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Responsibility and Priority in Liver Transplantation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2009

WALTER GLANNON
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Extract

In a provocative 1991 paper, Alvin Moss and Mark Siegler argued that it may be fair to give individuals with alcohol-related end-stage liver disease (ARESLD) lower priority for a liver transplant than those who develop end-stage liver disease (ESLD) from other factors. Like other organs, there is a substantial gap between the available livers for transplantation and the number of people who need liver transplants. Yet, unlike those with end-stage renal disease, who can survive for some time on dialysis before receiving a kidney transplant, those with liver failure will die without a liver transplant.

Type
Special Section: Open Forum
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , January 2009 , pp. 23 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

1. Moss A, Siegler M. Should alcoholics compete equally for liver transplantation? JAMA 1991;265:1295–8.

2. See note 1, Moss, Siegler 1991:1296.

3. See note 1, Moss, Siegler 1991:1296.

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23. See note 1, Moss, Siegler 1991:1297.

24. See note 21, Veatch 2007:2.

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