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There Can Be No Moral Obligation to Eradicate All Disability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2013

REBECCA BENNETT
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Abstract

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Type
Special Section: Rationality, Morality, and Disability
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 30 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

Notes

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3. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002.

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7. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002.

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11. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002, at 325.

12. See note 5, Harris 2000.

13. See note 5, Harris 2000.

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17. See note 16, Parfit 1987.

18. See note 16, Parfit 1987, at 378.

19. See note 16, Parfit 1987, at 388.

20. See note 16, Parfit 1987, at 388.

21. See note 16, Parfit 1987.

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27. See note 2, Harris 2001.

28. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002.

29. See note 1, Bennett, Harris 2002, at 30.

30. See note 5, Harris 2000, at 31.