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Häyry Reconsidered

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2013

KRISTEN HINE
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Extract

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Type
Responses and Dialogue
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 63 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

Notes

1. Häyry, M. Considerable life extension and three views on the meaning of life. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2011;20:21–9.Google Scholar

2. By “considerable life extensions,” Häyry means the “average and maximum increase of our biological and psychological existence from the current century (give or take a decade or two) to at least a millennium” (see note 1, Häyry 2011, at 22).

3. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 22.

4. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 24.

5. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 25.

6. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 25.

7. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 25.

8. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 25–6.

9. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 28.

10. Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus. In: Long, AA, Sedley, DN, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987, at 150.Google Scholar

11. Long, AA, Sedley, DN, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987, at 154.Google Scholar

12. It is worth noting, of course, that Epicurus would still warn us against forming false beliefs and desires about considerable life extension. For example, he would caution one against desiring considerable life extension because one (falsely) believes that by extending one’s life one reduces the duration of one’s death.

13. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 26.

14. See note 1, Häyry 2011, at 27.

15. For a similar view, see Heathwood, C. The problem of defective desires. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2005;83:487–504. Heathwood says, for example, “I do distinguish a life rich in personal welfare from lives rich in virtue, excellence, dignity, achievement, aesthetic value, etc.” (500).Google Scholar

16. Häyry, M. Rationality and the Genetic Challenge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010, at 208.Google Scholar