At a congress of the International Political Science Association held at The Hague in 1952, Professor Georges Langrod delivered a paper entitled “Local Government and Democracy,” subsequently published in the British journal Public Administration. The incisive logic and unorthodox conclusions of that paper seemed at the time to demolish, once for all, the justification of local representative government commonly found in much traditional liberal political theory. Mr. Keith Panter-Brick, facing a skilled prosecutor, and doing the best he could with a difficult case, replied in a later issue of the same journal. Dr. Leo Moulin next entered the discussion in defence of Langrod, and Panter-Brick wrote a second rejoinder. I felt that the contest, although conducted with flair by all parties, left far too many important questions unsettled. The object of this paper, however, is not to reopen points raised in dispute by the recent combatants; it is rather to suggest that the problems connected with the theory of local self-government ought to be approached in different terms.

The question to be considered refers to the relation between local self-government and democracy. By local self-government is meant that system of subordinate local authorities which has developed in many modern states. Each unit of local government in any system is assumed to possess the following characteristics: a given territory and population; an institutional structure for legislative, executive, or administrative purposes; a separate legal identity; a range of power and functions authorized by delegation from the appropriate central or intermediate legislature; and lastly, within the ambit of such delegation, autonomy—including fiscal autonomy—subject always, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, to the limitations of common law such as the test of reasonableness.

For one year after liberation in 1945, Czechoslovakia seemed to offer a picture of relative harmony between the political forces of democracy and communism personified by Eduard Beneš, the President, and Klement Gottwald, deputy Prime Minister, and leader of the Communist party. The themes of continuity and revolution, introduced during the wartime struggle for national liberation and developed for one post-war year in apparent concord, were soon to break off in open disharmony. Profound divergences appeared within the National Front of the six political parties concerning the course to be followed in future. On the Communist side there was a wish to complete a revolution that remained, in their view, unfinished. On the non-Communist side, there was a desire to end the course of drastic change and to establish order and legal stability on the Western pattern. These differences were for some time hidden by, or at least subordinated to, the unity symbolized by the National Front. By late 1947 what amounted to a deadlock had resulted, and prospects of continuing co-operation of Communists and non-Communists were slight. The climax in February, 1948, to be correctly appreciated, must be placed in the context of this deep and protracted crisis.

The first year of the liberated republic was one of reconstruction and revolution. The legal order was restored, with substantial new elements incorporated. The main organs of government were reconstituted, sometimes in greatly changed form. The punishment of war criminals, and the purification of Czech and Slovak life of “fascist elements,” were begun, through special “people's tribunals.” The property confiscated from German and Czech “traitors” was placed under “national administration.” Extensive nationalization of industry was begun, and a system of planning was prepared.

The Radcliffe Committee was appointed by Treasury Minute in May, 1957, “to inquire into the working of the monetary and credit system … [of the United Kingdom], … and to make recommendations.” It held eighty-eight meetings, collected three volumes of written evidence and one volume of evidence given orally, compiled new statistical information, and finally on July 30, 1959, presented a unanimous report to the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury. The public saw the Report three weeks later.

The prestigious composition of the Committee and the controversial ground which it was required to investigate alone ensured widespread attention for the Report. But the virtual flood of detailed comment emanating from academic economists and financial journalists in the United Kingdom is not entirely explained by this; nor even by the Committee's controversial views on matters of monetary theory and central banking practice. Because the views of the Committee on monetary policy and theory are not always fully developed, and in some instances appear to be ambiguous and contradictory, the Report offers limitless opportunities for articles on “What Radcliffe Really Meant,” including, of course, analyses of the essential deficiencies of the interpretations suggested. Unfortunately, the Report is such that the views of the Committee are easily misinterpreted, a danger of which this writer is aware, but one which he may not have succeeded in avoiding in every instance.

Monopolistic firms pay higher wages than competitive firms, according to J. W. Garbarino and J. K. Galbraith. Some writers believe that monopolistic firms balance the interests of employees, consumers, suppliers, and stockholders rather than maximize profits, a belief which suggests that they are generous employers rather than competitive firms who must strive for high profits. A few economists, in the taxonomic tradition, have suggested the possibility of high wages under monopoly, without expressing any opinion on the matter. The usual belief that monopolists take from the poor and give to the rich thus may be wrong. A finding that monopolists pay high wages also would imply that, for them, profit maximization takes second place to goals associated with public responsibility.

In the main stream of neo-classical theory is the opposite view that wages are low under monopoly. The exposition by Mrs. Joan Robinson assumes an upward-sloping supply curve of labour not only to each industry but also to each firm. Labour economists in recent years have followed Mrs. Robinson in stressing the prevalence of monopsony. It may be shown that product monopolists are likely to have more monopsony power than competitive firms, so, according to neo-classical theory, monopolists transfer income from the poor to the rich through low wages as well as through high prices.

I propose to test the proposition that monopoly raises wages and the opposite—that it lowers them—by comparing average annual earnings in Canadian monopolistic industries with those in matched United States industries which are competitive, or less monopolistic. The theories together with the evidence on which they are based will be presented first.

The purpose of this article is to discuss some aspects of forest management; its justification is the undoubted importance of forest-based industries to the Canadian economy, particularly Canada's foreign trade. Economists and those who administer forests are not agreed on the fundamentals of forest management. Nor have administrators agreed on the way in which forests should be utilized. We will, however, describe only one rule for forest management formulated by those responsible for administering forests—maximum sustained yield—and compare that rule with the results of capital theory.

In order to keep the analysis clear and to the point, a simplified example, based on an actual study, will be used throughout this paper. This example allows the divergent conclusions of capital theory to be illustrated and compared with the results of adopting maximum sustained yield, the rule recommended by the forester in the study from which the example is drawn.

The analysis here makes no pretence at originality and provides no new rule for managing forests. But it might serve to bring divergent groups closer to mutual understanding, and set the stage for some discussion of forest management by economists in Canada. It has been suggested, particularly by Professor Keirstead and Professor Scott, that no new theory of resources is needed because existing theory is adequate. On the other hand, Dr. Lamontagne and Dr. Keenleyside have suggested that economists have been remiss because they have neglected resources. These conflicting views indicate a need for an appraisal of existing theory concerning the administration of resources.

In the study of consumer spending a wide variety of factors, ranging from age, sex, and family size, through occupation, religion, and class background, to future expectations, advertising and personal influence, and compulsiveness, have been shown to have some influence on consumer taste and demand. Yet the precise influence these factors have, and the value which they should be assigned are still largely unknown. This paper offers a theoretical framework as one possible way of treating factors involved in consumer spending in a systematic manner. The approach is still in the process of formulation so that only the general structure of the theory can be presented.

Two assumptions are made about factors which influence consumer spending. First, it is assumed that factors may be treated as aspects of social systems or sub-systems. They may be viewed as contributing to one or other of the problems which all social systems must solve, to what have been called the adaptive, the goal attainment, the integrative, and the pattern-maintenance-tension-management problems. Thus factors are related to one another, in the first instance, by means of their functioning for the solution of system problems. Secondly, it is assumed that all factors do not have the same order of influence on consumer spending. Rather, factors are related to one another in a hierarchical way so that some can be treated as more general in their influence than others, and as unifying the more specific factors in some way. This view is derived from the more general assumption that social systems are composed of a number of distinct levels of structural organization.

Much attention has been devoted by sociologists and social psychologists to the question of the introduction of new members into a group or society. Preoccupation with this broad problem is visible, for instance, in studies of conversion to a religion, of movement from one social class to another, and of change of residence from one community or country to another. Not all studies, however, deal with the same aspects of the problem. Some focus on the factors which bring about such movement from one group to another. Others are concerned with the effects the movement has on both the group of origin and the group of destination. Finally, a good proportion of the studies purport to answer the following questions: What changes occur in the basic values, sentiments, and ways of behaving of the individual? To what extent are there such changes, and through what processes do they take place? This latter group of studies centres on concepts such as acculturation, integration, assimilation, adaptation, or absorption.

These concepts all refer to the same phenomenon, although perhaps from different angles. Park and Burgess, for instance, present the following general notion of “assimilation”: “A process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.” Blau has a very similar conception of the integration of the socially mobile into a new class. So does Eisenstadt with the concept of “adaptation,” although his definition is stated in terms of the final result rather than in terms of the process whereby it is achieved.