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The Motivation of Economic Activities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

Talcott Parsons
Talcott Parsons*
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

Specialization is, without doubt, one of the most important factors in the development of modern science, since beyond a certain level of technicality it is possible, even with intensive application, only to master a limited sector of the total of human knowledge. But some modes of specialization are, at the same time, under certain circumstances, an impediment to the adequate treatment of some ranges of problems.

The principal reason for this limitation of the fruitfulness of at least some kinds of specialization lies in the fact that the specialized sciences involve a kind of abstraction. They constitute systematically organized bodies of knowledge, and their organization revolves about relatively definite and therefore limited conceptual schemes. They do not treat the concrete phenomena they study “in general” but only so far as they are directly relevant to the conceptual scheme which has become established in the science. In relation to certain limited ranges of problems and phenomena this is often adequate. But it is seldom, after such a conceptual scheme has become well worked out, that its abstractness does not sooner or later become a crucial source of difficulty in relation to some empirical problems. This is apt to be especially true on the peripheries of what has been the central field of interest of the science, in fields to which some of the broader implications of its conceptual scheme and its broader generalizations are applied, or in which the logically necessary premises of certain of these generalizations must be sought.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , May 1940 , pp. 187 - 202
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1940

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References

1 See the author's Structure of Social Action (New York, 1937)Google Scholar for an analysis of this aspect of the work of these men.

2 Whether they are legally enforceable is secondary for present purposes.

3 As yet unpublished.

4 This is by no means meant to imply that there are no differences of typical motivation. Such differences could be accounted for either on the ground that the two occupational groups operated selectively on personality types within the population, or that they influenced the motivation of people in them. The essential point is that the treatment of the concrete differences of behaviour as direct manifestations of differences of ultimate motivation alone is clearly illegitimate in that it fails to take account of the institutional factor. It is quite possible that the institutionalization of financial selfinterest does, however, tend to cultivate a kind of egoism and aggressiveness in the typical business man which is less likely to be created in a professional environment.

5 This development involves a major change in the institutional setting of the problem of self-interest. Even though, as will be noted presently, in individual market competition, profit is rather an institutionally defined goal than a motive, it makes a considerable difference whether, as the older economists assumed, the consequences of a business decision will react directly on the personal pocket-book of the person making the decision, or only on that of the organization on behalf of which he decides. The position of the business executive thus becomes to a very large extent a fiduciary position. There is little difference between the considerations which will influence the manager of an investment trust, especially of a conservative type, and the treasurer of a university or a hospital, even though one is engaged in profit-making business, the other is a trustee of an “altruistic” foundation. In both cases the individual concerned has certain obligations and responsibilities, and unless the situation is badly integrated institutionally, it will on the whole, though perhaps in somewhat different ways, be to his self-interest to live up to them relatively well.

6 To avoid all possible misunderstanding it may be noted again that no claim is made that there are no important differences of motivation, above all that the business situation may not cultivate certain types of “mercenary” orientation. The sole important purpose of the present argument is to show that the older type of discussion which jumped directly from economic analysis to ultimate motivations is no longer tenable. The institutional patterns always constitute one crucial element of the problem, and the more ultimate problems of motivation can only be approached through an analysis of their role, not by ignoring it.

7 In his Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New York, 1934).Google Scholar This type of element is probably prominently involved in the widespread complaints about the prevalence of “commercialism” in medicine.