Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2014
The Kingston Immigration Holding Centre (KIHC) is a purpose-built prison for individuals subject to security certificates, located on the grounds of Millhaven Institution in Bath, Ontario. KIHC was created in 2006 in response to controversy over the use of provincial detention facilities for long-term security-certificate detention. While the security-certificate mechanism and its related processes have been the subject of a growing body of critical socio-legal scholarship, the juridico-political space of KIHC has yet to be described or problematized in depth. The present study addresses this gap by providing a detailed account of the history of the facility and an exploration of the interactions within the Canadian insecurity field that shaped its emergence, governing arrangement, and everyday operations. Given the paucity of publicly available official information about KIHC, our study draws extensively on material obtained through requests filed under the federal Access to Information Act. Building on the existing literature, we frame security-certificate detention as a form of normalized exceptionality made possible by counter-law and argue that it conforms to the juridico-political concept of the camp. We then proceed to describe how this particular camp came into being, with an emphasis on the role played by interactions between professionals and institutions within the Canadian security field. The interagency contractual arrangement between the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) that governs KIHC is outlined. We describe this arrangement as the product of the authority to detain indefinitely meeting the capacity to confine pragmatically, under the banner of national security, and consider its implications for CSC's correctional mandate. The KIHC facility emerges as an “ancillary exception,” the institutional reflection of attempts to reform and normalize the security-certificate mechanism. We conclude by making a case for the abolition of KIHC.
Situé sur le site de l'Établissement de Millhaven à Bath en Ontario, le Centre de surveillance de l'immigration de Kingston (CSIK) est une prison spécialement construite pour détenir des individus sujets à des certificats de sécurité. Le CSIK fut créé en 2006 en réponse à la controverse concernant l'utilisation des établissements correctionnels de l'Ontario pour la détention à long-terme des individus en vertu d'un certificat de sécurité. Bien que le mécanisme des certificats de sécurité ainsi que les processus s'y rattachant ont été l'objet de nombreuses critiques académiques sociolégales, l'espace juridico-politique du CSIK n'a, jusqu'à présent, jamais été décrit ou problématisé en profondeur. Cette étude tente de combler cette lacune, d'une part, en présentant en détail l'historique de cet établissement et, d'autre part, en explorant les interactions au sein du champ canadien d'insécurité qui ont façonné l'émergence du CSIK, l'organisation de son administration ainsi que ses opérations quotidiennes. Puisqu'il existe une pénurie d'information officielle à propos du CSIK, notre étude se base sur de nombreux documents obtenus à l'aide de demandes faites en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information. Prenant en compte la littérature existante, nous présentons la détention en vertu de certificats de sécurité comme une contre-loi normalisée, rendue possible de manière exceptionnelle, et avançons l'idée selon laquelle celle-ci est conforme au concept juridico-politique du camp. Nous décrivons comment ce camp particulier est né, tout en mettant un accent particulier sur le rôle qu'ont jouées les interactions entre les professionnels et les institutions au sein du champ canadien d'insécurité. Nous présentons également l'accord interdépartemental contractuel entre le Service correctionnel du Canada (SCC) et l'Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC), c'est-à-dire l'accord à la base de l'administration du CSIK. Nous décrivons cet accord comme étant le résultat de la rencontre de deux pouvoirs, soit l'autorité de détenir infiniment et la capacité de détenir pragmatiquement sous la bannière de la sécurité nationale. Nous considérons les implications de cette rencontre pour le mandat correctionnel du SCC. Le CSIK émerge comme une «exception ancillaire«, c'est-à-dire une tentative institutionnelle de réformer et de normaliser le mécanisme des certificats de sécurité. Nous terminons l'article en argumentant favorablement pour l'abolissement du CSIK.
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17 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA].
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23 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 [Charkaoui #1].
24 An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3 [C-3].
25 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38 [Charkaoui #2].
26 Larsen, Mike, “Security Certificates and Filtered Disclosure: Applying Charkaoui #2”, The Court, 10 October 2008, http://www.thecourt.ca/2008/10/10/security-certificates-and-filtered-disclosure-applying-charkaoui-2/Google Scholar.
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39 Prior to the creation of CBSA, the Enforcement Branch of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) was responsible for coordinating security-certificate detention.
40 Pratt, Securing Borders.
41 Mohamed Mahjoub was arrested on June 26, 2000; Mahmoud Jaballah in August 2001; Hassan Almrei on October 19, 2001; Mohamed Harkat on December 10, 2002; and Adil Charkaoui on May 21, 2003.
42 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The treaty entered into force on June 26, 1987; Canada acceded to it on June 24, 1987.
43 CSC, “Organization” (CSC, 2007), http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/organi-eng.shtml.
44 It should be noted that the s. 16(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, 1992, c. 20, permits “The Minister … with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into an agreement with the government of a province for (a) the confinement in provincial correctional facilities or hospitals in that province of persons sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary; and (b) the confinement in penitentiary of persons sentenced or committed to imprisonment for less than two years for offences under any Act of Parliament or any regulations made thereunder.” An example of this clause in action is the agreement between the government of Canada and the government of Newfoundland and Labrador, which “as a province without a federal penitentiary … is in a unique position as it may elect to house federally sentenced inmates within a provincial facility.” See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, “Minister Meets with Federal Minister Regarding New Penitentiary” (news release, April 3, 2008), http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2008/just/0403n12.htm.
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47 A separate paper needs to be written to adequately explore the politics of the hunger strikes. For the purposes of this discussion, we note only that they were long, serious, and ultimately influential as catalysts for political action. Unfortunately, this action did not conform to the demands to “charge or release” the detainees.
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53 CSC Position Paper, 3.
54 See note 44.
55 As observed by Bigo, “Security.”
56 Ss. 21(1)(a) and (b) of the act, under the heading “Operations of Government: Advice, etc.”, allows the agency in question to refuse to disclose records concerning advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution, or records concerning accounts of deliberations in which members of the government participate.
57 CSC Position Paper, 10.
58 Deputy Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), Memorandum for the Minister: Detention of Individuals Subject to Security Certificates (September 26, 2005), 2, 6 [PSEPC Federal Detention Memorandum]. Obtained through ATI request no. PS-SP A-2008-0023 to Public Safety Canada.
59 PSEPC, Options for Detention of Persons Detained Pursuant to Section 77 of the IRPA—“Security Certificates” Using Government of Canada Controlled or Operated Facilities (undated, presumed late June 2005)Google Scholar. Obtained through ATI request no. PS-SP A-2008-0023 to Public Safety Canada.
60 Ibid., 1.
61 CBSA, Table of Contents for Qs&As for Standing Committee and Follow-Up Questions from the Media (October 25, 2006), Q22 [CBSA Qs&As]. Obtained through ATI request no. A-2007-01287 to CBSA.
62 PSEPC Federal Detention Memorandum, 1.
63 Deputy Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), Memorandum for the Minister: Detention of Individuals Subject to Security Certificates (October 7, 2005), 1. Obtained through ATI request no. PS-SP A-2008-0023 to Public Safety Canada.
64 CBSA, Options for Detention of Persons Detained Pursuant to Section of the IRPA— (“Security Certificates”) Using Government of Canada (Federal) Controlled or Operated Facilities (Draft, July 2005), 6Google Scholar. Obtained through ATI request no. PS-SP A-2008-0023 to Public Safety Canada. Note that the third point was eventually discarded.
65 CBSA Qs&As, Q23.
66 CBSA, Questions and Answers Index: Kingston Immigration Holding Centre (updated April 5, 2006), Q8. Obtained through ATI request no. A-2007-01287 to CBSA.
67 Ibid. (note that while 2006 documents set the projected annual operating cost at $1.6 million, more recent documents show it to be considerably higher).
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91 CBSA, Hassan Almrei.doc (attachment to an e-mail message sent December 10, 2007). Obtained through ATI request no. A-2008-00205 to CBSA.
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100 CBSA, President's Directive PD 566-4: Detainee Counts (March 2006), 2. Obtained through ATI request no. A-2007-01287 to CBSA.
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106 Copies of the KIHC President's Directives and Standing Orders, which span several hundred pages, were obtained through ATI request no. A-2007-01287 to CBSA.
107 Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Report, 20.
108 Zedner, “Pre-crime.”
109 CCRA at s. 167(1).
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