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Quand l’économie renouvelle le droit : l’exemple de la justification de l’obligation alimentaire envers l’ex-époux en cas de divorce
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 September 2016
Abstract
In the early 1990s, a number of American legal thinkers began to question the justification for retaining a support obligation between former spouses when they divorced, in a society where adultery is no longer penalized in divorce law and women have become more financially autonomous. They found the answers in economic analysis. This article examines the two main approaches that drew the attention of legal writers. The first derives from the economy of the family and is based on the principle of efficiency. The second draws on the economy of contracts and is concerned with the nature of the relationship between the spouses. This attention to economic analysis is novel, from the European standpoint, because we see no evidence of that approach in the European literature dealing with the legal treatment of the economic inequalities between former spouses at the time of divorce.
Résumé
Au tournant des années 1990, un certain nombre de juristes américains se sont interrogés sur les justifications du maintien d’une obligation alimentaire entre ex-époux en cas de divorce, dans une société où l’adultère n’est plus sanctionné par le droit du divorce et où les femmes sont devenues plus autonomes financièrement. C’est dans l’analyse économique qu’ils ont trouvé ces justifications. Cet article revient sur les deux principales approches qui ont retenu l’attention des juristes. La première est issue de l’économie de la famille et repose sur le principe d’efficience. La seconde est tirée de l’économie des contrats et s’intéresse à la nature des relations entre les deux conjoints. Cette attention portée à l’analyse économique est originale du point de vue européen, car l’on ne trouve pas de traces d’une telle démarche dans la doctrine européenne portant sur le traitement juridique des inégalités économiques entre ex-époux au moment du divorce.
Keywords
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 31 , Special Issue 2: Les transferts économiques entre ex-époux à la suite du divorce : logiques alimentaire, compensatoire, indemnitaire? / Financial Transfers Between Spouses on Divorce: Logics of Need, Restitution, or Compensation? , August 2016 , pp. 203 - 217
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association / Association Canadienne Droit et Société 2016
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