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Television as a Political Issue in Britain
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
Extract
Since its return to power in 1951 the Conservative party of Great Britain, in its programme to restrict the influence of government in the economy and ensure greater scope and freedom for private enterprise, has projected television for the first time into the arena of partisan politics. And with the emergence of television as a political issue public attention has been focused on the relative merits of public service versus commercial television. The Government's announcement in May, 1952, that “in the expanding field of television provision should be made to permit some element of competition” touched off a controversy of unusual intensity and breadth of interest. Two years later the debate culminated in action by Parliament permitting the introduction of commercial competition.
From the beginning, opposition to commercial television was vehement and articulate because of the strong conviction that television (to a far greater extent, indeed, than sound broadcasting) is a force, potentially at least, capable of revolutionizing the lives of men and reshaping the course of civilization. Thus, Herbert Morrison, deputy leader of the parliamentary Labour party, declared in December, 1953, just prior to Parliament's approval of the Government's proposal, that the debate on television policy was the most important since the war. Statements concerning the gravity of the change came from diverse groups—the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the universities, the Labour party, a substantial segment of British industry, and even the Conservative Government itself.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , August 1955 , pp. 328 - 338
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1955
References
1 The Times, 12 15, 1953, 6.Google Scholar
2 Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, Cmd. 8116 (London: H.M.S.O., 1951), 11.Google Scholar
3 Ibid., 107.
4 Ibid., 213.
5 Broadcasting: Memorandum on the Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, Cmd. 8291 (London: H.M.S.O., 1951), 4.Google Scholar
6 Ibid., Cmd. 8550 (London: H.M.S.O., 1952), 3.
7 Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, Cmd. 8116 (London: H.M.S.O., 1951), 42.Google Scholar
8 Ibid., Appendix H, Cmd. 8117 (London: H.M.S.O., 1951), 344.
9 Ibid., Appendix H, Cmd. 8117, 554, 566.
10 The Times, 07 1, 1953, 7.Google Scholar
11 Report on the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, Appendix H, Cmd. 8117, 545–6.
12 Ibid., 547–52.
13 Ibid., 513.
14 For a more detailed discussion of the arguments advanced by both the proponents and the opponents of commercial television see Morrison, Herbert, “Commercial Television: The Argument Examined,” Political Quarterly, XXIV, 338–44Google Scholar, and Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, Cmd. 8116, 213–26.
15 The Times, 12 15, 1953, 2.Google Scholar
16 Data shown here made available to the author by the British Institute of Public Opinion.
17 The Times, 06 15, 1953, 2.Google Scholar
18 Broadcasting: Memorandum on Television Policy, Cmd. 9005 (London: H.M.S.O., 1953), 4–5.Google Scholar
19 The Times, 11 26, 1953, 2.Google Scholar
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 3.
22 Ibid., Dec. 15, 1953, 3.
23 Ibid., March 26, 1954, 9.
24 During the general election campaign in May, 1955, the positions of the two parties were reaffirmed. “The new medium of television, which is becoming ever more important in our lives, must not be under monopoly control. Conservatives have ensured that alternative and competing television programs will soon be available.” British Conservative and Unionist Party Election Manifesto, 1955 (London: British Information Services), 17.Google Scholar “Television is a growing influence for good or ill. Labour will establish an alternative public television service, free from advertising.” British Labour Party Election Manifesto, 1955 (London: British Information Services), 5.Google Scholar