1. From an interview with the Honourable A. McEachern, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (now Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia), in (1987) 5 U.B.C. Faculty of Law Newsletter.

2. Douglas, N., How About Europe (London: Chatto and Windus, 1930)Google ScholarPubMed.

3. Halpern, S., “On the Politics and Pathology of Legal Education (or, whatever happened to that blindfolded lady with the scales?),” Journal of Legal Education 32 (1982), 390Google Scholar.

4. Our observations and conclusions are intended to be confined to Canadian common law education only.

5. Some of the lawyers who were chosen were those who were already qualified in England. See Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, “Law and Learning,” Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Hereafter the Arthurs Report), (1983), 12Google Scholar.

6. Baker, G.B., “Legal Education in Upper Canada 1785–1889: The Law Society as Educator,” in Flaherty, (ed.), History of Canadian Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981–1983), vol. 2, 49Google Scholar.

7. Ibid., 55.

8. For a critical account of the covert uses of concepts such as professional ethics and the public interest in the United States see, Auerbach, Jerold, Unequal Justice, Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

9. Correspondence from Archdeacon John Strachan to Lieutenant Governor Peregrine Maitland, 1826, reproduced in Baker, “Legal Education in Upper Canada,” 55. “Lawyer” in all these contexts meant only those of the male gender. Women were prohibited from joining those hallowed ranks.

10. McLaren, J.P.S., “The History of Legal Education in Common Law Canada,” in Matas, R.J. and McCawley, D.J. (eds.), Legal Education in Canada (Montreal: Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 1987), 111Google Scholar.

11. Baker, “Legal Education in Upper Canada.” 91.

12. Ibid., 57. Initially at least this had not been the case. In particular there had been a large number of Irish applicants, who were far from the elite of the society and in many ways still frowned upon.

13. For an excellent description of her courageous fight, see Backhouse, Connie, ““To Open the Way for Others of My Sex”: Clara Brett Martin's Career as Canada's First Woman Lawyer,” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1 (1985), 1Google Scholar.

14. See Woodard, C., “The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective,” Virginia Law Review 54 (1968), 689CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stevens, R., Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850's to the 1980's (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983)Google Scholar. For an account of the influence of the Langdellian faith in the science of law on those responsible for Canadian legal education, see Baker, , “Legal Education in Upper Canada,” 109–111 and Kyer, C.I. and Bickenbach, J.E., The Fiercest Debate: Cecil A. Wright, the Benchers and Legal Education in Ontario 1923–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 31–33Google Scholar.

15. Indeed, a major reorganization of the law society's program in 1889 was prompted by an expression of interest in legal education from the University of Toronto. See Baker, “Legal Education in Upper Canada,” 108. Kyer, and Bickenbach, , The Fiercest Debate, 29–33Google Scholar.

16. Biggar, D.M., “Legal Education Again,” Canadian Bar Review 1 (1923), 863, 865Google Scholar.

17. Arthurs Report, 13. The Dalhousie Law School., begun in 1883, maybe an exception to this statement, conforming more closely to the American model of university legal education. In its early years, however, it may not have presented a strong alternative. It was underfunded and understaffed. Students took only seven hours of lectures per week, and many of these were taught by local practitioners. See McLaren, “The History of Legal Education in Common Law Canada,” 120.

18. Biggar, “Legal Education Again,” 868.

19. Ibid., 871.

20. Cohen, M., “The Condition of Legal Education in Canada,” Canadian Bar Review 28 (1950), 267Google Scholar, who relates that the dispute arose from the desire of the Benchers to keep academic as well as administrative control. For a detailed account of the events surrounding the change see Kyer, and Bickenbach, , The Fiercest DebateGoogle Scholar.

21. Henderson, G.F., “A Problem of Legal Education,” Canadian Bar Review 3 (1925), 371, 374Google Scholar, quoting with approval from Mr. Schumakers' article in Law Notes. It is instructive to compare Max Weber's analysis of the influence of the “status ideology” of lawyers upon legal thought and education in Wroth, G. and Wittich, C. (eds.), Economy and Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

22. Commentators of that time refer to the fact that the profession was criticized in the newpapers of the day as a monopoly. See for example, Steer, G.H., “On Legal Education in Canada,” Canadian Bar Review 25 (1947), 943, 944Google Scholar. There was a general concern among many at the bar that law had the least training and educational requirements of all the professions. To fail to put it on a par with other professions would encourage too many people and of the wrong types into the legal profession. See for example, G.F. Henderson, “A Problem of Legal Education,” 375.

23. Auerbach, , Unequal Justice, 25Google Scholar.

24. G.F. Henderson, “A Problem of Legal Education,” 376. Those who opposed the transfer of legal education into the universities saw it as the road to the “legal profession becoming a narrow monopoly in the hands of a class” in Montgomery, W.S., “The Problems of Legal Education,” Canadian Bar Review 12 (1934), 431–432Google Scholar.

25. Henderson, “A Problem of Legal Education,” 376.

26. Montgomery, “The Problems of Legal Education,” 431.

27. Denison, Shirley, “The Problem of Legal Education,” Canadian Bar Review 2 (1924), 85Google Scholar.

28. Kyer, and Bickenbach, , The Fiercest Debate, 252–253Google Scholar.

29. Rock, , “Motivation and Moderators and the Test Bias,” University of Toledo Law Review 2 (1970), 527Google Scholar.

30. See Hathaway, J., “The Mythical Meritocracy of Law School Admissions,” Journal of Legal Education 34 (1984), 86Google Scholar; Linn, Robert L., “Test Bias and the Prediction of Grades in Law School,” Journal of Legal Education 27 (1975), 293Google Scholar; Purich, Donald J., “Affirmative Action in Canadian Law Schools: The Native Law School,” Saskatchewan Law Review 51 (1987), 79Google Scholar. Even the authors of the test caution against its accuracy when applied for the purposes of determining the potential of “American Indian, Black, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican or other minority students whose educational experience, in and out of school, may have differed significantly from that of the great majority of students.” See Law School Admission Council, Law School Admission Services, Operations Reference Book (Newton, Pennsylvania, 1983)Google Scholar.

31. Ginger, Thomas J., “Affirmative Action: Answer for Law Schools,” Howard Law Journal 28 (1985), 701Google Scholar.

32. Recent studies have indicated that in spite of strong evidence to the contrary, the public is still of the opinion that the Canadian educational system offers equal access. See Livingstone, D.W., Hart, D.J., Davie, L.E., Public Attitudes Towards Education in Ontario 1984 (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1986)Google Scholar.

33. Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 103Google Scholar.

34. Ibid.

35. Weber, M. in Wroth, and Wittich, (eds.), Economy and Society, 952–954Google Scholar.

36. Arthurs Report, 19. See also Anisef, P., Okihiro, N., Losers and Winners: The Pursuit of Equality and Social Justice in Higher Education (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982)Google Scholar. In a survey carried out of the entire graduating year of 1974 in the Ontario law schools it was found that approximately sixty-six percent of the graduates had parents who were professional, managerial or self-employed. See Adam, and Lahey, , “Professional Opportunities: A Survey of the Legal Profession,” Canadian Bar Review 59 (1981), 674Google Scholar.

37. See Trent, William T., “Equity Considerations in Higher Education: Race and Sex Differences in Degree Attainment and Major Field from 1976 through 1981,” American Journal of Education (1984), 280CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38. Anisef, and Okihiro, , Losers and Winners, 69Google Scholar.

39. Ibid. The data for males tell the same, though less dramatic, story and the figures at the law school level would no doubt exceed those at the undergraduate level because costs are exponentially increased.

40. For example, Purich, “Affirmative Action in Canadian Law Schools,” states that there were only sixty Native Indian law students in 1983 whereas the figure should have been 380 if they were statistically representative of the population. There is no data for other ethnic minorities in Canada because law schools do not record the ethnic backgrounds of law students. In the United States the number of minority law students, although substantially increased from 1970, was still only 7.53 percent of the law student population in 1979: see Ginger, “Affirmative Action: Answer for Law Schools,” 701, 702.

41. Adam and Lahey, “Professional Opportunities.”.

42. The Arthurs Report, 20 documents the dramatic increase in numbers from 2,896 in 1962-1963 to 9,351 in 1976-1977. The present student population hovers around 9,500 of which about 2,800 graduate every year.

43. Ibid., 19-20. The probability of increasingly restricted access is borne out by a recent study concentrating on the enrolment patterns of minorities: see Orfield, Gary and Paul, Faith, “Declines in Minority Access: A Tale of Five Cities,” Educational Record 57 (Fall 1987-Winter 1988)Google Scholar.

44. Auerbach, , Unequal JusticeGoogle Scholar.

45. For example Shirley Denison, “The Problem of Legal Education,” 89 commented that he expected law schools to “create a class of lawyers, who by research, study and authorship are equipped for introduction or criticising reforms in a scientific spirit.”

46. McKennirey, J.S., Canadian Law Faculties (1982)Google Scholar, a survey prepared for Arthurs Report. The findings of this survey are discussed by Charles, W.H., “Objectives of Legal Education, in Matas, and McCawley, (eds.), Legal Education in Canada, 186Google Scholar.

47. The survey conducted for the Arthurs Report found that law deans perceived the influence of the profession only at the “formal” level, but suggested that the “informal influence is not perceived, simply because of a coincidence of values and objectives between the faculty and the profession.” Ibid., 42.

48. The core curriculum is examined by Charles, “Objectives of Legal Education,” 193-194.

49. Kennedy, D., “Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy,” Journal of Legal Education 32 (1982), 591, 597Google Scholar.

50. Arthurs Report.

51. . In particular, we are drawing upon Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America.

52. See, for example, S. Halpern, “On the Politics and Pathology of Legal Education”, D. Kennedy, “Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy”; Klare, K., “The Law School Curriculum in the 1980's: What's Left?” Journal of Legal Education 33 (1983), 337Google Scholar; Wilkins, R.K., “The Person You're Supposed to Become: The Politics of the Law School Experience,” University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 33 (1987), 98Google Scholar; Glasbeek, H.J. and Hasson, R.A., “Some Reflections on Canadian Legal Education,” Modern Law Review 50 (1987), 777CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53. Bowles, and Gintis, , Schooling in Capitalist America, 131Google Scholar.

54. O'Brien, M. and McIntyre, S., “Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal Education,” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1 (1986), 69Google Scholar; Boyle, C., “Teaching Law as if Women Really Mattered or, What About the Washrooms?” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1 (1986), 96Google Scholar.

55. See Banks, T.L., “Gender Bias in the Classroom,” Journal of Legal Education 38 (1988), 137Google Scholar; Wildman, S., “The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation,” Journal of Legal Education 38 (1988), 147Google Scholar.

56. See Purich, “Affirmative Action in Canadian Law Schools.” A 1977 Justice Department report concluded: “The more the Native students resembled regular law students, the more likely they were to succeed in law school.” Policy Planning and Development Branch, Department of Justice, Native Law Student Program, An Evaluation Report (Ottawa: 1977), 40Google Scholar.

57. For an extended discussion of this aspect of legal education see Wilkins, “The Person You're Supposed to Become.”

58. Bowles, and Gintis, , Schooling in Capitalist America, 40Google Scholar.

59. Pickard, T., “Experience as Teacher: Discovering the Politics of Law Teaching,” University of Toronto Law Journal 33 (1983), 279, 286CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60. Bowles, and Gintis, , Schooling in Capitalist America, 106Google Scholar.

61. Wilkins, “The Person You're Supposed to Become,” 115.

62. Ibid., 119.

63. Bowles, and Gintis, , Schooling in Capitalist AmericaGoogle Scholar.

64. This has been a perennial concern of law societies. Most recently, see Yachetti, , “Report of the Special Committee on Numbers of Lawyers,” Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 17 (1983), 222Google Scholar. This despite the fact that lawyers in Canada continue to earn about three times the national average income. See, Feldthusen, B., “Are There Too Many Lawyers?” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2 (1982), 224Google Scholar. The numbers debate and the pressure put on law schools by the profession is also discussed by Arthurs, H., Weisman, R. and Zemans, F., “Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism, in Abel, R. and Lewis, P. (eds.), Lawyers in Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, vol. 1, 1988), 123Google Scholar.

65. This survey was conducted by the Law Students' Society under the direction of C. Thorstenson. It was not intended to be a scientifically accurate instrument and has not been fully analysed. We refer to it here for discursive purposes and suppose that it is as good, indeed better, than our more informal observations. The survey is available from the authors on request.

66. Arthurs Report, 70.

67. Ibid.

68. Compare Kennedy, “Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy.”

69. Wilkins, “The Person You're Supposed to Become.” See also the student comments collected in Elkins, J.R., “Rites de Passage: Law Students “Telling Their Lives,”” Journal of Legal Education 35 (1985), 27Google Scholar.

70. Bernstein, R., Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)Google Scholar.

71. Compare C. Woodard's description of the “secularization” and scientization of legal education in “The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective.”

72. For example, Hart's, H.L.A. rules of recognition in The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961)Google Scholar. In law school, these rules are, of course, rules of constitutional pedigree, the doctrine of precedent, stare decisis, rules of statutory interpretation and so on.

73. In particular, we are here drawing upon Bernstein, R., The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976)Google Scholar, Held, D., Introduction to Critical Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1980)Google Scholar, MacIntyre, A., After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)Google Scholar, Unger, R., Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975)Google Scholar. A tentative application of the insights of social theory to the problem of teaching legal ethics can be found in Elkins, J., “Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education,” Journal of Legal Education 32 (1982), 11Google Scholar. For an analysis of the function of these epistemological dichotomies from a feminist perspective see O'Brien and McIntyre, “Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal Education.”

74. Horkeimer, M. and Adorno, T.W., Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), xiiGoogle Scholar.

75. Paradoxically, it was Max Weber who best expressed both the positivist view of knowledge and the ambivalence and anxiety of modernity:

it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.

…

The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and of the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals, which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.

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76. Habermas, J., Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

77. We are not arguing that all law teachers and lawyers are moral sceptics or ethical relativists (though these positions are significantly prevalent) but that the dominant model of legal knowledge serves to exclude normative concerns other than legalist ideals form the definition of legal expertise and threatens to present itself as exhaustive of rational legal knowledge.

78. Indeed, when asked, most law teachers say that their primary objective is to “help students to be more reflective, critical, analytical” (seventy-two percent) and to “help students understand the intellectual/philosophical significance of law” and the “impact of law on society” (forty-six percent). Results of the survey in the McKinerry Report, discussed in Charles, “Objectives of Legal Education.”

79. Ely, J.H., Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 58Google Scholar. Consider, for example, the Introduction to Lempert, R. and Sanders, J., Law and Social Science (New York: Longman, 1986)Google Scholar:

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80. As Duncan Kennedy argues, this latter methodology teaches that the practical world is beyond our control, that existing social arrangements are the inevitable result of necessary social compromises, and that change must be limited to minor reforms that do not interfere significantly with the market. See Kennedy, “Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy.”

81. MacIntyre, , After VirtueGoogle Scholar.

82. Indeed, the most important recommendation of the Arthurs Report, aimed at improving the academic discipline of law, was the proposal to create two separate streams of education. For reasons that should be apparent, we are dubious that the “academic stream” would acquire any significant degree of legitimacy or importance. More important, while not intended by the Report, the further institutionalization of the legalist dichotomy would only accelerate the problems we have sought to elucidate.

83. Weber, M., “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” in Shils, and Finch, , The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 4Google Scholar.

84. Ibid., 9.

85. Weber himself denied the possibility of objective sociological knowledge unfiltered by theory and values, see Trubek, D., “Max Weber's Tragic Modernism and the Study of Law in Society,” Law and Society Review 20 (1986), 573CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

86. See Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Kuhn, T., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970)Google Scholar; Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar. For a general account of these developments and their impact on the social sciences, see Bernstein, R., Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)Google Scholar.

87. The literature is so voluminous that there is no point in extensive citation. However, in researching this paper we have benefitted particularly from Unger, R., Knowledge and PoliticsGoogle Scholar.

88. We are referring to Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978)Google ScholarPubMed, and Law's Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. Few have yet felt the need to answer the feminist critique in any sustained or rigourous manner.

89. Peller, G., “The Metaphysics of American Law,” California Law Review 73 (1985), 1151, 1155CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90. For a full analysis of the impact of market forces on legal scholarship, see Glasbeek, H.J. and Hasson, R.A., “Some Reflections on Canadian Legal Education,” Modern Law Review 50 (1987), 777CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91. Arthurs Report, 32-33. H.J. Glasbeek and R.A. Hasson, “Some Reflections on Canadian Legal Education,” analyse this and other data from the Arthurs Report and arrive at conclusions similar to our own.

92. Halpern, “On the Politics and Pathology of Legal Education,” 387.

93. Shklar, J., Legalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 8Google Scholar.

94. See also Atiyah, P.S. on the inherent conservatism of legal values in Law and Modern Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 86–89Google Scholar.

95. See, for example Attorney General of British Columbia v. Couillard (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 567 (B.C.S.C.) and Re B.C. Government Employees' Union (1985) 48 B.C.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd 48 B.C.L.R. 5 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd 64 B.C.L.R. (B.C.C.A.); aff'd [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214. In Couillard McEachern C.J. enjoined prostitution on the streets of Vancouver. In B.C.G.E.U. he enjoined picketing by courthouse workers during the course of a legal strike. In both cases McEachem C.J. recognized the apparent novelty of the course of action which he was taking but expressed the firm belief that the decisions were fully required by the rule of law and the need for social order. We would point out in the first place that while the need for order and rule of law may be important values, they were far from exhaustive of the values that might have been considered in these cases and only appear to dictate the particular solutions when legalism forecloses all other values. In the second place, it is far from clear that the rule of law did in fact require or support either of these decisions even on narrowly legalistic grounds. Both cases are classic illustrations of the open texture and indeterminacy of law, allowing the widest scope for the exercise of judicial discretion. Yet the competing values are denied a voice through the apparent force of legal logic. Compare for example, A.G. Nova Scotia v. Beaver (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 281 (N.S.C.A.). See Cassels, J., “Prostitution and Public Nuisance: Desperate Measures and the Limits of Civil Adjudication,” Canadian Bar Review 63 (1985), 764Google Scholar.

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97. See Shklar, Legalism. For an excellent discussion of the problematic nature of professional role morality and its political connotations, see the essays in Luban, D. (ed.), The Good Lawyer (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983)Google Scholar.

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99. The Arthurs Report, 137-138, noted that a “profession that lacks a scientific base cannot properly serve either its clientele or an increasingly complex society, cannot maintain a credible claim to its privileges and powers, cannot attract to itself the best minds or employ those minds to best effect.” (italics added).

100. The empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of ideological notions is problematic. Recent studies suggest that although subordinate classes only ambiguously internalize the “dominant ideology” it does exert a considerable influence on the way in which dominant classes view the social world. See, for example, Abercrombie and Turner, “The Dominant Ideology Thesis,” and Mann, M., “The Social Cohesionof Liberal Democracy,” both in Giddens, A. and Held, D. (eds.), Classes, Power and Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)Google Scholar. For non-empirical discussion of attitudes specifically within the law school, see Stone, A., “Legal Education on the Couch,” Harvard Law Review 85 (1971), 392CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

101. Survey conducted by the Law Students' Society.

102. Schlegel, J.H., “Searching for Archimedes–Legal Education, Legal Scholarship and Liberal Ideology,” Journal of Legal Education 34 (1984), 103, 106Google Scholar.

103. Ibid., 106.

104. Ibid., 108.

105. See, for example, the comments of Paul Carrington on the Critical Legal Studies movement in, “Of Law and the River,” Journal of Legal Education 34 (184), 222Google Scholar, and the resulting correspondence in Journal of Legal Education 35 (185)Google Scholar.

106. Lasswell, H. and McDougall, M., “Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest,” Yale Law Journal 53 (1943), 203CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

107. For this type of criticism see Twining, W., “Pericles and the Plumber,” Law Quarterly Review 83 (1967), 396Google Scholar, and Stevens, Law School.

108. Stone, “Legal Education on the Couch,” 395-397, 401.

109. Windsor is the only law school that we are aware of in Canada that is attempting to establish different criteria for admissions. Each individual application file is reviewed by the faculty admissions committee and favourable treatment given to those who have backgrounds of service to the community or other experience which might demonstrate that they could make a significant contribution to the law school (similar procedures may apply at other law schools for “special” admissions categories). Accordingly, people are admitted to the law school who would not have been, had grades and the LSAT remained the sole criteria. Whether this also accounts for the fact that Windsor is the least represented law school in the “elite” Toronto law firms of all the Ontario law schools is something to ponder. See Adam and Lahey, “Professional Opportunities.”

110. See the discussion of part-time legal education in Wilkins, “The Person You're Supposed to Become.”

111. For an overview of the current state of feminist legal scholarship in Canada, see Boyd, Susan B. and Sheehy, Elizabeth, “Canadian Feminist Perspectives on Law,” Journal of Law and Society 13 (1986), 283CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

112. Gilligan, Carol, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

113. Worden, K.C., “Over Shooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education,” American University Law Review 34 (1985), 1141, 1147Google Scholar.

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115. See, for example, Gavigan, Shelly, “Law, Gender and Ideology,” in Bayefsky, A. (ed.), Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988), 283Google Scholar.

116. For a vivid description of just such a course, and of the associated dangers, see Toni Pickard, “Experience as a Teacher.”

117. See Meltsner, and Schrage, , “Report from a CLEPR Colony,” Columbia Law Review 76 (176), 581, 627Google Scholar. For a good description of the Ontario experience see Mossman, Mary Jane, “Community Legal Clinics in Ontario,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice (1983), 375Google Scholar, and for Quebec, Ontario and Saskatchewan see Zemans, F.H., “Legal Aid and Legal Advice in Canada: An Overview of the Last Decade in Quebec, Saskatchewan and Ontario,” Canadian Legal Aid Bulletin 3 (1979), 155Google Scholar.

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119. Savage, Harvey, “Towards Bridging the Gap between Legal Services and Legal Education: Model Projects in Native Communities,” Canadian Community Law Journal 2 (1978), 46Google Scholar.

120. For an analysis of the danger of such efforts see, Mandel, M., “The Rule of Law and the Legalization of Politics in Canada,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 13 (185), 273Google Scholar.

121. Detailed by Nader, R., “Law Schools and Law Firms,” Minnesota Law Review 54 (1970), 493Google Scholar.

122. For example, law firms permitted their associates to spend fifteen percent of their work time on pro bono work; employed full-time pro bono lawyers; and one firm even set up a new office in a slum area to offer legal advice and assistance for free if necessary. See Nader, ibid., 498.

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