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Dual Legal systems and the Basic Structure Doctrine or Constitutions: The Case of India

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Andreas Buss
Andreas Buss
Affiliation:
1248 Maitland Avenue, Ottawa (Ontario) Canada K2C 2C6, abussO43 @uottawa.ca
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Abstract

India's Constitution of 1950 was, on the whole, a creation of the Western spirit, superimposed on a society and a culture with a complex traditional legal system. But constitutions are more than simply legal texts which can be adopted at will; they are also means of cultural self-portrayal and mirrors of cultural heritage. This is illustrated here by an analysis of the tortuous history of the Basic Structure Doctrine in India's constitutional discussions. Although this doctrine, developed by Carl Schmitt during the time of the Weimar Republic in Germany, was introduced to India by the Supreme Court in order to reduce the flood of constitutional amendments, it soon underwent major reinterpretations and later referred to overarching principles of the Constitution. In this way the Constitution became permeable to some of the surviving traditional legal concepts of India. An appendix provides a comparison with the unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. In contrast to the Indian situation, the Canadian unwritten principles have no superlegal status and the written constitutional rules take precedence over them. Any constitutional amendment realized according to the prescribed procedure is legal, and no higher principle would provide legal continuity.

Résumé

La constitution indienne de 1950 était dans l'ensemble une création de l'esprit occidental, surimposée à une société héritière d'un système légal traditionnel complexe. Mais les constitutions sont plus que de simples textes légaux, elles sont aussi des portraits ou des miroirs d'un héritage culturel. Ce fait est illustré ici par l'analyse de l'histoire tortueuse de la doctrine des principes structurants dans le contexte constitutionnel indien. Bien que cette doctrine, élaborée par Carl Schmitt à l'époque de Weimar en Allemagne, ait été introduite en Inde par la Cour Suprême pour réduire la marée des amendements constitutionnels, elle a bientôt subi des réinterprétations majeures, et plus tard elle réfère à des principes englobants de la constitution. Par ce truchement la constitution a été rendue perméable à des concepts légaux traditionnels qui survivent toujours. Un appendice fournit une comparaison avec les principes non écrits de la constitution canadienne. À la différence de la situation en Inde, les principes non écrits canadiens n'ont aucune ‘superlégalité’ par rapport au texte écrit de la constitution. Des amendements constitutionnels, réalisés conformément à la procédure prescrite, sont légaux, et aucun principe supérieur ne peut assurer la continuité légale.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , August 2004 , pp. 23 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2004

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