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A Moral Argument against Turning Off an Implantable Cardiac Device: Why Deactivation Is a Form of Killing, Not Simply Allowing a Patient to Die

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2019

THOMAS S. HUDDLE
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Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , April 2019 , pp. 329 - 337
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

Notes

1. See, for instance, Rachels, J. The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality New York: Oxford University Press; 1986, Ch. 7;Google Scholar Brock, D. Taking human life. Ethics 1985;95:851–65.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

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10. See note 7, Sulmasy 1998, at 57.

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