¹ I owe the idea of engineering immortality into embryos to Harris, John; see his Intimations of immortality: The ethics and justice of life-extending therapies. In: Freeman, MDA, ed. Current Legal Problems, vol. 55. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2002:66Google Scholar. My argument is altogether not far from Feinberg's idea of allowing the future child an “open future.” See Feinberg, J. Freedom and Fulfilment: Philosophical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1992Google Scholar.

² Sometimes referred to as “apologists,” “quietists,” “thanatophiles,” or “deathists.” The proponents of immortality are referred to as “prolongevitists” or “life extensionists.” The first category has among its representatives authors such as Daniel Callahan, Francis Fukuyama, and Leon Kass, and the latter is represented by authors such as Arthur Caplan, John Harris, Aubrey de Grey, and Tom Kirkwood.

³ For example, someone who adheres to the ideas developed by Fukuyama, Francis in his book Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. London: Profile; 2002:101Google Scholar.

⁴ For example, in the style of Kass, Leon; see his Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity. San Francisco: Encounter Books; 2002:257–76 (chap. 9: L'Chaim and its limits. Why not immortality?)Google Scholar.

⁵ Kirkwood, T. Time of Our Lives. The Science of Human Ageing. London: Weidenfield & Nicholson; 1999:243–56Google Scholar.

⁶ I thank an anonymous reviewer of the journal for pointing this out to me.

⁷ For literature on acts and omissions, see, for instance, Rachels, J. Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine 1975;292(2):78–80CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Weinryb, E. Omissions and responsibility. The Philosophical Quarterly 1980;30:1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harris, J. Violence and Responsibility. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980Google Scholar; Hall, J. Acts and omissions. The Philosophical Quarterly 1989;39(157):399–408CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kuhse, H. Euthanasia. In: Singer, P. A Companion to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell; 1993Google Scholar; and Takala, T. Acts and omissions. In: Ashcroft, RE, Dawson, A, Draper, H, McMillan, J, eds. Principles of Health Care Ethics, 2nd ed.Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.; 2007:273–6Google Scholar.

⁸ See Habermas, J. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2003:chaps. 2, 6Google Scholar. According to Habermas, by intervening in the genome of our offspring, we create a type of (unidirectional, essence-determining) unequal relationship for which there is no precedent, due to which humans would cease to be “persons of equal birth.” Of course there may be a problem here for our case, as by not making the fetus mortal we already allow such inequality to arise; however, what Habermas stresses is the wrongness of creating the determining, unilateral relationship, and not seeing to it that fetuses are made to be of equal birth if they were not so naturally—plus the latter deed would undermine the equal birth anyway.

⁹ See, for example, Takala, T. (Im)morality of (Un)naturalness. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;13:15–9CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

¹⁰ Of course, as an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, in the same way it can be said of any parent that by reproducing she “condemns [her] own child to death.” However, the case is significantly not the same, as in reproduction where the option of immortality does not exist parents offer their offspring as much life as they can. The fact that life has an end is not the responsibility of parents as long as there is nothing they can do to make it endless. Also, they can justify their option in giving life anyway by the fact that if life is a benefit, then some benefit is better than no benefit, and one can always hope that death will eventually be defeated and the life of the respective offspring eventually saved.