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The Case against Conscription of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2008

WALTER GLANNON
Affiliation:
University of Calgary

Extract

In a recent set of papers, Aaron Spital has proposed conscription or routine recovery of cadaveric organs without consent as a way of ameliorating the severe shortage of organs for transplantation. Under the existing consent requirement, organs can be taken from the bodies of the deceased if they expressed a wish and intention to donate while alive. Organs may also be taken when families or other substitute decisionmakers decide on behalf of the deceased to allow organ procurement for the purpose of transplantation. When patients or families do not consent to organ procurement, many transplantable organs are lost. This is a tragic yet avoidable situation. The dead are beyond any benefit or harm, and their organs could be used to prevent harm by saving and improving the lives of many people suffering and dying from end-stage organ failure.

Type
Perspectives
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

Notes

1 Spital, A. Conscription of cadaveric organs for transplantation: A stimulating idea whose time has not yet come. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14:107–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Spital, A, Erin, CA. Conscription of cadaveric organs for transplantation: Let's at least talk about it. American Journal of Kidney Disease 2002;39:611–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Spital, A, Taylor, JS. Routine recovery of cadaveric organs for transplantation: Consistent, fair, and life-saving. Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 2007;2:300–3CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

2 See note 1, Spital 2005:108.

3 See note 1, Spital, Taylor 2007:301.

4 Veatch, R.supports this position in cases of non-heart-beating cadaver donors inTransplantation Ethics. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 2000:Chap. 13Google Scholar.

5 See Veatch, R. Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or change the definition of death? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2004;14:261–76CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. Also, Fost, N. Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is it important that organ donors be dead? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2004;14:249–60CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

6 As distinct from donation after brain death, in donation after cardiocirculatory death the 5-minute wait is to allow for the possibility of autoresuscitation, the heart's ability to resume beating on its own.

7 Harris, J. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1992:103Google Scholar. Also, Harris, J. Organ procurement: Dead interests, living needs. Journal of Medical Ethics 2003;29:130–4CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

8 Childress, JF, Liverman, CT, eds. Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action. A Report from the Institute of Medicine. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2006:205–28Google Scholar.

9 Truog, RD. Are organs personal property or a societal resource? American Journal of Bioethics 2005;5:14–6CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

10 Hester, DM. Why we must leave our organs to others. American Journal of Bioethics 2006;6:W23–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also, Howard, RJ. We have an obligation to provide organs for transplantation after we die. American Journal of Transplantation 2006;6:1786–9CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.