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The Eclipse of the Individual in Policy (Where is the Place for Justice?)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2009

Mark J. Bliton  and
Stuart G. Finder
Mark J. Bliton
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Medical Ethics, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, and Chief of the Clinical Ethics Consultation Service at the Center for Clinical and Research Ethics, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, Tennessee.
Stuart G. Finder
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Medical Ethics, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, and Associate Director of the Center for Clinical and Research Ethics, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, Tennessee.
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Extract

Several inquires about healthcare over the past several decades have shown that the evolution of healthcare practices exhibit their own microcosm of local and political influences. Likewise, other studies have shown clearly the ways in which both external and internal institutional factors establish the sectors within which healthcare is delivered. Although restrictions have always been present in some form, it seems obvious that whatever the precise form of healthcare delivery that results from current changes in its organization, there are going to be broader restrictions not only on the choices that providers will be able to make about individual patients' care and needs, but also regarding the character of their clinical judgments. Indeed, there are already reports of instances where physicians' contracts with managed care organizations forbid them to disclose the existence of services not covered by a plan.

Type
Special Section: Can Justice Endure Healthcare Reform?: From Patient Care to Policy (and Back Again)
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , Fall 1996 , pp. 519 - 532
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

Notes

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