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Microlevel Prioritizations and Incommensurability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2017

ANDERS HERLITZ
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Abstract:

This article addresses the prioritization questions that arise when people attempt to institutionalize reasonable ethical principles and create guidelines for microlevel decisions. I propose that this instantiates an incommensurability problem, and suggest two different kinds of practical solutions for dealing with this issue.

Keywords

prioritizationmicrolevel decisionsincommensurability
Type
Special Section: Open Forum
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , January 2018 , pp. 75 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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References

Notes

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