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Screening Desire: Same-Sex-Marriage Documentaries, Citizenship, and the Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

BJ Wray
BJ Wray
Affiliation:
Department of Justice, British Columbia Regional Office, Vancouver, [email protected]
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Abstract

This article explores how the legal arguments in favour of same-sex marriage recognition in the United States and Canada have been taken up in two recent documentaries on the subject: Tying the Knot: The Union That's Dividing America (USA, 2004) and The End of Second Class (Canada, 2006). My interest in these films lies in how they represent the legal challenges to their audiences. Like the litigation itself, each of these documentaries is built upon representational strategies that are intended to have the maximum impact on their audiences. Tying the Knot and The End of Second Class replicate the legal arguments and litigation strategies used by advocates of same-sex marriage. In particular, I analyse how each film represents the case for same-sex marriage through an appeal to three markers of equality rights discourses: rights evolve over time; rights are comparative; rights are indicators of national belonging. I contend that in their reliance on these markers, Tying the Knot and The End of Second Class unwittingly re-inscribe dominant notions of what it means to have full and equal national belonging and, thus, delimit what it means to be a “good” sexual citizen.

Résumé

Cet article explore comment les arguments juridiques en faveur de la reconnaissance des mariages entre personnes de même sexe, aux Etats-Unis et au Canada, sont représentés dans deux documentaires récents: Tying the Knot: The Union That's Dividing America (États-Unis, 2004) et The End of Second Class (Canada, 2006). Je m'intéresse notamment aux manières dont ces films présentent les contestations judiciaires à leurs auditoires. Comme les litiges, ces documentaires sont construits sur des stratégies représentationnelles qui ont pour but d'avoir un impact maximal sur leurs auditoires. Ainsi, Tying the Knot et The End of Second Class reproduisent les arguments juridiques et les stratégies de litige utilisés par les défenseurs des mariages entre personnes de même sexe. J'analyse, plus particulièrement, comment les deux films présentent ces procès à l'aide de trois thèmes récurrents: (1) les droits évoluent avec le temps; (2) les droits sont comparatifs; (3) les droits représentent des indicateurs d'une appartenance nationale. Je soutiens qu'en fonction de ces idées, Tying the Knot et The End of Second Class réintroduisent inconsciemment certaines notions dominantes de ce que signifie avoir une appartenance nationale pleine et égale et, par conséquent, délimitent ce que veut dire être un « bon » citoyen sexuel.

Keywords

mariages entre personnes de même sexedroit et filmétudes « queer »droit et sexualitédocumentairessame-sex marriagelaw and filmqueer studieslaw and sexualitydocumentary film
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , April 2009 , pp. 1 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2009

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References

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2 Tying the Knot: The Union That's Dividing America (DVD), directed by de Sève, Jim (New York: Roadside Attractions/1,049 Films, 2004)Google Scholar; The End of Second Class (DVD), directed by Nicol, Nancy (Toronto: VTape, 2006)Google Scholar.

3 Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 1 (1996); U.S., H.R.J. Res. 56, Federal Marriage Amendment, 108th Cong., 2003.

4 Barbeau v. British Columbia (A.G.) (2003), 15 B.C.L.R. (4th) 226 (B.C.C.A.) [Barbeau].

5 Halpern v. Canada (A.G.) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.) [Halpern].

6 Catholic Civil Rights League v. Hendricks (2004), 238 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Qc. C.A.) [Catholic Civil Rights League].

7 Marriage for Civil Purposes Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33.

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10 Tying the Knot Web site, http://www.1049films.com/story_mickie_&_lois.htm.

11 It is beyond the scope of this article to outline in any detail the range of alternatives to state-based recognition of same-sex marriage. I would, however, suggest a reworking of state-based benefits and obligations along the lines recommended by the Law Commission of Canada (LCC) in Beyond Conjugality (Ottawa: LCC, 2001), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/lcc-cdc/beyond_conjugaliry-e/html/front-e.html.Google Scholar The LCC recognized that the law does not always recognize the diversity of relationship choices made by Canadians and called on governments to pursue a more comprehensive and principled approach to the legal recognition and support of the full range of close personal relationships among adults. In order to accomplish this, as the LCC realized, a fundamental rethinking of the way in which governments regulate relationships is in order. Such rethinking is unlikely to occur if activists are satisfied with achieving inclusion.

12 Gregg, Ronald, “Queer Representations and Oregon's 1992 Anti-Gay Ballot Measure: Measuring the Politics of Mainstreaming,” in Between the Sheets, In the Streets: Queer, Lesbian, Gay Documentary, ed. Holmlund, Chris and Fuchs, Cynthia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 25Google Scholar.

13 Ibid.

14 During a panel discussion on same-sex marriage at Newfest: The New York Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Film Festival on June 5, 2004, Jim de Sève, director of Tying the Knot, characterized the debate over same-sex marriage as a battle over who is included as “normal”: “I think it's only a matter of normalization—people understanding that two men or two women marrying is normal, that it's something that's acceptable and normal and is an issue of social justice.”

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19 388 U.S. 1 (1967) [Loving].

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21 Barbeau; Halpern; Catholic Civil Rights League.

22 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. The three major intervener groups advocating same-sex marriage in the Reference were the Ontario and Quebec Couples, the British Columbia Couples, and the EGALE Couples. In each of these factums, as well as in several others supporting same-sex marriage, explicit reference was made to Brown and Loving. In each factum, these cases are used in patterns similar to those quoted here. I should also note that two interveners against same-sex marriage—the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Attorney General of Alberta—invoked Brown and Loving in order to distinguish them as solely related to racial inequalities.

23 291 Minn. 310 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1971).

24 Goodridge v. Massachusetts (Department of Health), 440 Mass. 309 (Sup. Ct. 2003).

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26 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415 (Sup. Ct. 2006).

27 Kerrigan & Mock v. Connecticut (Department of Health), 49 Conn. Supp. 644 (Sup. Ct. 2006).

28 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1948).

29 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, factum of the Ontario and Quebec Couples, at para. 25.

30 Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants in Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health (submitted on behalf of the couples by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD)), online: GLAD <http://www.glad.org/work/cases/goodridge-et-al-v-dept-public-health/> 58–59.

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35 Quoted in Boykin, Keith, “Whose Dream: Why the Black Church Opposes Gay Marriage,” The Village Voice (May 24, 2004), http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0421/boykin.phpGoogle Scholar

36 The use of racial analogies in gay and lesbian legal arguments has been written about extensively in the American context. See, e.g., Halley, “‘Like Race’ Arguments”; Kendall, Kate, “Race, Same-Sex Marriage, and White Privilege: The Problem with Civil Rights Analogies,” (2005) 17 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 17 (2005)Google Scholar; Somerville, Siobhan, “Queer Loving,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 11 (2005), 335CrossRefGoogle Scholar (explaining the operation of progress narratives in equality-rights discourses); Carbado, Devon W., “Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights,” UCLA Law Review 47 (2000), 1467Google Scholar (arguing that anti-racist responses to race/sexual orientation analogies normalize heterosexuality and that gay-rights advocates buttress the race/sexual orientation analogies with a racial conception of homosexuality as white); Coolidge, David Orgon, “Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy,” BYU Journal of Public Law 12 (1998), 201Google Scholar (arguing that those advocating same-sex marriage are not making a legal argument when they invoke Loving but are, instead, “playing the Loving card” as a political strategy); Russell, Margaret M., “Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and ‘The Civil Rights Agenda,’” African-American Law and Policy Report 1 (1994), 33Google Scholar (arguing that there are no parallels between the gay-rights movement and the Civil Rights movement and that the use of this analogy alienates African Americans).

37 Kendall, , “Race, Same-Sex Marriage, and White Privilege,” 135Google Scholar.

38 The intersectional approach in legal studies was first analysed by Crenshaw, Kimberle, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 4 (1989), 139Google Scholar.

39 Berlant, Lauren, The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sexuality and Citizenship (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 20Google Scholar.

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41 Complaint filed by GLAD on behalf of Kerrigan, et al. in Kerrigan (August 25, 2004)Google Scholar.

42 Halpern at para. 9 [emphasis added].

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. at para. 12.

45 Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants in Goodridge at 11.

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47 Ibid., 573–74.

48 Warner, Michael, The Trouble with Normal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 143Google Scholar.

49 findlay uses lower-case letters in the spelling of her name.