1. William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) at 153.

2. See e.g. Council of Australian Law Deans, “Statement on the Nature of Legal Research” (2005), online (pdf): Council of Australian Law Deans cald.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/cald-statement-on-the-nature-of-legal-research-20051.pdf,cited in Terry Hutchinson, “Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury” in Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burton, eds, Research Methods in Law, 2d ed (Routledge, 2017) 8 at 16.

3. See e.g. Thomas S Ulen, “A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law” (2002) 4 U Ill L Rev 875.

4. This criticism somewhat ironically extends from both practitioners and critics; see e.g. David M Trubek, “Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism” (1984) 36:1 Stan L Rev 575.

5. For a broad survey of the realism(s) that are connected to this movement, see Mark C Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, “Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism” (2010) 6 Annual Rev L & Soc Science 555.

6. See Brian Leiter, “Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,” in Jules Coleman, ed, Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to ‘The Concept of Law’ (Oxford University Press, 2001) 355 and its Scandinavian variant, Jakob vH Holtermann, “Getting Real or Staying Positive: Legal Realism(s), Legal Positivism and the Prospects of Naturalism in Jurisprudence” (2015) 29:4 Ratio Juris 535

7. See Jörg Kammerhofer, “International Legal Positivist Research Methods” in Rossana Deplano & Nicholas Tsagourias, eds, Research Methods in International Law: A Handbook (Edward Elgar, 2020) 95.

8. See e.g. Mathias M Siems & Daithí Mac Síthigh, “Mapping Legal Research” (2012) 71:3 Cambridge LJ 651; Robert C Ellickson, “Trends in Legal Research: A Statistical Study,” (2000) 29:S1 J Leg Stud 517.

9. Geoffrey Samuel, “Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative Law” (2008) 67:2 Cambridge LJ 288. See also Christopher McCrudden, “Legal Research and the Social Sciences” (2006) 122 Law Q Rev 632; Geoffrey Samuel, “Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?” (2009) 36:4 JL & Soc’y 431.

10. Anthony Bradney, “Law as a Parasitic Discipline” (1998) 25:1 JL & Soc’y 71.

11. See William Twining et al, “The Role of Academics in the Legal System” in Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2005) 920.

12. See Jason NE Varuhas, “Mapping Doctrinal Methods” in Paul Daly & Joe Tomlinson, eds, Researching Public Law in Common Law Systems (Edward Elgar, 2023) 70.

13. See Fiona Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (Hart, 2004).

14. See Christian Boulanger, “The Comparative Sociology of Legal Doctrine: Thoughts on a Research Program,” (2020) 21:7 German LJ 1362.

15. See Liz Fisher, “Craft Matters: Seven Tips for Legal Scholars” (2023) 35:1 J Envtl L 11.

16. See Joshua Neoh, “Text, Doctrine and Tradition in Law and Religion” (2013) 2:1 Oxford JL & Religion 175.

17. Although it is often recognized to share core elements, which have been relatively stable for about a century. See Susan Bartie, “The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship” (2010) 30:3 LS 345.

18. See e.g. Mátyás Bódig, Legal Doctrinal Scholarship: Legal Theory and the Inner Workings of a Doctrinal Discipline (Edward Elgar, 2021); Jan M Smits, “What is Legal Doctrine?: On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research” in Rob van Gestel, Hans-W Micklitz & Edward L Rubin, eds, Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 207; Robert Post, “Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law” (1992) 63 U Colo L Rev 615.

19. See Pauline C Westerman, “Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the Debate on Law” in Mark van Hoecke, ed, Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart, 2011) 87.

20. These include, for instance, interventions from judges, academic articles, and sub-disciplinal theorizing. See e.g. Lord Burrows, “Judges and Academics, and the Endless Road to Unattainable Perfection” (The Lionel Cohen Annual Lecture Series delivered remotely, 25 October 2021), online (pdf): The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom www.supremecourt.uk/docs/lionel-cohen-lecture-2021-lord-burrows.pdf); Geoffrey Samuel, “What is the Role of a Legal Academic? A response to Lord Burrows,” (2022) 3:2 Amicus Curiae (2d) 305; Jane Stapleton, Three Essays on Torts (Oxford University Press, 2021).

21. These discussions tend to track the debate on the role of evaluative judgments in jurisprudence. See e.g. Julie Dickson, “Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical Survey” (2004) 10:3 Leg Theory 117.

22. Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton University Press, 1949) at 190.

23. See Anne Orford, “Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law” (2014) 25:2 Eur J Intl L 369.

24. From a more critical perspective, see especially Christopher Tomlins, “Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative” (2000) 34:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 911.

25. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press, 1986). See more generally Nicos Stavropoulos, “Legal Interpretivism” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021), online: plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/law-interpretivist/.

26. See especially Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press, 1984) at ch I.4; Michael Martin, Verstehen: The Uses of Understanding in Social Science (Routledge, 2000).

27. The ‘explanation’ vs. ‘understanding’ debate has a longer and broader history; see Habermas, supra note 26 at 108ff.

28. In a strong sense (for example, for Dilthey) verstehen means reliving the subjective experience of an agent. We use verstehen here in the weaker sense that implies reconstructing their actions; see Habermas, supra note 26.

29. See Edward W Gimbel, “Interpretation and Objectivity: A Gadamerian Reevaluation of Max Weber’s Social Science” (2016) 69:1 Political Research Q 72; Habermas, supra note 26 at 191-92. Habermas distinguishes “Weber-the-methodologist” from “Weber-the-sociologist” ( ibid at 191). This is Habermas’ way of explaining the tension in Weber’s approach to verstehen, between objectivity and interpretation, to which Gimbel also points.

30. This observation was already made by Kelsen: see Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967); Martin P Golding, “Kelsen and the Concept of a ‘Legal System’” (1961) 47:3 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 355.

31. Habermas emphasizes that: “The interpreter [e.g., a legal scholar] would not have understood what a ‘reason’ is if he did not reconstruct it with its claim to provide grounds.… The description of reasons demands eo ipso an evaluation.… One can understand reasons only to the extent one understands why they are or are not sound, or why in a given case a decision as to whether reasons are good or bad is not (yet) possible [i.e., withholding judgment].” Habermas, supra note 26 at 115-16 [emphasis removed].

32. Ibid at 192 [emphasis in original].

33. For an exposition of what Hart meant by this see Scott J Shapiro, “What Is the Internal Point of View?” (2006) 75:3 Fordham L Rev 1157.

34. Rational reconstruction as a method dates back to antiquity, and has taken on different connotations in light of contemporary understandings of what ‘science’ is. See Golding, supra note 30. See also Bódig, supra note 18 at 235-37; Matthias Goldmann, “Principles in International Law as Rational Reconstructions. A Taxonomy” (13 November 2013), online (pdf): Social Science Research Network papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442027.

35. Stavropoulos, supra note 25 at §1 [emphasis removed].

36. On the nature of verstehen in social sciences, see especially Martin, supra note 26. Cf Dworkin, supra note 25 and his import of Gadamer’s and Habermas hermeneutics into his theory, which has been rightly criticized for not appreciating the full scope of law’s hermeneutic capacity as a cultural system; see Francis J Mootz III, “Interpretation” in Austin Sarat, Matthew Anderson & Cathrine O Frank, eds, Law and the Humanities: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 339.

37. See Varuhas, supra note 12.

38. Jørgen Pedersen, “Habermas’ Method: Rational Reconstruction” (2008) 38:4 Philosophy Soc Science 457 at 458.

39. On the distinctions between interpretivism (method) and hermeneutics (ontology), see Thomas A Schwandt, “Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretivism, hermeneutics, and social constructivism” in Norman K Denzin & Yvonna S Lincoln, eds, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2d ed (Sage, 2000) 189 at 195.

40. See Josef Bleicher, Contemporary hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as method, philosophy and critique (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) on the distinctions between the different kinds of hermeneutics used in scholarly practice.

41. See e.g. Francis J Mootz III, ed, Gadamer and Law (Routledge, 2016).

42. Andreas Paulus, Book Review of International Law Situated: An Analysis of the Lawyer’s Stance towards Culture, History and Community by Outi Korhonen, (2001) 12:5 Eur J Intl L 1027 at 1027 [emphasis added; footnotes omitted].

43. For an instructive analysis of this, see Dworkin’s discussion of conversational (Hermes) vs. constructive (Hercules) interpretation in Dworkin, supra note 25 at ch 2.

44. See Donatella di Cesare, “Hermeneutics and Deconstruction” in Niall Keane & Chris Lawn, eds, The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics (Wiley, 2016) 471 at 472.

45. See especially Stanley L Paulson “The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law” (1992) 12:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 311.

46. See Norman Blaikie, Approaches to Social Enquiry: Advancing Knowledge, 2d ed (Polity, 2007) at 123.

47. Cristina Lafont, “Heidegger’s hermeneutics” in Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard, eds, Law’s Hermeneutics: Other Investigations (Routledge, 2017) 11 at 11.

48. Ibid at 12.

49. Davide Nicolini, Practice Theory, Work, and Organization: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 35.

50. See Jon Nixon, Hans-Georg Gadamer: The Hermeneutical Imagination (Springer, 2017) at 44.

51. See Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s interest for legal hermeneutics” in Glanert & Girard, supra note 47, 48 at 54.

52. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G Marshall (Bloomsbury, 2013) at 319.

53. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Classical and Philosophical Hermeneutics” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings, ed & translated by Richard E Palmer (Northwestern University Press, 2007) 44 at 59-60 [footnote omitted].

54. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection” in Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed & translated by David E Linge (University of California Press, 1976) 18 at 25.

55. Francis J Mootz III, “A Future Foretold: Neo-Aristotelian Praise of Postmodern Legal Theory” (2003) 68:3 Brook L Rev 683 at 696, citing Hans-Georg Gadamer, Praise of Theory, translated by Chris Dawson (Yale University Press, 1998) at 31.

56. Gadamer, supra note 52 at 333.

57. In the strong sense, without theory, there is no room for practical judgment; see e.g. Walter A Brogan, “Gadamer’s Praise of Theory: Aristotle’s Friend and the Reciprocity Between Theory and Practice” (2002) 32:1 Research in Phenomenology 141.

58. See generally Twining et al, supra note 11.

59. See Edward Rubin, “Seduction, Integration and Conceptual Frameworks: The Influence of Legal Scholarship on Judges” (2010) 29:1 UQLJ 101. There is also a classic study by Merryman showing how US courts cite scholarship: see John Henry Merryman, “The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950” (1954) 6:4 Stan L Rev 613.

60. See Neil Duxbury, Jurists and Judges: An Essay on Influence (Bloomsbury, 2001).

61. On the French tradition doctrinal scholarship, see especially Philippe Jestaz & Christophe Jamin, La Doctrine (Dalloz, 2004).

62. See Stefan Vogenauer, “An Empire of Light? II: Learning and Lawmaking in Germany Today” (2006) 26:4 Oxford J Leg Stud 627.

63. For an exposition of the similarities of the science of the common and civil law, see Alexander Somek, The Legal Relation: Legal Theory After Legal Positivism (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 57-78. For broad surveys on the distinctions between these cultures, see e.g. Rob van Gestel, Hans-W Micklitz & Edward L Rubin, eds, Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Rob van Gestel & Andreas Lienhard, eds, Evaluating Academic Legal Research in Europe: The Advantage of Lagging Behind (Edward Elgar, 2019).

64. For a historical overview, see RC van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal History (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

65. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, XV UNCIO 355 at art 38(1)(d).

66. For a recent affirmation of this doctrine, see Charles C Jalloh, “Subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law” in Report of the International Law Commission, 72nd session (26 April-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2021), UNGAOR, 76th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/76/10 (2021) 186 at §§V-VII.

67. Sandesh Sivakumaran, “The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law” (2017) 66:1 ICLQ 1 at 1.

68. See e.g. Manfred Lachs, The Teacher of International Law: Teachings and Teaching, 2d ed (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 159ff, 216.

69. See David Hughes & Yahli Shereshevsky, “State Academic Lawmaking” (2023) 64:2 Harv Intl LJ 253.

70. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Beyond States and Non-State Actors: The Role of State-Empowered Entities in the Making and Shaping of International Law” (2017) 55:2 Colum J Transnat’l L 343.

71. Sondre Torp Helmersen, “Scholarly-Judicial Dialogue in International Law” (2017) 16:3 Law & Prac Intl Cts & Trib 464 at 464.

72. Penelope Jane Ridings, “The Influence of Scholarship on the Shaping and Making of the Law of the Sea” (2023) 38:1 Intl J Mar & Coast L 11 at 11.

73. See William Hamilton Byrne, “The influence of legal scholars on the development of international investment law” (2024) 27:2 J Int Econ Law 1, on the methodological problems for identifying this widespread influence. Cf Sondre Torp Helmersen, The Application of Teachings by the International Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2021) (finding only limited uses on the basis of a citation analysis alone).

74. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 74.

75. See Australia Act 1986 (Cth), 1985/142; Australia Act 1986 (UK), c 2. See also Sonali Walpola, “After the Australia Acts: the High Court’s attitude to changing the common law (1987-2016)” (2021) 21:1 OUCLJ 31.

76. Career legal academics only began to emerge in Australia in the 1960s: see e.g. Susan Bartie, “A Full Day’s Work: A Study of Australia’s First Legal Scholarly Community” (2010) 29:1 UQLJ 67.

77. For a review of the literature, see Rachel Klesch, Guzyal Hill & David Price, “The Academy and the Courts: Citation Practices” (2023) 42:1 UQLJ 103.

78. Russell Smyth, “Other than ‘Accepted Sources of Law’?: A Quantitative Study of Secondary Source Citations in the High Court” (1999) 22:1 UNSWLJ 19 at 29.

79. Ibid at 42.

80. Michael Chesterman & David Weisbrot, “Legal Scholarship in Australia” (1987) 50:6 Mod L Rev 709 at 709.

81. See Francis A Trindade, “Towards an Australian Law of Torts” (1993) 23:1 UWA L Rev 74.

82. [1966] HCA 40.

83. See ibid at paras 11, 14, 22, McTiernan J.

84. See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren, [1967] UKPCHCA 2.

85. [1976] HCA 65.

86. See ibid at paras 17 (Mason J), 50 (Stephen J).

87. See Walpola, supra note 75.

88. [1994] HCA 13 [Burnie Port Authority].

89. (1866), LR 1 Ex 265.

90. Burnie Port Authority, supra note 88 at para 29.

91. [1995] HCA 65.

92. Ibid at para 36, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey & Gaudron JJ.

93. On tort law, see especially Harold Luntz, “Torts Turnaround Downunder” (2001) 1:1 OUCLJ 95.

94. [1996] HCA 37.

95. See ibid at nn 86-89 and accompanying text, Toohey, McHugh, Gummow & Kirby JJ.

96. [1998] HCA 3.

97. See ibid at para 186ff. See especially ibid at n 296.

98. [1998] HCA 5.

99. Ibid at para 85, Kirby J.

100. [2001] HCA 18.

101. See ibid at paras 100-168.

102. [2003] HCA 38 [Cattanach].

103. See ibid at paras 6, 34, citing William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Bk I (Clarendon, 1765) at 125, 441.

104. See Cattanach, supra note 102 at paras 78, 114-20.

105. See ibid at paras 227-28.

106. [2006] HCA 15.

107. See e.g. ibid at paras 257-62, 274-77.

108. See ibid at para 274, citing John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon, 1980) at 178-79.

109. See e.g. Cole v Sth Tweed Heads Rugby Club (2004), 217 CLR 469 (HCA) (on the liability imposed on a server of alcohol); Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery, [2007] HCA 6 (on whether the public roads authority could be deemed an independent contractor).

110. See The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, “Harold Luntz: Doyen of the Australian Law of Torts” (2003) 27:3 Melbourne UL Rev 635.

111. John Gava, “Law Reviews: Good for Judges, Bad for Law Schools?” (2002) 26:3 Melbourne UL Rev 560 at 560.

112. Russell Smyth & Ingrid Nielsen, “The Citation Practices of the High Court of Australia, 1905-2015” (2019) 47:4 Federal L Rev 655 at 675.

113. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force on 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute]; Joseph Powderly, “The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretative Judicial Function: Reflections on Sources of Law and Interpretative Technique” in Carsten Stahn, ed, The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 2015) 444.

114. Indeed, its crimes against humanity jurisprudence is often regarded as more conservative in this context: see e.g. Leila Nadya Sadat, “Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age” (2013) 107:2 Am J Intl L 334.

115. See e.g. Nora Stappert, “A New Influence of Legal Scholars? The Use of Academic Writings at International Criminal Courts and Tribunals” (2018) 31:4 Leiden J Intl L 963; Stewart Manley, “Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court” (2016) 27:1 Eur J Intl L 191.

116. See Neha Jain, “Teachings of Publicists and the Reinvention of the Sources Doctrine in International Criminal Law,” in Kevin Jon Heller et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2020) 106.

117. Rome Statute, supra note 113 at art 7(1).

118. See ibid at art 7(2), art 9: Elements of Crimes.

119. See Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges (Public redacted) (30 September 2008) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I), online (pdf): International Criminal Court www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF. [Katanga]

120. See Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press, 2005) at 225, para 656.

121. Katanga, supra note 119 at para 395.

122. See Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Public) (15 June 2009) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II), online (pdf): International Criminal Court www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2009_04528.PDF [Gombo].

123. See Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, 2d ed (Nomos, 2008).

124. Gombo, supra note 122 at para 81.

125. Ibid at para 88, citing Werle, supra note 120 at ch 4.

126. Gombo, supra note 122 at para 83.

127. Ibid at para 151.

128. Rome Statute, supra note 113 at art 7(2).

129. See William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press, 2010).

130. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Public) (31 March 2010) at para 90 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II), online (pdf): International Criminal Court www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2010_02409.PDF.

131. See ibid . The Court cited a large body of scholarship in support of this in the same paragraph.

132. Ibid at para 90.

133. Ibid at para 51-53, Hans-Peter Kaul J, dissenting

134. See e.g. Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute (Public) (7 March 2014) at para 1800 (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II), online (pdf): International Criminal Court www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Public) (21 March 2016) at para 160 (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber III), online (pdf): International Criminal Court www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF. [

135. See Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal (Public redacted) (5 April 2016), Olga Herrera Carbuccia J (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber V(a)), online (pdf): International Criminal Court www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.PDF. [Ruto].

136. See Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 3d ed (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 355.

137. Carsten Stahn, A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 56.

138. Gleider I Hernández argues similarly: “International law, given its multifaceted and diffuse law-creating methods and its relative lack of normative hierarchy, is the archetype of a relatively indeterminate system leaving much room for contestation.” Gleider I Hernández, “The Activist Academic in International Legal Scholarship” (16 December 2013) at 3, online (pdf): European Society of International Law esil-sedi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Hernandez-ESIL-Reflections.pdf.

139. For Habermas, this is a move between facticity and normativity, while for Luhmann, it is a process of structural coupling. See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg (MIT Press, 1996) at 198; Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Oxford University Press, 2004).

140. See Habermas, supra note 26.

141. Ibid at 191-92 [first emphasis added, second emphasis in original].

142. See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Polity Press, 1984) at 284.

143. Ibid at 331.

144. We refer here to ‘immanent critique’ as a flexible notion rather than that exclusively associated with the Frankfurt school. On the relationship between doctrine and critique as conceived in critical theory and critical legal studies, see further William Hamilton Byrne, “Is Critique Part of the Practice of International Law?” (2024) 12:1 London Rev Intl L 65.

145. Compare the long debate on whether law really is a social science (which often relies on a rather binary view of what science is, and the role of norms within it). See generally supra note 9.

146. Anne Peters, “Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour” (2013) 24:2 Eur J Intl L 533 at 543. Peters contends that legal practice provides the ‘reality check’ for international legal scholars.

147. On the broader lineage of Aristotelian notions of praxis here, see Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).

148. See further Nicholas Davey, “A Hermeneutics of Practice: Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Epistemology of Participation” [2015] J Applied Hermeneutics, online (pdf): University of Calgary journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/jah/article/view/53266/pdf (excavating this from Gadamer).

149. See further Jack Mendelson, “The Habermas-Gadamer Debate” (1979) 18 New German Critique 44.

150. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, translated by Jeremy J Shapiro (Beacon Press, 1971) at 211.

151. See Maren Hofius, “Towards a ‘theory of the gap’: Addressing the relationship between practice and theory” (2020) 9:1 Global Constitutionalism 169.

152. Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc JD Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Polity Press, 1992) at 69.