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What Is the Habermasian Perspective in Bioethics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 February 2012

DARRYL GUNSON
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Extract

The overarching question addressed in this article is whether there is something that might reasonably be called a Habermasian approach or perspective that bioethical enquiry might utilize.

Type
Special Section: Kant, Habermas, and Bioethics
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , April 2012 , pp. 188 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

Notes

1. Habermas, J.The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2003.Google Scholar

2. Habermas, J.The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society. Boston: Beacon Press; 1984.Google Scholar

3. Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston: Beacon Press, 1985.Google Scholar

4. Habermas, J.The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity; 1987.Google Scholar

5. Habermas, J.Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Oxford: Polity; 1990.Google Scholar

6. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 5.

7. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 11.

8. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 12.

9. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 13.

10. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 42.

11. Although Habermas is very much aware that genes do not determine exactly how a child will “turn out,” he does sometimes write as though genetic determinism is true. For example, “But in the case of a genetic determinism carried out according to the parents’ own preferences. . . .” See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 62.

12. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 63.

13. “Liberal eugenics needs to face the question of whether the perceived dedifferentiation of the grown and the made is likely to affect the autonomous conduct and moral self-understanding of the programmed person.” See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 52–3 (emphasis in the original).

14. See Mameli, M.Reproductive cloning, genetic engineering and the autonomy of the child: The moral agent and the open future. Journal of Medical Ethics 2007;33(2):87–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. “We should remain sceptical about this imaginary dramatisation of anticipated facts.” See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 54.

16. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 47.

17. We might gloss this as related to the values of dignity and autonomy. Dignity seems to depend on accepting an element of ourselves as given or beyond human control, whereas we also understand ourselves as autonomous beings. This means that we can make choices about how to live and about other aspects of our lives. See Häyry, M.Rationality and the Genetic Challenge: Making People Better? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar According to Häyry, some may say that Habermas overstresses the choice part and does not protect the grown part, whereas others would say that he does not protect the choice element enough.

18. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 71.

19. By this I mean tracing conceptual connections between the central ideas that form part of the cultural background to our societies, and also, perhaps, working out the consequences of upsetting these connections. This may include philosophical ideas, but also things that shape our cultural understanding of ourselves, such as art and literature.

20. I have in mind something like Rawls’s “natural primary goods,” which all people could be expected to benefit from, because they are regarded as essential for any life project, whatever it might be. Still, just what such goods are might be quite difficult to determine. Even something such as health has been questioned. Habermas, for example, queries whether health qualifies, given that its value may differ in the context of different life histories. “Parents can’t even know whether a mild physical handicap may not prove in the end to be an advantage to their child” (see note 1, Habermas 2003, at 86). This may be so, but as others have argued, this uncertainty is a perennial feature of the relationship between us and future generations; the uncertainty does not allow us to avoid the responsibility for doing what we think is right (Harris J. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press; 2007, at 142).

21. See note 5, Habermas 1990:196–215.

22. Brand, A.The Force of Reason. Sydney: Allen and Unwin; 1990.Google Scholar

23. “Analogous to” because normative claims are not true or false; rather, according to Habermas, they are validated along the same lines as any other claim—by appeals to antecedent principles or criteria for establishing them.

24. See note 5, Habermas 1990, at 197.

25. As Habermas puts it, “I must prove that my moral principle is not just a reflection of the prejudices of adult, white, well-educated Western males of today.” See note 5, Habermas 1990, at 197.

26. Hegel GWF. Natural Law. Philadelphia: UPP; 1975, at 77.

27. See note 5, Habermas 1990, at 205–6.

28. Cf. Habermas 1990, at 201.

29. Habermas, J. Discourse ethics: Notes on a program of philosophical justification. In his Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: MIT Press; 1990:43–116.Google Scholar

30. For the view that Kant builds his substantive moral views into his conception of rationality see Walker R. Kant. London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul; 1978, at 158. It may also be argued that Habermas’s procedural concept of communicative rationality trades on culturally specific ideas about autonomy, respect, inclusion, and so on (see Gunson D. Global bioethics, collective identities and the limits of rationality. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2010;4(1):1–37).

31. See note 5, Habermas 1990, at 93, emphasis in the original.

32. See note 5, Habermas 1990, at 89.

33. See note 5, Habermas 1990, at 93.

34. See, for example, Culler, J.Communicative competence and normative force. New German Critique 1984;35:133–44.Google Scholar

35. For a discussion of this and related points see note 30, Gunson 2010.

36. See note 5, Habermas 1990, at 65–6.

37. Cf. Benhabib, S.Critique, Norm and Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press; 1980, at 294–5.Google Scholar

38. See Outhwaite, W.Habermas: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity; 1994:44–57.Google Scholar

39. For a discussion of the idea of a reconstructive science see Habermas, J. What is universal pragmatics? In: Communication and the Evolution of Society. London: Heinemann; 1979.Google Scholar

40. Cf. Habermas, J. Reconstruction and interpretation in the social sciences. In his Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Oxford: Polity; 1990.Google Scholar

41. See note 5, Habermas 1990.

42. See Gunson, D, Collins, C.From the I to the We: Discourse ethics, identity and the pragmatics of partnership in the west of Scotland. Communication Theory 1997;7(4):278–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43. Forester, J, ed. Critical Theory and Public Life. Cambridge: MIT Press; 1985.Google Scholar The discussion of public inquiries might serve as a useful model for the assessment of bioethical decisionmaking.

44. See note 43. This is an example of the application of DE to the process of establishing community partnerships in the west of Scotland.