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In Defence of the Common Law Constitution: Unwritten Rights as Fundamental Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2015
Extract
Alan Brudner’s closely-argued, richly-textured and wide-ranging work, Constitutional Goods, provides a striking and original account of the rule of law and its implications for legitimate government. Since the rule of law includes the enforcement of substantive principles ofjustice, it requires a clear separation of powers between court and legislature. The role of the court is chiefly confined to pure practical reason, determining what the public reason of the liberal consti-tution requires. It is the role of the legislative assembly to give its assent to governmental measures that apply the principles ofjustice to empirical circumstances, where the scope for reasonable disagreement provokes a transition from natural law to political judgment. Judicial review carries no anti-democratic implications because it defends the conceptual boundaries of popular decision-making: ‘Democracy is not defeated but protected if the court invalidates a law no free person could impose on himself, for the majority has no more authority to pass such a law than an autocrat nor any jurisdiction to decide by fiat a question to which there is a correct legal answer.’
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References
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3. Ibid. at 131.
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5. Ibid. at 244.
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11. Ibid. at ix.
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15. Ibid. at 66.
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21. Ibid. at 77.
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23. Ibid. at 69.
24. Ibid.
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26. Ibid. at 142-43.
27. Ibid. at 143.
28. Ibid.
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45. Ibid.
46. Brudner objects to the distinction I have made between the conscientious inciter and someone who counsels disobedience for personal gain (Constitutional Justice, supra note 9 at 107): he objects that motive is irrelevant since both inciters threaten to displace an objective order by a subjective will and hence the dissolution of Law’s rule: Constitutional Goods, supra note 1 at 117, n.12. When we insist on compliance with the conditions of Law’s rule, objectively determined, however, we can distinguish between what is in substance an appeal to Law, correctly understood, and incitement of admitted law-breaking (for personal gain) on the other.
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48. Ibid.
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55. ex parte Simms, supra note 52.
56. See R. v. A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45.
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