A policy or institution is often objected to on the ground that it interferes with freedom. Yet even where a policy is shown to have certain effects, it is frequently far from clear whether these effects constitute a diminution of freedom. To clear up the matter, many thinkers have tried to elucidate “the meaning of freedom.” Most who have made such an attempt have missed the mark through including within “the meaning of freedom” other things which they regard as desirable besides freedom itself. It is notorious that many who attempt to say what art is tell us only what they regard as good art. Many who try to define “law” fail to give an account applicable to bad laws as well as good laws. Recently a few attempts have been made to avoid this sort of pitfall in elucidating what is meant by the familiar word “freedom.” The latest and most ambitious attempt at this is made by F. E. Oppenheim in his book Dimensions of Freedom.

If a man has freedom, he is free. Yet if someone is not free on a certain evening, we should not say on that account that he is lacking freedom. “Freedom” is not simply the substantive corresponding to the adjective “free,” as “redness” corresponds to “red.” We speak of a room as being free of dust, of a lawn as free of weeds, of milk as free of impurities. The adjective “free” is applicable in many contexts in which the substantive “freedom” is not. Freedom is literally asserted only of human beings, whether singly or in groups. When applied elsewhere, as in speaking of a tiger recovering its freedom or “freedom of the will,” it is used only metaphorically, on analogy to its literal use. Yet “freedom” is clearly also not the substantive that corresponds to the adjective “free” whenever this adjective is applied to human beings.