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Must Good Causes Compete?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2009

Mary Midgley
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of New-castle-on-Tyne

Extract

Rather than discussing the economic side of competition, the actual shortage of resources, I want to discuss competitiveness itself, the competitive attitude. Certainly good causes must in a sense be in competition; that is, they must share resources. The question is should they actively compete? Should they see themselves as competing?

I want to look at a range of difficulties that seem endemic to controversy as such. Some of the difficulties are psychological, but that does not mean that they are accidental, neurotic oddities of particular disputants. They afflict almost everybody who must argue about something important. Other difficulties are in-trinsic in the nature of human life–clashes between rival values, needs, and ideals, places where no fully satisfactory resolution seems attainable.

Type
From the Bioethics in a Changing World International Conference, Cambridge University
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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