Bereaved Families’ Accounts of Declining a Request for Organ Donation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2012
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23. For more accessible reading, we decided to simplify the transcription to the absolute minimum, leaving only the basic intonation signatures (full stops) as well as noting significant pauses (dots in round brackets) and backchannel responses. Omitted text is noted in square brackets. Italicized text indicates the fragments to which we want to draw the readers’ attention.
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