Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2009
I work at a research institute where the staff spends its time thinking about ethical issues that arise with progress in medicine, the life sciences, and technology. After such thinking, we make public policy recommendations. We pride ourselves in the diversity of our staff: there is a doctor, a lawyer, a linguistic anthropologist, a political scientist, a theologian, some philosophers, and so on. Both men and women do research and we are religiously diverse: Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and atheists
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