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Carl Schmitt on Sovereignty and Constituent Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2015

Renato Cristi
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Extract

Schmitt's Verfassungslehre stands as perhaps the most systematic and least circumstantial of his works. While his production is marked, on the whole, by an extraordinary sensitivity toward his own concrete situation, leading at one point to an unbounded and shameless opportunism, this particular work seems to rise above the political fray, reflecting possibly the mood of 1928, which marks the halcyon days of the Weimar republic. Recently, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde has tried to shake off the Verfassungslehre from its composed academic bearing by relating its argument to the polemical friend/enemy theory developed by Schmitt in his Der Begriff des Politischen (1927) and Schmitt's characterization of the state as the political unity of a nation. Beyond this, Böckenförde has connected the Verfassungslehre to the eminently partisan notion of sovereignty put forth by Schmitt in his Politische Theologie (1922), where he flaunts his allegiance to the Catholic counterrevolution.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 10 , Issue 1: CARL SCHMITT , January 1997 , pp. 189 - 201
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1997

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References

1. Schmitt, Carl, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität (Munich & Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922) at 20.Google Scholar

2. Ibid. at 20. See Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, “Der Begriff des Politischen als Schlüssel zum Staatsrechtlichen Werk Carl Schmitts” in Quaritsch, Helmut, ed., Complexio Oppositorum. Über Carl Schmitt (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988) at 287.Google Scholar

3. Ibid. at 83. See Schmitt, Carl, Die Diktatur. Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf (Munich & Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1928) at 23.Google Scholar

4. See Cristi, Renato, “Carl Schmitt on Liberalism, Democracy and Catholicism” (1993) 14 Hist, of Pol. Thought 281 at 282-300.Google Scholar

5. Schmitt, Carl, Verfassungslehre (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965) at 244.Google Scholar

6. Supra note 1 at 12.

7. Ibid. at 13.

8. Ibid. at 14.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid. at 15. Schmitt refers the matter to what he had written earlier on the state of exception. See Die Diktatur, supra note 3 at 22-24.

11. Ibid. at 16. In his Die Diktatur, supra note 1, Schmitt takes Hobbes and Pufendorf to be supporters of “scientific natural law (wissenschaftliche Naturrecht)” and opponents of the “natural law of justice (Gerechtigkeitsnaturrecht)” tradition. For them the issue is not the content of a decision, but only that a decision be effectively made; the real question is who adjudicates and who has the power to decide. See Die Diktatur, supra note 3 at 21-24.

12. Ibid. at 18.

13. In his Politische Theologie, supra note 1 at 18, Schmitt refers to “the Charte of 1815.” This is obviously a misprint. In Die Diktatur, supra note 3 at 193, he correctly identifies it as the Charte of 1814 and transcribes its article 14: “Le Roi est le chef suprême de l'état, il commande les forces de terre et mer, déclare la guerre… et fait les règlements et ordonnances nécessairespour l'exécution des lois et la sûretéde l'état.”Google Scholar

14. Kaufmann, Erich maintains that the monarchical principle, defined as “l'autorité préexistant du roi, supérieur et antérieur à l'acte constitutionnel,” was first introduced by the Charte of 1814.Google Scholar See Kaufmann, Erich, Studien zur Staatslehre des monarchischen Prinzipes (Leipzig: Oscar Brandstetter, 1906) at 38.Google Scholar

15. Supra note 1 at 61.

16. Ibid. at 61

17. Ibid. at 62.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid. at 62-63.

20. Ibid. at 63.

21. Ibid. at 65-66.

22. Die Diktatur, supra note 3 at 23.

23. Ibid. at 23.

24. In his Die Diktatur, Schmitt develops the notion of sovereign dictatorship based on the traditional role played by Roman commissarial dictators. While their function was the preservation of the constitutional order, the aim of a sovereign dictator is the elimination of “the whole existing order” and the generation of a new constitution, one thought to be the true constitution. “An appeal is thus made to the constitution that will be enacted, not to the one that actually exists” (Die Diktatur, supra note 3 at 137). This abrogation of the existing order translates into the adoption of a revolutionary stance whereby sovereign dictators place themselves above the constitution. It would appear that this is a purely political move, completely “devoid of juridical value” (ibid. at 137). But, according to Schmitt, what lies above and beyond a constitutional system is not purely a Machtfrage. A sovereign dictator appeals to a power that even if not constituted ought to be seen as the “foundation” of a constitution. “This is the meaning of the pouvoir constituant” (ibid. at 137) which allows one to transpose the limits of a legal system without crossing over the limits of the juridical. Schmitt's sovereign dictator borrows from the juridical status that attaches to commissarial dictators. Contrary to McCormick, who claims that the aim of Die Diktatur is to present “temporary dictatorship…as an appropriate use of functional rationality,” it seems to me that Schmitt here promotes the notion of sovereign dictatorship by upholding its juridical value. See McCormick, John P., “The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers” in Proceedings of the 17th IVR World Congress, vol. VI (Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrici, 1995) at 112.Google Scholar

25. I discuss this issue in “Carl Schmitt on Liberalism, Democracy and Catholicism,” supra note 4.

26. Schmitt's constant preference for a strong State was not challenged by this acceptance of monarchy and democracy as legitimate forms of government. In his Verfassungslehre, supra note 5 at 236, he recognizes that democracy may be stronger and more decisive than monarchy.

27. Supra note 5 at xii.

28. Ibid. at xii.

29. Ibid. at 53.

30. Ibid. at 54.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid. at 289. According to Kaufmann, the monarchical principle is the pivotal concept of Friedrich Julius Stahl's political philosophy. See Studien zur Staatslehre des monarchischen Prinzipes, supra note 14 at 80.

33. Supra note 5 at 56.

34. Ibid. at 58.

35. Ibid. at 57.

36. Ibid. at 59. See Pasquino, Pasquale, “Die Lehre vom ‘pouvoir constituant’ bei Emmanuel Sieyès und Carl Schmitt” in Quaritsch, Helmut, ed., Complexio Oppositorum. Über Carl Schmitt (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988) at 379.Google Scholar

37. Ibid. at 60.

38. Ibid. at 75.

39. Schmitt conceives of a third possible subject of constituent power, different from the monarch and the people. A minority may also be a subject of constituent power, and a State where this happens “has an aristocratic or oligarchic form of government” (supra note 5 at 81). Schmitt is not thinking of a quantitative or electoral minority. Such a minority, or political party or faction, cannot be subject of constituent power. Only a “firm organization” (ibid. at 81) may be in the position of generating a constitution by means of its constituent power. Schmitt visualizes a circle of powerful families, as was the case in the Middle Ages, or a corporate order, such as the Soviets in the Soviet Union or the fiasco in Italy. He does not allude to a nation's armed forces, but surely they fit this scheme of things. At the same time, Schmitt admits that the theoretical construction that attributes constituent power to a minority “is not yet clear.” An ambiguity encumbers the notion of a minority or an aristocratic group qua subject of constituent power. In cases like this, “there is no definitive renunciation to invoking the will of the people, for whose true and unfalsified expression one ought first to create the preconditions” (ibid. at 82). One should also say that to contemplate the possibility of this third kind of constituent power implies, on the part of Schmitt, an exploration of the putschist possibilities of revolutionary conservatism. See Renato Cristi, “La noción de Poder constituyente en Carl Schmitt y la génesis de la Constitución chilena de 1980” (1993) 24 Revista Chilena de Derecho 229.

40. Supra note 5 at 242.

41. Ibid. at 92.

42. Ibid. at 94.

43. Ibid. at 93.

44. Ibid. at 107.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid. at 108.

47. See Breuer, Stefan, “Nationalstaat und pouvoir constituant bei Sieyès und Carl Schmitt” (1984) 70 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 510.Google Scholar

48. Supra note 5 at 80. See Kérvegan, Jean-François, Hegel, Carl Schmitt. Le politique entre spéculation et positivité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992) at 306.Google Scholar

49. Supra note 5 at 80.

50. Die Diktatur, supra note 3 at 142.

51. This paper was read at a session of the 17th IVR World Congress held in Bologna in 1995. This was facilitated by a travel grant from Wilfrid Laurier University. For comments and suggestions I owe thanks to Heiner Bielefeldt, John McCormick and William Scheuerman. I am particularly indebted to David Dyzenhaus for his commentaries and editorial help.