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Kant on International Law and Armed Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2015

Brian Orend
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In recent years, there has been tremendous interest in the contributions of the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant to on-going debates about the appropriate nature of international justice and law. The end of the Cold War, for example, seemed to bring with it promises of greater international cooperation of the kind envisaged by Kant. Furthermore, those interested in the more explicitly moral aspects and potentialities of international law, such as those regarding human rights protection, have looked to Kant for comfort and inspiration in the face of strong pressures from doctrines dismissive of such aspects, such as law-and-economics and the statist strictures of realpolitik.

There has, however, been widespread scholarly disagreement over Kant’s precise heritage in this regard: some, for instance, have found in Kant’s international writings a harbinger of world government while others have criticized Kant for faihng to specify any concrete powers for his fabled cosmopolitan federation; some have accused Kant of sacrificing his exalted moral principles on the dubious altar of state-centred expediency while others dismiss Kant as one of the most naively optimistic, and hopelessly moralistic, international thinkers ever; and, finally, some have accused Kant of glorifying the resort to warfare while others insist that Kant actually advocated “an extreme pacifism.” There is, in short, a ferocious and complex debate regarding which set of ideas can properly be called the “Kantian” view of these foremost issues of international law and what, if any, value can be attached to it.

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Research Article
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Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , July 1998 , pp. 329 - 381
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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References

1. See W.M. Reisman, “International Law After the Cold War” (1990) 84 Am J. Int’l L. 859; and A-M. Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda” (1993) 87 Am J. Int’l L. 205. There has also been enormous interest recently in Kant’s descriptive philosophy of history, wherein the attainment of perpetual peace is somehow seen as the inevitable end of the historical process. This interest was launched by the brilliantly provocative, and enormously controversial, scholarship of Michael Doyle. Doyle has argued that Kant, more than any other person or doctrine, correctly predicted the course of international relations—especially the “peace among liberal democratic states”—in the Western world during the last 200 years and counting. This article shall not engage these descriptive issues or empirical claims; the focus, rather, is entirely on the normative side of Kant’s internationalism. For more information about the empirical debate, consult the following sources: M. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I” (1983) 12 Phil. & Publ. Affairs 204, “Part II.” (1983) 12 Phil. & Publ. Affairs 323; M. Brown et al., eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); J. Rawls, “Law of Peoples” in S. Shute & S. Hurley, eds., On Human Rights (New York: Basic, 1993) 40; C. Lynch, “Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law” (1994) 18 Ethics & Int’l Affairs 39; and W.L. Huntley, “Kant’s Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace” (1996) 40 Int’l Stud. Q 45.

2. For a list of those who think that Kant’s writings mark a harbinger of world government, see W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) at 9n. Examples of those who criticize Kant for failing to specify needed powers for his federation are T. Carson, “Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have Said” (1988) 14 Soc. Theory & Practice 173], and J. Bourke, “Kant’s Doctrine of ‘Perpetual Peace’” (1942) Philosophy 324. D. Meyers accuses Kant of being a realist in “Kant’s Liberal Alliance: A Permanent Peace?” in K. Kipnis & D. Meyers, eds., Political Realism and International Morality (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987) 212. For those who think Kant a naive moralist, see any work by a prominent realist, or neo-realist, such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan or Kenneth Waltz. Kant’s cryptic remarks about war being needed to advance culture are referred to in J. Chanteur, From War to Peace, trans. S. Weisz (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992) at 180–215. Finally, Kant is labelled an “extreme pacifist” by F. Tesón in his “The Kantian Theory of International Law” (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 53 at 90.

3. For more on the inauguration and scope of these Tribunals, see W.M. Reisman & C. Antoniou, eds., The Laws of War: A comprehensive collection of primary documents on international laws governing armed conflict (New York: Vintage, 1994) at 386–406.

4. I. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. Ellington, in Ethical Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1993) 20 [hereinafter Groundwork] (para. 408).] When citing Kant, every effort shall be made to provide the page number from the English translation plus the paragraph (para.) number from the standard Prussian academy edition of the works of Kant: G. Martin, ed., Kants Gesammelte Schriften: Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968).

5. Kant, Groundwork, supra note 4; I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1963); I. Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. P. Cams with J. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1977); I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1993), passim; and I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans, and ed., Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) [hereinafter Metaphysics]. See also T. Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice” (1988) Kant-Stud. 408 [hereinafter “Justice”]; and R. Velkley, “The Crisis of the End of Reason in Kant’s Philosophy and the Remarks of 1764–5” in R. Beiner & W.J. Booth, eds., Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993) 76; J. Rawls, “Themes of Kant’s Moral Philosophy” in Beiner & Booth, eds., ibid. 291 [hereinafter “Themes”].]

6. See also E. Weinrib, “Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason” (1987) 87 Colum. L. Rev. 472.

7. Groundwork, supra note 4 at 28–40 (paras. 420–32); “Themes”, supra note 5 at 291–319; and T. Pogge, “The Categorical Imperative” in O. Hoffe, ed., Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Vittori Klostermann: Frankfurt/Main, 1989) 172 [hereinafter “Imperative”].

8. The “at bottom” quote is at Groundwork, supra note 4 at 41 (para. 436). The five formulations of the CI, with their textual locations, are as follows:

1) The Formula of Universal Law: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” (Groundwork, supra note 4 at 30 (para. 421)).

2) The Formula of die Law of Nature: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.” (Groundwork, supra note 4 at 30 (para. 421)).

3) The Formula of the End-in-Itself : “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of anomer, always at me same time as an end and never simply as a means.” (Groundwork, supra note 4 at 36 (para. 429)).

4) The Formula of Autonomy: “Act under the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law.” (Groundwork, supra note 4 at 38 (para. 431)).

5) The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: The kingdom of ends refers to Kant’s postulate of an ideal ethical commonwealth wherein all beings legislate for themselves in harmony with all others in accordance with the ideal of treating all as ends and not as mere means. We are also to act in accord with such a conception. (Groundwork, supra note 4 at 36–41 (paras. 429–36)).

9. O. O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: An Exploration of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) passim; C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) passim; C. Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Universal Law” (1985) 66 Pac. Phil. Q. 24; C. Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity” (1986) Kant-Stud. 183; and T. Pogge, “Imperative” supra note 7 at 172–93. See also H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) and L.W. Beck, “Kant’s Two Conceptions of the Will in Their Political Context” in Beiner and Booth, eds., supra note 5 at 38.

10. Groundwork, supra note 4 at 26 (para. 416).

11. D. Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

12. For these criteria, I have relied partially on Frances Kamm’s astute characterization of non-con-sequentialism, in her elegant article: “Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself and the Significance of Status” (1992) 20 Phil. & Publ. Affairs 354.

13. Ibid.

14. Metaphysics, supra note 5 at 24 (paras. 230–1).

15. T. Pogge, “Justice” supra note 5 at 408–33. See also A. Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) at 80–115; L. Mulholland, Kant’s System of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) at 140–54; P. Benson, “External Freedom According to Kant” (1987) 87 Colum. L Rev. 559; and R. Pippin, “On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Rechtslehre” in R. Kennington, ed., The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1985) 107.

16. I. Kant, The Doctrine of Right, Part I of Metaphysics, supra note 5 at 90 (para. 312) [hereinafter Right.]

17. Rosen, supra note 15 passim. See also “Justice” supra note 5 at 408–33; and J. Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism” (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1535.

18. Right, supra note 5 at 23–6 (paras. 229–34).

19. Right, supra note 5 at 23–35, 44–5 (paras. 229–45, 256–57).

20. Right, supra note 5 at 45–86 (paras. 257–308).

21. The “foremost issue” quote is from I. Kant, Theory and Practice in T. Humphrey, ed., Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. T. Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1983) 78 (para. 298) [hereinafter Theory and Practice]. The other quotes are from I. Kant, Perpetual Peace in Humphrey ed., ibid, at 114 (para. 353) in the note.

22. Right, supra note 5 at 23–26,45–86 (paras. 229–33, 255–307). See also Mulholland, supra note 15; S. Shell, The Rights of Reason (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1980); M. Gregor, “Kant on ‘Natural Rights’” in Beiner & Booth eds., supra note 5 at 50; and M. Gregor, “Kant’s Theory of Property” (1988) 41 Rev. of Metaphysics 757.

23. Right, supra note 5 at 23–26, 45–86 (paras. 229–33, 255–307).

24. Right, supra note 5 at 90–5 (paras. 313–16).

25. Ibid.

26. Theory and Practice, supra note 21 at 83–4 (para. 305). See also: “Justice”, supra note 5 at 408–33; Rosen, supra note 15; Mulholland, supra note 15; Shell, supra note 22; P. Riley, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983); H. Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); W. Kersting, “Politics, Freedom and Order: Kant’s Political Philosophy” in P. Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 342; O. O’Neill, “Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise” in H. Williams, ed., Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1992) 50; and for a different perspective on Kant’s domestic theory of justice see H. Van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

27. I. Kant, Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, trans. H. Nisbet in H. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 47 (para. 24) [hereinafter Universal].

28. Examples of such praise can be found at Gallie, supra note 2 at 13–14; and Tesón, supra note 2 at 53–54.

29. The first quote is from I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans. H. Nisbet in H. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 94 (para. 344) [hereinafter Perpetual]. The second quote is from I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Part One: The Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Right, trans. H. Nisbet in H. Reiss, ed., ibid. at 140 (para. 316). As can now be seen, two translations of the Rechtslehre are here being used, for wider consideration and a more balanced and fuller effect: the Gregor (supra note 5) and the Nisbet-Reiss (this note). In future notes, specification will always be made which version is being employed, using short forms G and N-R, respectively. The third quote is at Right, N-R at 165 (para. 343). The fourth quote is at Kant, Right, N-R at 168 (para. 347).

30. Right, G supra note 5 at 16 (para. 223).

31. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 165, 168 (paras. 343, 347).

32. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 164 (para. 343).

33. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1992) at 51–74 and H. Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Another discussion of Kant’s doctrine of the moral personhood of states is: S. Byrd, “The State as a ‘Moral Person’” in H. Robinson, ed., Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, vol.1 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1995) 171.

34. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 105–8 (paras. 358–61). By “hospitality”, Kant refers to a kind of freedom of movement and interaction, especially to the allowance by states for commercial contracts to be forged between their various citizens.

35. Right, G supra note 5 at 105 (para. 332).

36. The first quote is at I. Kant, On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’ in H. Reiss, ed., supra note 29 at 91 (para. 312) [hereinafter On the Common Saying]. The second quote is from Right, N-R supra note 29 at 163–64 (para. 343). The third quote is from Right, N-R supra note 29 at 164 (para. 344).

37. War as “scourge” in I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. Greene and H. Hudson (New York: Harper, 196) at 29 in the note [hereinafter Religion]. War as “the greatest evil” in I. Kant, Speculative Beginning of Human History in T. Humphrey, ed., Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. T. Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1983) at 58 (para. 121) [hereinafter Speculative]. War as the “source of all evils” is from On the Common Saying, supra note 36 at 91 (para. 312). The other references are all from I. Kant, The Contest of Faculties, in H. Reiss, ed., supra note 29 at 183, 187, 189.

38. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 174 (para. 354).

39. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 174 (para. 354).

40. “Justice”, supra note 5 at 428.

41. Gallie lists such people at Gallie, supra note 2 at 9.

42. Universal, supra note 27 at 49 (para. 26).

43. The “world-republic” quotes are at Kant, Religion, supra note 37 at 30. The other quote is from On the Common Saying, supra note 36 at 92 (para. 312).

44. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 102 (para. 354).

45. Ibid, at 105 (para. 357).

46. “Justice”, supra note 5 at 427–33 and Carson, supra note 2 at 173–214.

47. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 173 (para. 353).

48. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 104 (paras. 355–56).

49. “Justice”, supra note 5 at 427–33.

50. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 118 (para. 373) in the note.

51. This reading is also supported by Riley, supra note 26 at 114–34; Williams, supra note 26 at 244–69; and L. Mulholland, “Kant on War and International Justice” (1987) 78 Kant-Stud. 25 [hereinafter “War”] and Mulholland, supra note 15 at 348–72. On the public use of reason, see O. O’Neill, “The Public Use of Reason” (1986) 14 Pol. Theory 523.

52. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 102 (para. 354).

53. Speculative, supra note 37 at 55–7 (para. 118–20).

54. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 113–4 (para. 367).

55. Ibid, at 103, 114 (paras. 354, 357).

56. Both Pogge and Carson do an excellent job summarizing the relevant arguments here: See “Justice”, supra note 5 at 427–33 and Carson, supra note 2 at 176–79.

57. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 105 (para. 357).

58. Ibid, at 104 (para. 356).

59. Ibid, at 104–5 (para. 356).

60. Ibid, at 104 (para. 356).

61. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 174–5 (para. 355). This contention, that by “federalism” Kant does not envision or advocate an actual federal structure between nation-states, finds support in: Mulholland, supra note 51 at 25–41 and Mulholland, supra note 15 at 348–72; Riley, supra note 26 at 114–34; Gallie, supra note 2 at 3–36 and F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963) at 62–79. Thus, I find one of the most frequently offered criticisms of Kant’s international theory, namely that he fails to specify the institutional details of his posited federation, to be misplaced. This popular criticism can be found, for example, Bourke, supra note 2 at 324–33. See also I. Ward, “Kant and the Transnational Order: Towards a European Community Jurisprudence” (1995) 8 Ratio Juris 315.

62. H. Williams, “Judgements on War: A Response” in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, vol. 1, part 3, supra note 33, 1385 at 1393; Tesón, supra note 2 at 90; G. Geismann, “World Peace” Rational Idea and Reality: On the Principles of Kant’s Political Philosophy” in H. Oberer, ed., Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik (Germany: Konigshausen und Neumann, 1996) at 286; Gallie, supra note 2 at 19–20.

63. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 103 (para. 355).

64. Ibid, at 105 (para. 356).

65. Supra note 37.

66. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 95 (para. 345).

67. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 174 (para. 354).

68. Tesón, supra note 29 at 90.

69. Not all scholars deny that Kant has a just war theory, or something approximating it. The works of Leslie Mulholland (e.g., “Kant on War” supra note 51) and Thomas Mertens (e.g., “War and International Order in Kant’s Legal Thought” (1995) 8 Ratio Juris 296) seem much more congenial in this regard. They both anticipate versions of some of the claims which follow.

70. Prominent classical realists often mentioned include Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. More contemporary realists include Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger, as well as so-called neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane. Notable realist tracts include Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1973), Kennan’s Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954) and Waltz’s Man, The State and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). See also R. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and S. Forde, “Classical Realism” in T. Nardin & D. Mapel, eds., Traditions in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 62; and J. Donnelly, “Twentieth Century Realism” in Nardin & Mapel, eds., ibid. 85.

71. It should be stressed that the following only captures some important distinctions and then only to a certain degree. Mapping out all logically possible kinds of realism is simply beyond the ambit of this work; indeed, it would be easy to lose oneself in such a task. So I have limited myself to those kinds most commonly found in the realist literature and which seem most relevant in terms of alternatives to just war theory. I am indebted to Christian Barry, David Johnston and Thomas Pogge for helpful discussions on this point.

72. Morgenthau, supra note 70 at 9.

73. C. von Clausewitz, On War, trans. A. Rapoport (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1994).

74. Walzer, supra note 33 at 3–20.

75. Perhaps it ought to be explained briefly why the strong/weak distinction is appealed to, in both DR and PR, in this way. Why not use, for example, the distinction between “should” and “may” as indicative of the strong/weak distinction? The reason is that such a distinction, in terms of war, seems less apt than one which contrasts a purely self-regarding policy with one whose terms depend on the behaviour of the other. Given the highly interactive nature of warfare, this latter seemed to be a most interesting conception of the strong/weak distinction.

76. J. McMahan, “Realism, Morality and War” in T. Nardin, ed., The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) 78.

77. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 102–03 (para. 355).

78. The first quote is from Perpetual, supra note 29 at 123–4 (paras. 378–79); the second is from ibid, at 124 (para. 380).

79. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 122–5 (paras. 374–76).

80. Ibid, at 116 (para. 370).

81. On the Common Saying, supra note 36 at 92 (para. 312).

82. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 116–20 (paras. 370–86).

83. Ibid, at 123 (para. 378).

84. I am indebted to Thomas Pogge and Jonathan Neufeld for emphasizing this point.

85. See, for example, W.V. O’Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger, 1981) and R. Phillips, War and Justice (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).

86. J. Teichman, Pacifism and the Just War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

87. The two most sophisticated defences of pacifism in the recent English literature are: R. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); and, indirectly, R. Norman, Ethics, Killing and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also J. Narveson, “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis” in R. Wasserstrom, ed., War and Morality (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970) 63; and G.E.M. Anscombe, “War and Murder”, ibid, at 42

88. Quotes are from Right, N-R supra note 29 at 164–65, 167 (paras. 344, 346)

89. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 95 (para. 345).

90. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 167 (para. 346).

91. Right, G supra note 5 at 26–8 (paras. 235–36); and T. Hill, Jr., “Making exceptions without abandoning the principle: or how a Kantian might think about terrorism” in R.G. Frey & C.W. Morris, eds., Violence, Terrorism and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 196. This issue of justification versus excuse will become relevant when we consider shortly Kant’s response to a pacifist’s challenge.

92. Right, G supra note 5 at 105 (para. 331).

93. The first quote is at Right, G supra note 5 at 105 (para. 332) and the second is at 107 (para. 334).

94. Right, G supra note 5 at 108 (para. 335).

95. Hill, supra note 91 at 196–204.

96. Ibid, at 204–16.

97. Ibid, at 201–12.

98. Ibid. For a different perspective on this matter, see S. Fleischacker, “Kant’s Theory of Punishment” in H. Williams, ed., Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1992)191.

99. Right, N-R, supra note 29 at 167 (para. 346).

100. P. Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994) 86–110.

101. Contemporary re-statements of traditional just war theory can be found in Walzer, supra note 33; Holmes, supra note 87 at 114–82; Christopher, supra note 100; O’Brien, supra note 85; J.B. Elshtain, ed., Just War Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); R. Wasserstrom, ed., War and Morality (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970); R. Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996); J.T. Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984); and P. Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968).

In terms of the actual figures and corpus of the Just War Tradition, notables include Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, Vattel and Vitoria. The best historical studies of this corpus are at J.T. Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) and J.T. Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). For the primary documents themselves, see St. Augustine, Basic Writings (New York: Random House, 1948); St. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica (London: Washbourne, 1912–22), II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q 64, AA. 6, 7; and the following from J.B. Scott, ed., Classics of International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925): H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres; E. Vattel, The Law of Nations; F. Vitoria, De Indis et De Jure Belli Reflectiones; and F. Suarez, De triplici virtute theologica (De caritate, disputatio 13).

102. Ibid.

103. I owe this emphasis, and the phrase, to Thomas Pogge. It should be noted that some members of the Just War Tradition did indeed deal with some of the issues contained in jus post bellum. However, none did to the same width or depth as Kant; for all practical purposes, we can count Kant as the founder of jus post bellum as a separate category of just war analysis.

104. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 167 (para. 346).

105. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 96 (paras. 346–47).

106. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 166–67 (paras. 345–46).

107. Ibid, at 167 (para. 346).

108. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 102–5 (paras. 356–57).

109. See “Imperative”, supra note 7 and “Justice” supra note 5, for more on the residual indeterminacy of the CI and the UPJ.

110. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 168–70 (paras. 347–48).

111. This powerful pacifist contention is most compellingly stated in Holmes, supra note 87 at 183–213.

112. ‘Terrorism”, supra note 91 at 220–4 and Walzer, supra note 33 at 152–59,277–83. Aquinas, apparently, is the first one to have devised the DDE. It should be noted that most contemporary formulations of the DDE include at least a third criterion: that the goodness of the good effect G be at least proportional to the badness of the bad effect B. But, since Kant eschews any appeal to proportionality, he does not avail himself of this third criterion.

113. ‘Terrorism”, supra note 91 at 220–24. The passage referred to is in I. Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns in Groundwork, supra note 4 at 63–68 (paras. 425–30).

114. Hannah Arendt is (in)famous for ridiculing much of Kant’s later political theory as the product of senility, in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Obviously, a large part of this section of the article has been devoted to demonstrating the falsity of her belief in this regard. There is much of great value in the later work. At the same time, there is just no denying that there are particular moments—even very important moments, such as this one—where there seems little other reason for Kant’s neglect and sloppiness than his deteriorating condition.

115. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 96–97 (paras. 346–47).

116. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 168–69 (para. 347).

117. Ibid, at 170–71 (para. 349).

118. Ibid, at 168 (para. 347).

119. Ibid, at 169–71 (paras. 348–49).

120. Ibid, at 170 (paras. 348–49).

121. Perpetual, supra note 29 at 93–108 (paras. 343–60).

122. Right, N-R supra note 29 at 167–68 (para. 346).

123. These rival doctrines range from (strong) realism to various forms of recent post-modern approaches to legal thought in general and international law in particular.

124. See T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Amongst Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) for an example of an utterly non-normative approach to international law. Note in particular his appendix, devoted to arguing why justice should not be the concern of international law. A related account can be found in T. Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

125. For more on the current laws of war, see the following: Reisman & Antoniou, eds., supra note 3; G. Best, War and Law since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); I. Detter Delupis, The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); M. Howard, ed., The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); and H. Lauterpacht, International Law, Vols. 3 and 4: The Law of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977–78).

126. See for example, Reisman & Antoniou, eds., supra note 3. An illustrative set of articles would be 30–41 of the Hague Convention (IV).

127. In my article “Jus Post Bellum”, forthcoming in the J. of Soc. Phil. There I contend that any cessation of hostilities must involve the fulfilment of the following elements: JPB 1) just cause for termination (namely, that the rights which were violated have been vindicated and the aggressor’s gains rolled back); JPB 2) right intention (the victor must construct a peace treaty solely with the intent of appropriate rights-vindication); JPB 3) proper authority and public declaration of the terms of the peace; JPB 4) discrimination (any terms of the peace, such as punishment of the aggressor, have to discriminate between those elites in aggressor most responsible for the aggression and the civilian population, which still retains its rights); and JPB 5) proportionality (the terms of the peace must be proportional to the just end of rights-vindication). In general, rights are to be vindicated but not, so to speak, in a vindictive fashion. The current body of law surrounding the cessation of hostilities, I contend in this article, ought to be reformed so as to include these important principles and perhaps others. I close by applying these principles to a real-world case, namely, the termination phase of the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

128. J.J. Rousseau, Emile, trans. A. Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1978) at 472.