Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T05:03:47.186Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

National Communism in Eastern Europe since the 22nd Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

H. Gordon Skilling
H. Gordon Skilling*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
Get access

Extract

It is more than two years since the historic 22nd Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the dramatic repercussions in Eastern Europe of the 20th Congress five years earlier, the impact of the 1961 meeting was at first much less striking. The renewed assault on Stalin, this time open and unrestrained, did not generate a comparable intellectual ferment or unleash political forces capable of producing a crisis of the dimensions of 1956. No doubt Khrushchev and the other Eastern European leaders were anxious to avoid the disastrous consequences of that year, when the stability, and indeed the very existence, of communism hung in the balance, at least in Hungary and Poland. This time, certainly, their efforts carefully to control the direction and tempo of change were more successful, and the modest thaw did not produce a flood. None the less, there were serious consequences, often slow in manifesting themselves and differing substantially in each country, but having a long-run potential for modifying profoundly the shape and content of communism in Eastern Europe.

An entirely unforeseen result of 1956 had been the emergence of China as an influential force in world communism, challenging the hitherto predominant position of the Soviet Union. Her extraordinary intervention in the affairs of Eastern Europe during and after the Hungarian revolt had greatly contributed to the stabilizing of the situation, but had marked the emergence of a balance of power within the communist system and the beginning of a serious conflict of policy and doctrine between the two great communist states. Although the full effect of this Chinese challenge was at first somewhat obscured from view, it became increasingly clear that it would have an even more profound impact than earlier defiance by smaller states such as Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. At the 22nd Congress, only the tip of the iceberg of Sino-Soviet differences protruded in the form of the Chinese protest at Khrushchev's public denunciation of Albania. The full measure of the divergence was revealed in the subsequent two years, reaching a climax in the confrontation of mid-1963.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , August 1964 , pp. 313 - 327
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1964

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See my “Communism: National or International?” International Journal, winter, 1960, XV, no. 1, 36–48.Google Scholar

2 Control is taken to mean the ability of the Soviet Union to compel other states to take action desired by it. “Influence” is taken to mean the ability of the Soviet Union to affect the action taken by other states. Broadly speaking, the difference between “control” or “influence” corresponds to the difference between “coercion” or “persuasion.” There are five main types of Soviet control or influence: (i) diplomatic, (ii) political, (iii) military, (iv) economic, and (v) ideological, exercised either directly on the individual state or through the medium of the organizations of the Soviet bloc.

3 For this and the following, see the speech by Hoxha on May 30, 1962, and Zeri i Populitt, June 30, Sept. 19, 20, 30, 1962, and Feb. 7, March 27, April 18, June 23, 25, 1963 (all read in translation; all citations from translated sources are marked transl.).

4 Dec. 26, 1961, Cf. Népszabadság, Jan. 20, 1962 (transl.) which wrote: “The Hungarian counterrevolution is a warning example showing where international dogmatism could lead.…”

5 Full comment on the Congress was delayed until the publication in February, 1962, of the December, 1961, issue of Socijalizam, containing extended comments by Najda Pasić and Bogdan Petrović. See the long article on polycentrism by Petrovic, Punisa, “On Problems of Leadership and International Relations in the International Workers' Movement,” Naša Stvarnost, 03, 1962 (transl.).Google Scholar

6 Speeches given in Borba, Dec. 23 and 30, 1962 (transl.), and the report of the second speech in Pravda, Jan. 3, 1963.

7 Borba, Jan. 24, 1963 (transl.).

8 Borba commented on these events as “a new struggle for an important reorientation of Bulgaria's internal life,” but one that will not be painless or quick. “The roots of the old cannot be extirpated overnight. There will be resistance and it is reckoned with. There are no illusions.” Nov. 13, 1962 (transl.).

9 Rudé Právo, Aug. 22, 1963.

10 The proceedings were fully reported in literary newspapers, such as Kulturný Život and Literární Noviny, from the end of April to early June, 1963.

11 Most recently, a reorganization of the Government has eliminated not only Široký, but other veteran associates of Gottwald, including Dolánský, D'uriš, and Krosnář.

12 Dec., 1961 (transl.).

13 Népszabadág, Nov. 19, 1961 (transl.), and Pravda, Nov. 21, 1961.

14 Népsxabadág, Dec. 10, 1961 (transl).

15 His speech at the Csepel factory, in Népsdabadág, Dec. 3, 1961 (transl.).

16 See the articles by I. Szirmai, ibid., March 10, 1963 (also published in World Marxist Review, March, 1963), and March 30, 1963 (transl.).

17 For Tito's, speech, Borba, 05 7, 1962 (transl.).Google Scholar See also speech by Ranković at the Central Committee, ibid., July 23, 1962; Tito's speech at the Congress of People's Youth, ibid., Jan. 24, 1963.

18 Speech to the Supreme Soviet during Tito's visit, Izvestiya, Dec. 13, 1962, and Borba, Dec. 13, 1962 (transl.).