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Theoretical Underpinning of Intellectual Property: “I am a Pragmatist But Theory is my Rhetoric”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2015
Extract
This article emanates from a Symposium hosted by Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson and sponsored by the University of Western Ontario Law School and Centre for Innovation Law and Policy. The Symposium and the resulting articles aim to explore the theoretical dimensions of intellectual property law. This article argues, in contrast to the learned scholarship of my co-panellist, that theorising about intellectual property law is an innately political act that implements a pragmatic moment fueled by economic, social and cultural factors.
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- Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2003
References
This article was part of a symposium, “Intellectual Property—Theoretical Underpinnings or Pure Pragmatism?”, co-hosted by the Ontario Center for Innovation Law and Policy and the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, February 10, 2003, in London, Ontario. Thanks to Professors Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Mark Perry, Graeme Austin and Adam Moore for their assistance.
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8. On the notion of tradition, consider the following statement from the Eldred decision. “But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary”: Justice Ginsburg delivering the Opinion of the Court in which Rehnquist CJ and O”Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas JJ joined, in Eldred v. Ashcroft 123 S. Ct. 769, 790; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 751, para. 61 (2003).
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10. See also: Fitzgerald, Anne, Intellectual Property Law 2nd ed. (Sydney, AU: Law Book Company, 2002) at 7–9 Google Scholar; Hughes, Justin, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 Georgetown L. J. 287 Google Scholar; Merges, Robert, Menell, Peter, Lemley, Mark, & Jorde, Thomas, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 2nd ed. (Aspen, NY: Aspen Publishers, 2000)Google Scholar at 121.
11. See for example: Landes, William & Posner, Richard, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762) at 83; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 at 42932 (1984); Netanel, Neil “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society” (1996) 106 Yale L.J. 283.Google Scholar
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15. Goldstein, Paul, Copyright’s Highway: from Gutenberg to the celestial jukebox (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994 Google Scholar) ch. 5.
16. 347 U.S. 201 at 209 (1954). See also Sony Corp. of ‘America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S 417 at 429-32 (1984).
17. For recent writings critical of the presumption that IP law is always economically beneficial see: Benkler, Yochai, “Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain” (1999) 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 Google Scholar at 400ff; Boyle, James, “Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property” (2000) 53 Vander. L. Rev. 2007 Google Scholar. http://jamesboyle.com/; Cohen, Julie, “‘Copyright and the Perfect Curve’” (2000) 53 Vander. L. Rev. 1799 Google Scholar http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jec/publications.html
18. Vaver, David, Intellectual Property Law: copyright, patents, trade-marks (Concord, ON: Irwin Law, 1997) at 613 Google Scholar; Fewer, David, “Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Ex Pression and the Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 U.T.Fac. L. Rev. 175 Google Scholar at 187-93; Ricketson, Sam & Richardson, Megan, Intellectual Property: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Sydney, AU: Butterworths, 1998) at 818 Google Scholar; Welcome RealTime SA v. Catuity Inc. [2001] FCA 445 at para. 129; Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd. v. Telstra Corporation Limited[2002] FCAFC 112.
19. On the application of this theory to Canadian intellectual property law see: David Fewer, ibid. at 187-89, 191-93. Interestingly, the European Union in their Fundamental Charter of Rights adopted on 7 December 2000 at Nice provides in art. 17 (2): “Intellectual Property shall be protected.”
20. CCH Canadian Limited v. The Law Society of Upper Canada [2002] 4 FC. 213.
21. Desktop Marketing, supra note 18.
22. Reichman, Jerome H. & Samuelson, Pamela, “Intellectual Property Rights in Data?” (1997) 50 Vander. L. Rev. 51; International News Service v. Associated Press 248 Google Scholar U.S. 215 (1918); National Basketball Association v. Motorola Inc. 105 F. 3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997); Board of’Trade v. Dow Jones 456 N.E. 2d 84 (1983); Gordon, Wendy “On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse “ (1992) 78 Google Scholar Virginia L. Rev. 149.
23. Fitzgerald, Brian & Gamertsfelder, Leif, “Protecting Informational Products through Unjust Enrichment Law” (1998)Google Scholar Eur. Intel. Prop. Rev. 244; Matarese v. MooreMcCormack Lines Inc. 158 F 2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1946); Bristol v. Equitable Life Insurance Society of’US 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506. (N.Y.C.A.).
24. The European Court of Justice in Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v.E.C. Commission (Magill Case) [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718 at para. 71 explains: “The Court of First Instance is right, … in stating that the essential function of copyright is to protect the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for creative effort.” See also: Art. 27 (2) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12. On moral rights in the common law world see: Millar, supra note 12 at 252-53; Gerald Dworkin, “Moral Rights and the Common Law Tradition” (1994) Aus. Intel. Prop. J. 5.
25. For example see s 195 AWA Copyright Act 1968 (Australia): s. 195 AWA Author’s consent to act or omission—work that is not a film or included in a film
(1) This section applies to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work other than such a work as included in a cinematograph film.
(2) It is not an infringement of a moral right of an author in respect of a work to do, or omit to do, something if the act or omission is within the scope of a written consent genuinely given by the author or a person representing the author.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a consent does not have any effect unless it is given:
(a) in relation to specified acts or omissions, or specified classes or types of acts or omissions, whether occurring before or after the consent is given; and
(b) in relation to either of the following:
(i) a specified work or specified works existing when the consent is given; or (ii) a specified work, or works of a particular description, the making of which has not begun or that is or are in the course of being made.
(4) A consent may be given by an employee for the benefit of his or her employer in relation to all or any acts or omissions (whether occurring before or after the consent is given) and in relation to all works made or to be made by the employee in the course of his or her employment.
(5) A consent given for the benefit of the owner or prospective owner of copyright in the work or works to which it relates is presumed, unless the contrary intention appears in the consent instrument, to extend to his or her licensees and successors in title, and to any persons who are authorised by the owner or prospective owner, or by such a licensee or successor in title, to do acts comprised in the copyright.
26. Vaver, supra note 18 at 8796.
27. At the federal level see Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 USC 106A. A concise summary of the scope of moral rights in US law is found in Carter v. HelmsleySpear Inc. 71 F. 3d. 77 (2nd Cir. 1995).
28. For an argument suggesting moral rights should have limited application in the eclectic transnational and digitised world of the Internet see: Fisher, William, “Property and Contract on the Internet” (1998) 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1203 Google Scholar available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/AcademicAffairs/coursepages/tfisher/
29. On this notion, see Mackaay, Ejan, “The Economics of Emergent Property Rights on the Internet” in The Future of Copyright in the Digital Environment, ed. by Bernt Hugenholtz, P. (The Hague , NL: Kluwer, 1996) 13 Google Scholar; Hal Varian, “Versioning Information Goods” http://www.sims. berkeley.edu/hal/people/hal/papers.html; Heller, Michael “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets” (1998) 111 Google Scholar Harv. L. Rev. 621 ; Cohen, Felix, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Samuelson, Pamela & Opsahl, Kurt, “Licensing Information in the Global Information MarketFreedom of Contract Meets Public Policy” (1999)Google Scholar Euro. Intel. Prop. Rev. 387; Lester Thurow “Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights” (1997) 95 Harv. Bus. Rev.; Stewart, Thomas A., Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organisations (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell, 1997)Google Scholar; Lange, David D., “Recognising The Public Domain” (1981) 44 (Autumn) Law & Contemp. Prob. 147 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gold, Richard E., Body Parts: Proprietary Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological Materials (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996).Google Scholar
30. See further: Fitzgerald, Brian, “Software as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property in Digital Architecture” (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 337 Google Scholar.
31. A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc. 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000). See further Brian Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, Anne, Cyberlaw: Laws Relating to the Internet, Digital Intellectual Property and ECommerce (Sydney, AU: Lexis Nexis/Butterworths, 2002)Google Scholar at ch. 12.
32. Ibid. at 1018-19.
33. Ibid.
34. A&M Records v. Napster Inc., supra note 31 at 1020-22.
35. Ibid. at 1022.
36. Sony Corp. of America, supra note 16.
37. Ibid. at 1020-21.
38. Ibid. at 1023.
39. Ibid. at 1023-24.
40. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has since denied Napster’s application for en banc review.
41. MetroGoldwynMayer (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Kazaa Case) 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 865.
42. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Also cited as (1991) I.P.R. 129.
43. (1997) 3D 296 (F.C.A.) [official cite: [1998] 2 F.C. 22 (F.C.A.)]
44. Supra note 20.
45. [2002] F.C.A. F.C. 112. [Cited in Aus. L. Rev. as [2002] 192 A.L.R. 433.]
46. Ibid. “25 The primary data that is used to produce DtMS” products is taken from Telstra”s white pages directories and yellow pages directories. A Sydney company, Dependable Database Data Pty Ltd., sends every white pages directory and yellow pages directory to the Philippines where a large team types (the technical term is key punches) all the listings into a computer. The information is changed in various respects. For example, abbreviations are expanded (Rd to Road), the name of the State is included, and the information is formatted so that it may easily be read by a computer. The information is then provided to DtMS in electronic form, usually as a computer disk.
26 The information is loaded onto the computer system maintained by DtMS. There is some cursory validation of the data, but not to any significant extent. Then information is added, such as the appropriate industry code, number of employees, facsimile number and Ausdoc DX number. The information is updated if errors are identified, or if there is a “do not contact” attached to a particular name”: [2001] FCA 612.
47. See Moore this issue at pp. 209ff
48. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 22.
49. Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
50. See Brian Fitzgerald & Leif Gamertsfelder, supra note 23; Matarese, supra note 23; Bristol v. Equitable Life Insurance Society of US 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506.(N.Y.C.A.).
51. On these concepts see www.gnu.org; www.opensource.org; D. Bollier, “The Power of Openness: Why Citizens, Education, Government and Business Should Care About the Coming Revolution in OpenSource Code Software” http://eon.law.harvard.edu/opencode/h2o/#intro; McGowan, David “Legal Implications of OpenSource Software” (2001)Google Scholar U. Ill. L. Rev. 241; McJohn, Stephen M., “The Paradoxes of Free Software” (2000) 9 Google Scholar Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25; Maher, Marcus, “Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative Intellectual Property Incentive Paradigm” (2000) 10 Fordham I. P., Media & Ent. L.J. 619 Google Scholar; Brian Fitzgerald & Graham Bassett, “Legal Issues Relating to Free and Open Source Software” J. L. & Info. Science, forthcoming.
52. On this notion see Fitzgerald, Brian, “Intellectual Property Rights in Digital Architecture (including Software): The Question of Digital Diversity?” (2001)Google Scholar Euro. Intel. Prop. Rev. 121.
53. Eric S.Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar at http://www.tuxedo.org/esr/writings/cathe-dralbazaar
54. Scott McBride, M., “Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Protection” 2002 17 Google Scholar Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1331; European Comm., Managing IPR in a Knowledge-based economy—Bioinformatics and the influence of public policy (Brussels: November 2001). This information is found on http://www.cordis.lu/life/src/pub_qol.htm
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