon by legitimizing certain nontraditional practices such as expropriation and deportation. By de-territorializing certain groups, these practices contributed to their uprooting and to their alienation from their native identity. On the other hand, despite timid attempts to raise awareness, national public authorities in independent Cameroon have been unable (or unwilling) to repair past injustices. The implementation of modern law to the detriment of the traditional system appears to have contributed to the prolongation of the deconstruction of identity that began during the colonial era. Overall, the issue of land ownership in Cameroon has intensified rather than mitigated the sense of urgency regarding the need to address the affairs of the country’s minorities and indigenous peoples.

In a context where cultural difference is for many a source of apprehension, often leading to discrimination against minority groups, culture and cultural rights are particularly important for Indigenous peoples. However, compared with the promotion and protection of other human rights, the marginalization of cultural rights is readily apparent. This article explores one of the sources of this marginalization by asking the following question: to what extent does the concept of culture within the field of international law influence the promotion and protection of cultural rights of minority groups? The author claims that ambiguity around the notion of culture and the absence of a binding definition in the international human rights field yield a reductionist conception of culture. By failing to do justice to minority cultural rights, this conception impacts the realization of those rights and exacerbates certain exclusions. A re-conceptualization of the notion of culture, one that accounts for anthropological ideas and concepts, is therefore needed.

Drawing on a series of criminal cases that took place in Hamilton in late 1852, this paper explores the operation of race in law during the period against the backdrop of Hamilton’s geography. The paper sheds light on the living conditions of a segment of the population that has left scarcely a trace in the historical records. As well, a close examination of Hamilton’s census records and physical space reveals that those found guilty in these trials were linked to a particular racially and ethnically charged, vice-prone space rather than the more respectable central part of the city. The author argues that the construction of Prince’s Island, which lay in the marshes just west of Hamilton, as a “den of vice” probably conditioned the findings of guilt and innocence in one of the trials while promoting the impression that justice was “colour-blind.”

Immigrant minorities adapt to many of the practices and values of their host society. This adaptation is a two-way street. The state and the courts can be called upon to take into account the impact that some of these practices with a religious or cultural basis might have. Thus, as we learned from the Bruker v. Marcovitz decision, an obligation of a religious nature can be characterized as civil in nature when it is part of a contract signed in Canada. The same is true when a contract is entered into while the parties resided abroad. Although such an obligation can be considered justiciable, it is not always easy for Canadian courts to respect the specific nature of the standard in question. Indeed, judges must understand the scope of the standards involved, the function of certain institutions, or the importance of practices with which they are not necessarily familiar. When it comes to the mahr, or dowry, an examination of jurisprudence shows that the specific nature of this practice is not always understood, and in cases where it is recognized, the execution of the obligation it entails cannot always be ensured.

In the new, post-Soviet Russia, some people have been excluded from the possibility of possessing human rights based on different identity claims. Lesbians and gay men are among those who are excluded. Though in some states the mechanism of this is manifestly inscribed in the law, in Russia the mechanism is hidden in the field of silence: the field of discourse on homosexuality is full of lacunas. While the most productive speakers are certainly LGBT activists, the most passive ones are the state officials. These forces come into discursive play where rights are at stake. The purpose of this paper, based on original research on the emerging activism of gays and lesbians in Russia, is to uncover the regulative features of silence in the Russian discourse on homosexuality.