The labour problems of expansion and full employment are as intense and numerous as those of depression. Social and psychological problems arise from the twin processes of industrialization and urbanization. Large-scale immigration, and internal migration from rural to urban areas, bring complex problems of social disorganization and cultural conflict. Similar difficulties attend new industrial projects set up in hitherto untouched rural communities and in remote, unpopulated areas. Occupational maladjustments of various kinds are often characteristic of rapid industrial expansion. Labour shortages and bottlenecks develop side by side with pockets of unemployment. Labour-employer relationships become less personal, and internal communication more difficult, as enterprises expand in scale. Restlessness and dissatisfaction arise where workers find difficulty in adjusting to rapid technological change and unfamiliar environments. Employers complain about labour's irresponsibility and insubordination, high turnover and absenteeism, inefficiency and slowdowns.

Other problems are connected with the inflation that usually accompanies rapid economic expansion. Rising prices constantly threaten to outrun wages and salaries. Widening disparities of income among occupational groups generate dissatisfaction and unrest. Reports of high industrial profits, spectacular gains in the stock-market, and the conspicuous expenditures of the nouveaux riches, all provide very real (even if statistically inaccurate) symbols of unfairness in the distribution of income, and encourage labour to make what often seem exorbitant demands upon employers.

In the present stage of development of economic theory there is found even at the most elementary level a general theory for pure competition, for monopolistic competition, and for monopoly, but there is not to be found anywhere a general theory of oligopoly or circularity. Thus, there is a general theory for all branches of the modern classification of types of competition except one branch, namely, oligopoly. The explanation given for the absence is that a rival's possible reactions to price or output alterations by some particular firm are unlimited in number; there are indeed many oligopoly or circularity theories—a theory for each of many sets of specific assumptions.

It is not the purpose of this essay to set forth a general theory of oligopoly, but rather to move in the direction of a general classification of forms of competition. An attempt is made to retain one special characteristic of Professor Chamberlin's work viz., that of proceeding by degrees from one extreme to another, a characteristic Professor Chamberlin achieved with his “number of firms” and “degree of product differentiation.” At the same time it is attempted to break up oligopoly situations; thus, for example, “leadership oligopoly” is as distinct from “collusive oligopoly” as it is from pure competition, or as monopolistic competition is from pure competition.

The role of such left-wing Liberals as Frederic Harrison, Professor E. S. Beesly, A. J. Mundella, Vernon Harcourt, and Tom Hughes in bringing the English working classes into politics on the side of the Liberals in the late 1860's and early 1870's has long been appreciated. What has not, perhaps, been sufficiently realized is the quandary in which these middle-class radicals found themselves when the general election of 1874 approached. The years following the Hornby v. Close case and the appointment of the great royal commission on trade unions in 1867 had seen a rapid development in the political consciousness of the workmen—especially of the unionists—which was, from the point of view of the radicals, all to the good; but they had also seen the politically conscious among the working classes turning bitterly against the Liberals. The milestones in the latter of these two important political trends were the Liberals' Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871, the Gas Stokers' and Chipping Norton cases and the persistent refusal of the Gladstone Government to respond to the demands of the unions' lobby for the reform of the labour laws of the country. Labour feeling with regard to the Liberal party was reflected, for example, in the discussions of the Labour Representation League in 1871. A meeting of September 2 voiced strong disapproval of the Government's treatment of the working-class legislative demands and of its general attitude of hostility. The meeting decided to initiate discussions on the advisability of forming a third party. There was also a great deal of criticism of the Liberals at the Trades Union Congress of 1872 and, in the following year, the Parliamentary Committee of the Congress minced no words in discussing the matter in its report on the year's work. After reciting the fruitless efforts of the labour lobby during the 1872 session, the report concluded with the remark that a Liberal government under which such a legal situation could be consolidated was a mockery. And in two bye-elections in August, 1873, at Dundee and Greenwich, the workmen supported independent candidates in opposition to the official Liberals. Gladstone's cabinet shuffle of that same month probably did little to improve relations. Robert Lowe, who took the Home Office, was considered an enemy of the working classes and John Bright was well known as an opponent of unions and of all state action in industrial affairs.

A significant aspect of anarchism, which brings it close to Russian nihilism and in the minds of some people is responsible for the erroneous identification of the two, is individual terrorism. Individual acts of violence, known especially in the last century as “propaganda by deed,” have been regarded by some anarchists as part and parcel of the over-all revolutionary activity which is to culminate in the overthrow of the existing social system by acts of mass violence. There were and are anarchists of different schools opposed to violence as a means towards the establishment of an anarchist society, and they include not only religious anarchists like Leo Tolstoy and individualists like Benjamin Tucker, but also many of those who at one time or another could be classed as anarchist communists, for instance, Francisco Ferrer, Louisa S. Bevington, and Gustav Landauer. The so-called philosophical anarchists are also opposed to violence, if by them are meant people who believe in the possibility or at least the desirability of realizing the ideals of anarchism but do not accept the usual anarchist analysis of the existing system or the methods generally advocated by anarchist groups for the achievement of anarchism. Thus Godwin, Tolstoy, and Tucker, could be included in this group, and among our contemporaries Bertrand Russell.

In the present century anarchists have almost ceased in theory and practice to view individual terrorism as important. Violent acts have been usually perpetrated by people who had practically no significance as thinkers and writers. Alexander Berkman is probably the only notable exception here, while men like Kropotkin, fortunately for anarchism, propagated anarchist ideas by the written and spoken word rather than by “deed.”

In 1945 Professor K. R. Popper published a work on political theory called The Open Society and Its Enemies. It extols the “open” as against the “closed” society and criticizes those thinkers who have supposedly advocated the closed society. The first volume is concerned with criticizing Plato, whom Popper believes to be the chief totalitarian theorist of the ancient world; the second volume with the criticism of Hegel and Marx as the chief totalitarian theorists of modern Europe. This article sets out to refute what Popper says about Plato. Space forbids a defence of Hegel, although such a defence would be valuable these days when some men choose a few political sentences from Hegel, detach them from his central philosophic position, and put him in the same category as Marx. Nevertheless, Plato is a greater genius even than Hegel, so that the refutation of Popper's position can rest on what he says about the greatest of philosophers.

Such a defence is incumbent on a philosopher in these days, when no adequate understanding of Plato can be assumed. Indeed in North America, where the fides implictta of the social scientists has been empirical and pragmatic, Popper's thesis is liable to convince; for it is in essence a justification of that pragmatic tradition against the rationalism of Plato. Men who want to believe that there is such a thing as an independent “social science” can find in Popper reasons for doing so.

The purpose of this article is neither to consider the formal provisions of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Acts, 1948 and 1953, nor to outline the findings of the Commission set up under the 1948 Act. These have been dealt with elsewhere. Our more limited purpose is to examine the operation of the 1948 Act and the efficiency of the machinery set up in the light of a recent report of the Select Committee on the Estimates. The function of this Committee is to investigate items in the Government estimates for expenditure to see whether public funds are being properly and economically applied to the purposes for which they are voted. The Committee therefore does not question the policy laid down by Parliament. On the other hand, in questioning whether the Commission and the Government departments concerned are making the best use of the funds available in accordance with the provisions and intentions of the Act, the report and the minutes of evidence allow us to judge whether the Act, as it stands, provides an adequate basis for inquiry into and the control of monopolistic practices.

At the outset it should be borne in mind that there are important differences between the British legislation and that of the United States and Canada. Both North American countries have legislation which forbids specific practices and creates offences under the criminal law. The British legislation does neither. There is a commission which investigates industries referred to it by the President of the Board of Trade and makes its report upon these industries to him. Following a report by the Monopolies Commission that certain practices are contrary to the public interest the President of the Board of Trade or the minister in charge of certain other Government departments may make an order forbidding the practices in that industry only.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse and evaluate Canadian post-war monetary policy, in the light of the recurring inflationary pressures to which the economy was subjected. In the evaluation of past events, even the least perceptive critic possesses two great advantages, that is, published statistical data and the revelations of hindsight. When rightly used, hindsight is a valuable guide, but the critic must be careful to distinguish two significant questions: (1) In the light of the relevant contemporary circumstances, what alternatives were available to policy-makers at the time decisions were made? (2) What were the merits or demerits of the policies adopted, when viewed in the light of subsequent events, that is, given the same problem again, would different policies be adopted?

Any analysis, to be useful, must guard against oversimplification and unrealistic abstraction, and it is therefore impossible to evaluate Canadian postwar monetary experience fairly unless the analysis moves beyond the consideration of primarily domestic influences to an adequate recognition of the economic difficulties posed by violent shifts in our balance of payments. The following criticism of specific aspects of Canadian policy does not imply any over-all condemnation, for although we may deplore the damage which inflation has wrought, it must be admitted that its post-war development in this country has been relatively moderate, despite the substantial limitations imposed upon Canadian monetary policy by our open economy.