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What Exactly Did You Claim?
A Call for Clarity in the Presentation of Premises and Conclusions in Philosophical Contributions to Ethics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2014
Abstract:
Philosophers should express their ideas clearly. They should do this in any field of specialization, but especially when they address issues of practical consequence, as they do in bioethics. This article dissects a recent and much-debated contribution to philosophical bioethics by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, examines how exactly it fails to meet the requirement of clarity, and maps a way forward by outlining the ways in which philosophical argumentation could validly and soundly proceed in bioethics.
Keywords
- Type
- Dissecting Bioethics
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014
References
Notes
1. Minerva, F. New threats to academic freedom. Bioethics 2014;28:157–62.Google Scholar
2. Häyry, M. Academic freedom, public reactions, and anonymity. Bioethics 2014;28:170–3.Google Scholar
3. Giubilini, A, Minerva, F. After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live? Journal of Medical Ethics 2012. doi:10.1136/medethics-2011-100411.Google Scholar
4. Häyry, M. Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics. London and New York: Routledge; 1994Google Scholar, at 66–7, 122–3.
5. See note 1, Minerva 2014, at 157.
6. See note 3, Giubilini, Minerva 2012, at 3.
7. See note 3, Giubilini, Minerva 2012, at 1–2.
8. See note 3, Giubilini, Minerva 2012, at 3.
9. See note 3, Giubilini, Minerva 2012, at 2.
10. See note 3, Giubilini, Minerva 2012, at 2–3.
11. See note 3, Giubilini, Minerva 2012, at 3.
12. See note 1, Minerva 2014, at 161–2.
13. Savulescu J. “Liberals are disgusting”: In defence of the publication of “After-Birth Abortion.” BMJ Blogs; 2012 Feb 28; available at http://blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2012/02/28/liberals-are-disgusting-in-defence-of-the-publication-of-after-birth-abortion/ (last accessed 16 Apr 2014).
14. The grand idea defended in the paper could also be psychological personhood, but this would not have been original enough to warrant publication.
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