Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T18:32:41.192Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Basis of Representation in the House of Commons*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

Norman Ward
Norman Ward*
Affiliation:
The University of Saskatchewan
Get access

Extract

The Canadian House of Commons, superficially at least, is so obviously a representative assembly that an examination of the basis of representation therein may perhaps seem a waste of time. Yet one cannot proceed far in a study of the House of Commons without becoming aware that some aspects of representation rest on bases whose existence receives little explicit recognition, and that the theories of representation which are explicitly accepted in Parliament are often contradicted by the facts.

A major obstacle to the understanding on parliamentary representation is the broad disagreement among authorities as to what representative government is, and what it ought to be. This problem will not be settled here, but it must be recorded that the best-known works on representative government, which range from the reasoned pronouncements of John Stuart Mill to the impatient murmurs of proportional representation societies, are uniformly reticent in defining the institution which they are discussing. Concise descriptions of particular kinds of representative government are common, but genuine definitions are not. A British Royal Commission on Electoral Systems worked for several months in 1909 and neither the commissioners nor the witnesses who appeared before them attempted to assess accurately what the fundamental purpose of an electoral system was. Again, John Stuart Mill believed that a single legislature could represent a nation, and being happily ignorant of twentieth-century psychology, he was able to argue further that representative institutions could be improved by taking thought. G. D. H. Cole, on the other hand, has stated that the representation of a whole population by one body is impossible; Parliament, he says, represents everybody for everything, and therefore nobody for anything—and his way out of this impasse is to urge the creation of an apparently indefinite number of representative assemblies, each of which would discharge one specific function.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , November 1949 , pp. 477 - 494
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1949

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Halifax, June 9, 1949.

References

1 Kingsley, J. D., Representative Bureaucracy (Antioch Press, 1944), p. 281.Google Scholar

2 Ford, H. J., Representative Government (New York, 1924), p. 3.Google Scholar

3 Cole, G. D. H., Social Theory (New York, 1920), p. 103.Google Scholar

4 MacIver, R. M., The Modern State (Oxford, 1926), pp. 203 ff.Google Scholar

5 Burke, E., Works (London, 1900), vol. I, pp. 446–7.Google Scholar

6 See Luce, R., Legislative Principles (Boston and New York, 1930), chap. XIX.Google Scholar

7 An interesting short discussion of the survival of medieval concepts in contemporary British government is found in the B.B.C.'s publication, The Listener, 03 17, 1949, pp. 441–2.Google Scholar See also R. Luce, Legislative Principles, chap. IX; Luce takes a contrary view of early parliamentary representation, claiming that the early members were agents or delegates, not representatives.

8 Burke, , Works, vol. II, p. 132.Google Scholar In Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, Burke wrote: “The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation. It was not instituted to be a control upon the people, … [but] a control for the people.”

9 Canada, House of Commons Debates (unrevised edition), 03 7, 1949, p. 1235.Google Scholar

10 Ibid., Mar. 8, 1949, p. 1288.

11 Ibid. (revised ed.), 1890, p. 3197.

12 Beauchesne, A., Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada (Toronto, 1943), pp. xxvii–xxviii.Google Scholar Apart from privileges and immunities, the independence of members is further protected by statutory provisions which make it illegal for a member to sit in Parliament if he holds an office of emolument (excepting members of the ministry) or a government contract.

13 The latest was in 1939.

14 See Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1920, pp. 2024 ff.Google Scholar

15 Cross, A., The People's Mouths (Toronto, 1944), p. 114.Google Scholar

16 Statutes of Canada, 1942-3, c. 1, s. 3.

17 See Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1942, on “Dominion Plebiscite Act” and “National Resources Mobilization Act.”

18 I am indebted to an essay by Miss June Green, a student at the University of Saskatchewan, for suggestions concerning the use of questions asked in the House as a measure of a member's interests.

19 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1932–1933, p. 5348.Google Scholar

20 Ibid., 1940, p. 2400.

21 See Ward, Norman, “Electoral Corruption and Controverted Elections” (Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 02, 1949, pp. 74–86).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 See Luce, R., Legislative Principles (Boston and New York, 1930), p. 76.Google Scholar

23 Ibid., pp. 332-3.

24 Quoted in Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (Great Britain), 1910.Google Scholar

25 Statutes of Canada (Prov.), 16 Vic, c. 152.

26 British North America Act, 1867, s. 51.

27 Confederation Debates, 1865, p. 38.Google Scholar

28 Cauchon, J. E., L'Union des provinces de l'Amérique Britannique du Nord (Quebec, 1865), p. 79.Google Scholar

29 See Whitelaw, W. N., “Reconstructing the Quebec Conference” (Canadian Historical Review, 1938, pp. 123–37)Google Scholar; Confederation Debates, 1865, pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

30 J. Pope, Confederation Documents, First Draft of British North America Bill, s. 25.

31 British North America Act, 1867, s. 51.

32 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1932–1933, p. 5240.Google Scholar

33 A part of Western Ontario was somehow overlooked in 1924.

34 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1872, p. 926.Google Scholar

35 Ibid., 1892, p. 3255.

36 Ibid., p. 3119.

37 Ibid., p. 3255.

38 Ibid., p. 3175.

39 Brown, I., The Meaning of Democracy (Oxford, 1926), p. 65.Google Scholar

40 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1899, pp. 3442 ff.Google Scholar; 1939, pp. 1807-41; 1947 (unrevised edition), p. 718.

41 Most of the statistics on which these generalizations are based have not yet been published. See Ward, Norman, “Parliamentary Representation in Canada” (Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1947, pp. 447–64).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42 Table compiled from recorded divisions in the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, 1949. A comparable table for 1947 reveals the same regional variations, but attendance generally in 1947 was much poorer than in 1949, suggesting that the proximity of a general election may also influence representation in the House. Another factor to be considered is the change in party leadership experienced by the two major parties.