^1. Taylor, Charles, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate” in Rosenblum, Nancy L., ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) 78.Google Scholar Habermas organizes his discussion of citizenship around Taylor's two models of citizenship. See Habermas, Jürgens, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992) at 491.Google Scholar

^2. Habermas, ibid. at 493–94.

^3. See Barber's, BenjaminJihad vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine, 1996) at 7Google Scholar for a discussion of the tensions between the “market's universal church” and “retribalized politics of particularist identities.”

^4. Black, Max, “More About Metaphor” in Ortony, Andrew, ed., Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 28.Google ScholarLakoff, George and Turner, Mark call this the “Literal Theory Position.” See Lakoff, George & Turner, Mark, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The preference of the literal over the figurative use of language is evident in Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, Mill and Bentham who call for an austere precision and plainness of language. Hobbes and Locke both argue that metaphor is an abuse of ordinary language and that reason and science are separaate from art and imagination.

^5. See Johnson, Mark, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) at 67.Google Scholar For the objectivist position (Johnson calls this the “literal core” theory), metaphors assert cross-categorical identities that do not exist objectively in reality. Thus, for the objectivist there is no usefulness in metaphor.

^6. See Black, Max, Models and Metaphors (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962) at 44–45.Google Scholar See also Richards, Ivor Armstrong, Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: Oxford University Press, 1936).Google Scholar

^7. “More About Metaphor,” supra note 4 at 29. See also Models and Metaphors, ibid. at 45. Of particular importance to the argument is Black's assertion thet every metaphor is the “tip of a submerged model.”

^8. Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) at 245.Google Scholar

^9. See Lakoff, George & Johnson, Mark, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Lakoff, George, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johnson, Mark, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987)Google Scholar, for the development of an experiential basis for meaning.

^10. Lakoff & Johnson, ibid. at 17, 18, 25.

^11. Image-schemata metaphors can be distinguished from image-metaphors. The latter map one mental image onto another for singular effect, for example in literature. Image-schemata metaphors, on the other hand, provide general structures for thought. See Lakoff & Turner, supra note 4 at 97–99.

^12. Johnson, supra note 9 at xix–xx.

^13. See Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 9 at 117–18; Johnson, ibid. at 104.

^14. See also Hoffman, R. R., Cochran, E. L. & NeAd, J. M., “Cognitive Metaphors in Experimental Psychology” in Leary, David E., ed., Metaphors in the History of Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 173 at 176.Google Scholar See also David E. Leary, “Psyche's Muse: The Role of Metaphor in the History of Psychology” in David E. Leary, ed., ibid., 2 at 26.

^15. Wallerstein, Immanuel, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 185.Google Scholar David J. Elkins argues that nations make three territorial assumptions as the basis of political authority: the nation has exclusive use of its territory; the nation has continuous use of its territory; the nation has contiguous use of its territory. Elkins, David J., Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political Evonomy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 13.Google Scholar

^16. See Wallerstein, ibid. at 189. Will Kymlicka supports Wallerstein's assertion that there is a tension between national and cultural communities. He points out that the vast majority of the world's states are “culturally plural states.” The problem with many liberal theorists (like Rawls and Dworkin) is their use of a simplified model of the state where the political community is co-terminus with the one and only one cultural community. See Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) at 36, 177.Google Scholar

^17. Sedimentation occurs when interpretations become basic metaphors by sinking into the unconscious store of skills and strategies we bring to the activity of interpreting the world around us. This process creates what Alfred Schutz called the “stock of knowledge at hand,” which is the collection of past experience and learning on the basis of which the individual can interpret present experiences and effectively plan a course of action. See Schutz, Alfred, “On Multiple Realities” (1945) 5:4Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 533 at 533–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^18. Smith, Anthony, “Towards a Global Culture” (1990) 7 Theory, Culture & Society 171 at 177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^19. Foucault, Michel, “Questions of Geography” in Gordon, Colin, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980) 63 at 70.Google Scholar

^20. See Castells, Manuel, The Informational City: A New Framework for Social Change (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1991) at 124.Google Scholar

^21. Zukin, Sharon, Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) at 268.Google Scholar

^22. John Jakle argues the relationship between places and images of places. He writes: “What a place subjectively appears to be predisposes behavior, although images must reflect the material world in some logical way to be appropriate as formulations of expectation.” Jakle, John A., “Social Stereotypes and Place Images: People on the Trans-Appalachian Frontier as Viewed by Travelers” in Zonn, Leo, ed., Place Images in Media: Portrayal, Experience, and Meaning (Savage, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1990) at 83.Google Scholar

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^24. Lefèbvre, Henri, The Production of Space, trans. Nicholson-Smith, Donald (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) at 46–48.Google Scholar

^25. Frederick Jackson Turner first made the argument that the frontier was significant to American history. For Turner, an ever-moving frontier, where lands were plentiful led to the westward expansion of America and the dissolution of cultural ties with Europe. See Billington, Ray A., The Genesis of the Frontier Thesis: A Study in Historical Creativity (San Mareno, CA: Huntington Library, 1971)Google Scholar; Bogue, Allan G., Frederick Jackson Turner: Strange Roads Going Down (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).Google Scholar

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^29. Elkins, supra note 15 at 28.

^30. Ibid. at 28–31.

^31. Smith, supra note 18 at 177.

^32. Heilbroner describes the deterritorialization of wealth. He describes the shift from the concept of wealth (a symbol of power and prestige based on a person's property) to the concept of capital (understood as wealth whose value does not adhere in its physical characteristics but in its use to create increasing amounts of capital). The dynamic quality of capital is apparent in its change from comodity to money and back again. See Heilbroner, Robert, Twenty-First Century Capitalism (Concord Ont.: Anansi, 1992) at 27–30.Google Scholar Carey argues that, with the adoption of the telegraph, communication was severed from transportation. As the telegraph became part of the process of conducting business, the shape of business, the shape of business relations began to change. Before the telegraph, business relations were personal. After, the relation between buyers and sellers were mediated through organizations and management stuctures. Carey, James, Communication and Culture: Essays on Media and Society (Boston: Unwin, 1989) at 203–05.Google Scholar

^33. Cairncross, Frances, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997) at 257.Google Scholar

^34. This has not always been the case. Internet communities began as a by-product of sharing work across networks of large computers. The explosion of discussion groups and personal communications that followed the growth of the networks continued until the mid-nineties, when commercial activity was allowed for the first time. It is only since about 1994 that the internet has become a vast, international home-shopping network.

^35. Wicklein, John, quoted in Pavlik, John V. & Dennis, Everette E., eds., Demystifying Media Technology (London: Mayfield, 1993) at 3.Google Scholar

^36. Gore, Al, “A National Vision” (1991) 16:7Byte 188.Google Scholar See also Johnson, David, Getting Canada Online: Understanding the Information Highway (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995).Google Scholar

^37. Gill writes that the hallmark of the postindustrial society is “the accelerating pace and the multi-dimensional nature of information and communication technologies and their penetration in all facets of societies globally.” Gill, Karamjit S., “Knowledge in the Post-Industrial Society” in Gill, K. S., ed., Information Society: New Media, Ethics and Postmodernism (London: Springer, 21996) 3 at 3.Google Scholar For a similar argument, see Lyotard, Jean-François, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minessota Press, 1984).Google Scholar See also Appadurai, Arjun, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global and Cultural Economy” (1990) 2:2Public Culture 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vattimo, Gianni, The End of Modernity, trans. Snyder, Jon R. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).Google Scholar According to sociologist David Lyon, in postmodern society, media become central to culture. He accepts the centrality of information technology and the notion that consumerism has eclipsed the centrality of production. Lyon, David, Postmodernity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) at 7.Google Scholar Similarly, Scott Lash characterizes postmodernism based on the implosion of the cultural and the commercial; the eclipse of the avant-garde; a shift from mass production and consumption to a fragmented service and information economy; a shrunken and fragmented working class; and a fragmentation of opposition into decentralized social movements. Lash, Scott, Sociology of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1990) at 37–38.Google Scholar

^38. Bell, Daniel, The Coming Post-Industrial Society: Forecasting (New York: Colophon, 1976).Google Scholar Bell argues that in the postindustrial society, power will be based on knowledge rather than property and the economy based not on manufacturing but on information processing and services. The new society will be future-oriented and run by technocrats and professional managers. See also Fuller, Buckminster, Critical Path (New York: St. Martin's, 1981)Google Scholar; Toffler, Alvin, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970)Google Scholar; Toffler, Alvin, The Third Wave (New York: Morrow, 1980)Google Scholar; Toffler, Alvin, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth and Values at the end of the 21st Century (New York: Bantam, 1990).Google Scholar

^39. Pacey, Arnold, The Culture of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983) at 2.Google Scholar Harold Lasswell has also arguaed that an effective information and communications system has an important role to play in the creation (a convergence) of social values. Lasswell actually promotes the desirability of a differentiated yet unified global culture supported by media images. See Lasswell, Harold, “Communications in a Divided World” (London: International Broadcast Institute, 1977)Google Scholar; Lasswell, Harold, “future of World Communication and Propaganda” in Lasswell, Harold, Lemer, Daniel & Speine, Hans, eds., Propaganda and Communication in World History, vol. 3 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980) 528.Google Scholar

^40. This view David E. Cooper identifies with the position of Technology as Liberation in which freedom is understood as an active will-to-power and the primary goal of technology is mastery over nature. Properly deployed, technology becomes a utopian force for political freedom (democracy), the participatory democracy of the Agora. Cooper, David E., “Technology: Libration or Enslavement?” in Fellows, Roger, ed., Philosophy and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 10.Google Scholar

^41. Dizard, Wilson, The Coming Information Age (New York: Longman, 1983) at xiii.Google Scholar

^42. This view of technology is what Albert Borgmann calls the substantive view in which technology appears as a force in its own right that shapes societies and values from the ground up. Its proponents are usually anti-technologist like Jacques Ellul or Martin Heidegger. David E. Cooper calls this view “[t]echnology as Enslavement or the Frankenstein thesis.” Technology should control nature but rises against us. See Borgman, Albert, Technology and the Character of Everyday Life: A Philosophical Enquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) c. 2.Google Scholar For example, Lewis Mumford argued that technology is inimical to human development and fulfillment. While Mumford's early work predicted a humane evolution based on an equilibriium between technological and social development, in later workds he saw instead an information-based bureaucracy running a military industrial complex. Mumford, Lewis, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934).Google Scholar For a taste of Mumford's early optimism, see pp. 431–35. For examples of his later pessimism, see The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1970) at 193–99, and The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967). Jacques Ellul made the case that technology is out of control; it proceeds according to a logic that is independent of human needs and concerns. For Ellul, technology is an autonomous and uncontrollable force. Langdon Winner, expanding on Ellul's technological determinism, argues that technology is an autonomous and uncontrollable force. Landgon Winer, expanding on Ellul's technological determinism, argues that technology is not a neutral means of human ends but that it creates an all-encompassing system that imposes its patterns on every aspect of life and thought. Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964).Google Scholar See also Winner, Langdon, Autonomous Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).Google Scholar

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^45. Both are also, according to Bruce Gronbeck, interpretations of life set out purposively by rhetors “who want to control the way we envisage ourselves and the world.” Gronbeck, Bruce E., “Communication Technology, Consciousness, and Culture: Supplementing FM-2030's View of Transhumanity” in Medhurst, Martin J., Gonzalez, Alberto & Peterson, Tarla Rai, eds., Communication and the Culture of Technology (Pullman, Wash.: Washington State University Press, 1990) 14.Google Scholar

^46. Poster's view of postmodernism does not lie far outside the mainstream of American communications theory. For example, Chesebro and Bertelson valorize communications technology in terms similar to the mode of information. For them, the mode of communication (traditionally the channel) offers a perspective for examining the entire communication process. Communication technologies are also types of symbolic action. Technological processes can change power relations, material outsomes, and the human environment. Realignments in these areas create an aesthetic unique and appropriate to it. See Chesebro, James & Bertelsen, Dale A., Analyzing Media: Communication Technologies as Symbolic and Cognitive Systems (New York: Guilford, 1996) at 187.Google Scholar

^47. Michel Foucault develops a disjunctive view of history. For Foucault, history does not unfold in an evolutionary manner but epoch change in radical, unforeseen ways based on “breaks” in the flow of society. Foucault, Michel, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).Google Scholar In another contexte, thomas Kuhn argued that science is based on Paradigm shifts that alter the way we view the world.

^48. Computers can be described, as Sherry Turkle suggests, as evocative objects. Lucy Suchman describes the computer as an interactive artifact with reactive, linguistic and opaque properties. See Turkle, Sherry, The Second Self: Computeres and the Human Spirit (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1984) at 14.Google Scholar See also Suchman, Lucy A., Plans and Situated Action: The Problem of Human Machine Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 7.Google Scholar Laurel defines computers as interactive technology. She suggests that the computer game is the model of human-machine interaction. According to Laurel, early software designers regarded the computer as a machine naturally suited for representing things that one could see, control, and play with. She argues the computer's “interesting potential lay not in its ability to perform calculations but in its capacity to represent in which humans could participate.” See Laurel, Brenda, Computers as Theatre (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1992) at 1.Google Scholar

^49. For contemporary proponents of media ecologies, see Heim, Michael, Electric Language: A Philosophical Study of Word Processing (New Haaven: Yale University Press, 1987).Google Scholar See also Heim, Michael, The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)Google Scholar and Bolter, Jay David, Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991).Google Scholar

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^53. McLuhan, Marshall, Understanding Media (New York: Mentor, 1964).Google Scholar The insight was McLuhan's but has remained part of the discourse of tehcnological development, particularly the development of computers as communications medium.

^54. Industrialism produces technology, “and the cutting of time into fragments suited to the needs of the engineer and the accountant.” Innis, Harold A., The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951) at 134.Google Scholar

^55. Poster, Mark, The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) at 8Google Scholar [hereinafter The Mode of Information].

^56. Poster, Mark, The Second Media Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1995) at 3.Google Scholar

^57. Ibid. at 7–8.

^58. The Mode of Information, supra note 55 at 6. Poster is not alone in characterizing subjectivity in digital communications in post-structuralist terms. For example, Sherry Turkle claims that subjectivity becomes fluid through interaction with technology. Turkle, Sherry, Life on The Screen: Identity in the Age of Internet (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1996) at 15Google Scholar [hereinafter Life on The Screen].

^59. The Second Media Age, supra note 56 at 30.

^60. For a richer excavation of selfhood, see Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

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^62. Jones, Steven G., “Understanding Community in the Information Age” in Jones, Steven G., ed., Cybersociety: Computer-Mediated Communication and Community (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995) 11.Google Scholar

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^64. Ibid. at 31.

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^67. Ibid. at 61.

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^71. Ibid.

^72. Gore, supra note 36 at 189. The information highway also resonated with Gore's own connection to infrastructure projects, since his father, a former Senator, had been the proponent of the American interstate highway system.

^73. See Life on The Screen, supra note 58 and Poster, Mark, “Cyberdemocrary: Internet and the Public Sphere” (1995) 2 Difference Engine.Google Scholar Available at Mark Poster's home page, supra note 61.

^74. Gibson, William, Neuromancer (New York: Ace, 1984).Google Scholar

^75. Benedikt, Michael, ed., Cyberspace: First Steps (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1992) at 1.Google Scholar

^76. McLuhan, Marshall & Fiore, Quentin, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: Bantam, 1968) at 55.Google Scholar McLuhan's view is common in assessments of the social impact of computers. Frederick Williams, for example, compares earlier communications technologies, which extended the range of human messages with the computer and allow us to extend our capability to act upon messages. Williams, Frederick, The Communications Revolution (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982).Google Scholar

^77. Richard C. MacKinnon, “Searching for the Leviathan in Usenet” in Jones, ed., supra note 62, 112 at 114–15.

^78. Ibid. at 120.

^79. Ibid. at 134–35.

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^81. These concepts apear in Levin, Charles, Jean Baudrillard: A Stud in Cultural Metaphysics (London: Prentice-Hall, 1996) at 5, 59, 89, 183.Google Scholar

⁸² Ibid. at 89.

^83. “Cyberdemocracy,” supra note 61.

^84. Falk, supra note 27 at 39. See also Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” (October-November 1994) Boston Review 3. Nussbaum argues that civic education should cultivate a sense of cosmopolitan citizenship since our primary allegiance “is to the community of human beings in the entire world.”

^85. Falk, Richard, Explorations at the End of Time: The Prospects for World Order (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992) at 1.Google Scholar

^86. Ibid. at 16.

^87. Ibid. at 226.

^88. Sandel, Michael J., Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996) at 343.Google Scholar

^89. See also Rocher, Guy, “Les Communautés minoritaires au Canada: Esquisse de la situation (1)” in Kulesar, Kalman & Szabo, Denis, eds., Dual Images: Multiculturalism on Two Sides of the Atlantic (Budapest: Institute for Political Science of The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1996) 85 at 92.Google Scholar