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The Migrating Spirit of the Secession Reference in Southeastern Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Zoran Oklopcic
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Extract

Apart from examining the use of the Secession Reference in three post-Yugoslav, Southeastern European countries, this article also suggests that there is a different, more general reading of the Secession Reference that could have been deployed in Southeastern Europe. Before discussing what I call the ‘spirit of the Secession Reference’, I examine an important preliminary question: what could justify the migration of such a general constitutional idea? I argue that existing justifications for the use of comparative jurisprudence are either inadequate or need to be qualified before we can make an argument that the spirit of the Reference can indeed migrate. I then turn to outlining the components of the Secession Reference’s spirit. My argument is that the Secession Reference should be approached not only as a set of particular arguments and interpretive strategies, but also as embodying a distinct way of dealing with deep national diversity. To me, the spirit of the Secession Reference comprises four components: First, it embraces radical political projects as legitimate. Second, it establishes that all contentious political issues are subject to principled negotiations. Third, in doing so, it downplays the dominant contemporary vocabulary of popular sovereignty and self-determination. Fourth, as a result of the previous three components, the spirit of the Secession Reference simultaneously respects and deflates radical nationalist mobilization.

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Research Article
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Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , July 2011 , pp. 347 - 376
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Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2011 

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References

I am indebted to Helena Kolozetti, Rueban Balasubramaniam, Martin Hevia, Alex Schwartz and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. I also thank Alanda McLean of this Journal for her excellent editorial assistance.

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98. Secession Reference, supra note 1 at para 66.

99. Ibid.

100. At this point one can only speculate whether this duty is inseparable from the source of the secessionist demand: the province. From the Reference it appears that only a federal unit can expect its demands to be met in good faith. Imagine a situation; say in 2095, where territorially contiguous ridings in British Columbia with a Chinese majority demand secession from Canada. Could a Canadian constitutional order ‘remain indifferent’ contra the Supreme Court’s statement at para 63 of the Reference?

101. Secession Reference, supra note 1 at para 96. Mancini, Susanna, “Rethinking the boundaries of democratic secession: Liberalism, nationalism, and the right of minorities to self-determination” (2008) 6: 3-4 Int J Const L at 571 Google Scholar.

102. Secession Reference, supra note 1 at para 96.

103. This raises an interesting question, which I am not going to pursue here: what would be the normative basis for the claims of these minorities to remain in Canada? If we derived the legitimacy of their claim to choose their political status (Québécois or Canadian) from the principle of democracy, then the question becomes why not allow the same right to other territorially concentrated minorities irrespectively of their status as a federal unit. For the example, see the discussion supra note 100.

104. Secession Reference, supra note 1 at para 85.

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108. Partial Decision, supra note 6 at para 57.

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111. Partial Decision, supra note 6 at para 31.

112. Technically, the judgment in the Partial Decision could have been made without invoking the Secession Reference. See “Concurring Opinion of Judge Dr Hans Danelius” at 39-42 in Partial Decision, supra note 6.

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115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. The federal government would probably point not only to Serbia and Montenegro, but also to the secession of Southern Sudan where the majority requirement was set to 60% of those voting.

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120. Dion, Stéphane, “What does Kosovo mean for Quebec?”, The Mark (12 August 2010)Google Scholar online: http://www.themarknews.com/articles/2023-what-does-kosovo-mean-for-quebec.