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The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2021

Marc Champagne
Marc Champagne*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Surrey, BC, V3W 2M8, Canada
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

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Type
Commentary
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , July 2021 , pp. 448 - 454
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Notes

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40. The shorter life spans of replicants, which is a much more important difference, would also have to match ours.

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50. See note 27, Berman 1994:326.