Article contents
Informed Consent in the Human Genome Enterprise
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2009
Extract
When Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist philosopher, declared some four decades ago that man makes himself, this assertion was based on Sartre's belief that human beings do not possess an essential human nature. Man's self creation had to do with his freedom to choose the roles that he played or could play, and their attendant effects on his attitudes and responsibilities. It said nothing about his freedom to alter his biological nature.
- Type
- Special Section: Designs on Life: Choice, Control, and Responsibility in Genetic Manipulation
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995
References
Notes
1. This paper is extrapolated from Standards of disclosure in informed consent in Goldworth, A, Silverman, W, Stevenson, DK, Young, EWD, Eds. Ethics and Perinatology: Issues and Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.Google Scholar
2. Katz, J. “Ethics and clinical research” revisited: a tribute to Henry K.Beecher. Hastings Center Report, 1993;23:34.Google Scholar
3. See note 2. Katz, . 1993;23:34.Google Scholar
4. Andrews, LB, Fullarton, JE, Holtzman, NA, Motulsky, AG. Assessing Genetic Risks. Implications for Health and Social Policy. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993 (prepublication copy). Executive Summary 18.Google Scholar
5. Barber, B. The ethics of experimentation with human subjects. Scientific American 1976;234:25–31.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
6. Adams, RB, Shea-Stonum, M. Toward a theory of control of medical experimentation with human subjects: the role of compensation. Case Western Reserve Law Review 1975;25:608–9.Google Scholar
7. Applebaum, PS, Lidz, CW, Meisel, A. Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987:139.Google Scholar
8. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals, NY Supreme Court, Vol. 211, NY, 1914:129–30.
9. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P 2d 170 (Cal. App. 1957).
10. Natanson v. Kline, 350 Pacific Reporter; 2d series 1960:1106.
11. Canterbury v. Spence, US App. DC; 464 F 2d 772; 1972:787.
12. For Canadian policy see Gilmore, A. The nature of informed consent. Canadian Medical Association Journal 1985;132:1198–1203.Google ScholarPubMed
13. Mason, JK. Medico-Legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood. Hants: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1990:80.Google Scholar
14. Shaw, J. Informed consent: a German lesson. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1986;35:864–90.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed The subjective standard has also had some application in the United States since the Okla homa Supreme Court decision in Scott v. Bradford (1979). See Mazur, VJ. Why the goals of informed consent are not realized. Journal of General Internal Medicine 1988;3:370–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
15. See note 7. Applebaum, et al. 1987:139.Google Scholar
16. See note 7. Applebaum, et al. 1987:139.Google Scholar
17. Faden, RR, Beauchamp, T. A History and Theory of Informed Consent. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986:31.Google Scholar
18. For additional criticisms of the professional practice and reasonable person standards, see Brody, H. Transparency: informed consent in primary care. Hastings Center Report 1989:5–9.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
19. Relman, AS. What market values are doing to medicine. The Atlantic Monthly 1992:99–106.Google ScholarPubMed
20. Hilfiker, D. A doctor's view of modern medicine. New York Times Magazine 1986:46.Google Scholar
- 3
- Cited by