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Wrong Again—Rejoinder to Annas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2009

ELIZABETH FENTON  and
JOHN D. ARRAS
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Extract

It is clear from George Annas's response to our arguments that he has misunderstood and misrepresented our positions on several key points. We suspect that this may be due in part to significant differences between our respective agendas and points of view, so we begin this exchange with an exploration of these differences.

Type
The Great Debates
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 141 - 150
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

1. Annas's obduracy in misrepresenting our position is difficult for us to fathom. We state very clearly both in our original essay and in an unpublished version of this very response to his rejoinder, which Annas has supposedly read, that our problem is not with the human rights movement per se or its merger with bioethics, but rather with specific misapplications to global bioethical problems and with some limitations of human rights as a method for thinking about allocation issues.

2. Annas GJ. Human rights and American bioethics: Resistance is futile. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2010;19:133–141, at 134 (this issue).

3. See, e.g., the work of Dan Brock, Allen Buchanan, Daniel Callahan, James Childress, Norman Daniels, Carl Elliott, Ezekiel Emanuel, James Dwyer, Ruth Faden, Christine Grady, Bruce Jennings, Nancy Kass, Loretta Kopelman, Alex London, Thomas Pogge, Ruth Macklin, Gopal Sreenivasan, Jeremy Sugarman, Dan Wikler, and many, many others.

4. See note 2, Annas 2010:134.

5. See note 2, Annas 2010:galley proofs.

6. According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, there is a human right to “Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.” See Part III, Article 7, d at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm. Even some of the most sympathetic commentators on human rights have criticized this provision as mistaking a laudable social goal for a human right.

7. See for example James Griffin, “First Steps in an Account of Human Rights.” European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2001); John Tasioulas, “Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: Retracing Griffin's Steps.” European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002); Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004); Thomas Pogge, ed. Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Charles Beitz, “Human Rights as a Common Concern.” American Political Science Review 95 (2001).

8. See note 2, Annas 2010:136.

9. Annas GJ. American Bioethics: Crossing Human Rights and Health Law Boundaries. New York: Oxford University Press; 2005:41.

10. Fenton E. Overlapping consensus and human rights. [dissertation]. Charlottesville: University of Virginia; 2008.

11. Rawls J. The Laws of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press; 1999, at 65.

12. Rawls's list excludes, for example, human rights to freedom of religion and expression, and it also fails to secure political equality and equal rights for women within religiously dominated, patriarchial societies. For criticism of Rawls's minimal list see particularly Buchanan A. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2004.

13. See note 2, Annas 2010.

14. See note 9, Annas 2005:37.

15. See note 9, Annas 2005:35.

16. See note 2, Annas 2010:138.

17. See note 9, Annas 2005:41.

18. In Wells's futuristic novel The Time Machine (1895), two species exist that are both descended from human beings, and one is under constant threat from the other.

19. See, for example, Harris J. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2007; Green R. Babies by Design: The Ethics of Genetic Choice, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2007); Buchanan A, Brock DW, Daniels N, Wikler D. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2000; Buchanan A. Human Nature and Enhancement. Bioethics 2008;23(3):141–50; Buchanan A. Enhancement and the Ethics of Development. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2008;18:1–34; Glover J. Choosing Children: The Ethical Dilemmas of Genetic Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006.

20. See note 2, Annas 2010:139.

21. See note 9, Annas 2005:41.

22. See note 9, Annas 2005:41.

23. Sunstein C. Worst-Case Scenarios. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2007.

24. In “Enhancement and the Ethics of Development,” Allen Buchanan argues persuasively that the genetic enhancement debate needs to be substantively reoriented to take account of the many foreseeable benefits that the technology could have and which carry a significant opportunity cost if forgone.

25. See note 2, Annas 2010:137.

26. See note 2, Annas 2010:138.

27. See note 2, Annas 2010:galley proofs.

28. See note 2, Annas 2010:137.

29. See note 2, Annas 2010:140.