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Altering Humans—The Case For and Against Human Gene Therapy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2009

Nils Holtug
Nils Holtug
Affiliation:
A research fellow in the Bioethical Research Group, Department of Education, Philosophy, and Rhetoric at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
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Extract

The case in favor of gene therapy is quite simple. Gene therapy is likely to improve the health and well-being of some people that are among the worst off in society, namely patients with painful and life-threatening diseases. However, two types of objection have been raised.

Type
Special Section: Alpha and Omega: Ethics at the Edges of Life
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , Spring 1997 , pp. 157 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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References

Notes

1. Some people believe that deontological constraints have a threshold, such that if enough is at stake, it is permissible (or obligatory) to violate a constraint. However, since I shall reject the deontological objections to gene therapy, it doesn't really matter in the present context whether constraints have a threshold.

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51. Adherents of the Argument from Evolution must also consider selective abortion and genetic counseling dubious. For some reason, these worries are seldomly articulated.

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55. Incidentally, it is expected that new progress will be made in fighting malaria by means of genetic engineering; see note 43. Dixon, 1993:24. Also see note 56.Google Scholar

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61. The terms ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ are of course quite vague.

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63. See note 17. Glover, 1984:56.Google Scholar

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66. Even if our aim is to make the decisions they will want us to have made, acting in what we believe to be their interest is the best bet.

Of course, it may be in the interest of future people that they are able to exercise their auton omy maximally. If this were the case, it would not provide us with an argument against enhancing these people, but maybe with a duty to enhance their capacities for autonomy. (Max Charlesworth defends the view that autonomy in this sense is the relevant criterion when making decisions about enhancement engineering; see Charlesworth, M. Life, Death, Genes and Ethics. Crows Nest: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1991:93–5.)Google Scholar

67. See note 17. Glover, 1984:149.Google Scholar

68. See note 11. Holtug, 1993.Google Scholar