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8. See note 4, Nyholm, O’Neill 2017, at 664.

9. See note 4, Nyholm, O’Neill 2016, at 651.

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20. In particular, the existentialists stressed the importance of action for self-definition and authenticity.

21. In psychology, this is typically discussed under the term self-efficacy.

22. Heidegger discussed authenticity in terms of a self-owned life. To be authentic, or eigentlich, a person has to take action in a self-determined and independent manner. By externalizing central parts of the self-narrative and describing them as happening to oneself, this ownership necessary for authenticity is lacking.

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24. I mainly discussed the authenticity of persons, defined as having a certain kind of self-narrative. A single action, thought, or feeling is authentic if it is in accordance with such a self-narrative. Someone has had an authentic life if he mostly acted, thought, and felt authentically.

25. See note 2 Erler, Hope 2014, at 219–32.

26. See note 2 Erler, Hope 2014.

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29. See note 6, DeGrazia 2000.

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32. See note 3, Pugh et al. 2017, at 646 and note 30, Ekstrom 1993.

33. Alessandro Ferrara discussed this distinction between autonomy and authenticity in his analysis of Rousseau’s work. See Ferrara, A. Modernity and Authenticity: A Study in the Social and Ethical Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; 1993.Google Scholar