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Making Sense of the Immorality of Unnaturalness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2009

MARK SHEEHAN
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Extract

"Dissecting Bioethics," edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics. The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people's actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated. The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at [email protected].

Type
Dissecting Bioethics
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 177 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

1. See McMillan J. The return of the inseminator: Eutelegenesis in recent and contemporary reproductive ethics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 2007;38:393–410.

2. Sandel M. The case against perfection. The Atlantic Monthly 2004;293(3):51–62.

3. Takala T. The (Im)Morality of (Un)Naturalness. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;13:15–9 at p. 15.

4. Testa G, Harris J. Ethics and synthetic gametes. Bioethics 2005;19(2):161. Testa and Harris do go on to say why they think it is absurd. We shall mention some of their moves below.

5. Kass L. The wisdom of repugnance. The New Republic 1997:22.

6. See note 5, Kass 1997:20.

7. I am here using “response” in a way that distinguishes it from “judgment.”

8. There is nothing here intended to contravene a noncognitivist approach. Insofar as a noncognitivist position can reconstruct substantive moral argument, it will also reconstruct this distinction—say between responses that are susceptible of argument and those that are not.

9. Mill JS. On nature. Lancaster E-text, prepared by the Philosophy Department at Lancaster University, from Nature, The Utility of Religion and Theism. London: Rationalist Press; 1904, available at http://www.lancs.ac.uk/users/philosophy/texts/mill_on.htm (last accessed 18 March 2008).

10. Norman R. Interfering with nature. Journal of Applied Philosophy 1996;13(1):1–11 at p. 2.

11. See note 4, Testa, Harris 2005:161–2.

12. See note 3, Takala 2004:16.

13. That is, on the plausible assumption that a (the) defining feature of a fact is its truth aptness.

14. Wiggins D. Needs, Value, Truth (3rd ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998:95.

15. Garrard E, Wilkinson S. Mind the gap. In Häyry M, Takala T, Herrisone-Kelly P, eds. Bioethics and Social Reality. New York: Rodopi; 2005:77–91 at p. 79.

16. See McDowell J. Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supp. Vol. 52) 1978:13–29. Reprinted in McDowell J. Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1998:77–94.

17. See note 10, Norman 1996:3.

18. Hume D. A treatise of human nature [1739]. In: Raphael DD, ed. British Moralists 1650–1800. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett; 1991:510.

19. Butler J. Fifteen Sermons and a Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue [1726], Matthews WR, ed. London: Bell and Sons; 1958:7 (p. 13, original pagination).

20. It is important here to clearly distinguish human activity from human nature. What constitutes proper human activity is likely to be importantly informed by human nature, and one way of developing an account of the former is through a rich account of the latter. I take it that the sense of human nature discussed by the British Moralists and in the Natural Law tradition is more about human activity or behavior than the necessary properties of human beings. To put it starkly, this sense of human nature concerns our “moral constitution,” as Butler might have put it, not our genetic composition. Having said this, the nature of human nature is far from being a simple matter but is beyond the scope of this paper.

21. See also Holland S. Bioethics: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2003:154–7.

22. This differs somewhat from Holland's account of the paradox. His version has it that it is paradoxical to decline to achieve a goal completely because we are so intent on it. But it does not seem to be the intensity of our intent that causes us to decline the full realization. Instead, the paradox (or the contradiction) is both to desire the goal (i.e., to avoid dying) and not desire the goal (i.e., being immortal): We are clearly very intent on achieving the goal and yet we decline to achieve it completely (see note 21, Holland 2003:154).

23. See note 21, Holland 2003:186. He cites Elliot D. Uniqueness, Individuality and Human Cloning. Journal of Applied Philosophy 1998;15(3):217–30.

24. We might also object that when the term “manufacturing” becomes appropriate for the kind of decisions we are making, we have crossed an important threshold.

25. See note 10, Norman 1996:3.

26. See note 21, Holland 2003:156.

27. See note 21, Holland 2003:155.

28. In a different but not unrelated context David Wiggins writes: “And the long and the short of it is that, in this way, without paying a penny of its own into court or even exerting itself, philosophy can all too easily finish up . . . failing to support the side of the argument that might have expected its assistance.” Wiggins D. Nature, respect for nature, and the human scale of values. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2000;100:7.