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Let Us Assume That Gene Editing is Safe—The Role of Safety Arguments in the Gene Editing Debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 December 2018

SØREN HOLM
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Abstract:

This paper provides an analysis of the statement, made in many papers and reports on the use of gene editing in humans, that we should only use the technology when it is safe. It provides an analysis of what the statement means in the context of nonreproductive and reproductive gene editing and argues that the statement is inconsistent with the philosophical commitments of some of the authors, who put it forward in relation to reproductive uses of gene editing, specifically their commitment to Parfitian nonidentity considerations and to a legal principle of reproductive liberty.

But, if that is true it raises a question about why the statement is made. What is its discursive and rhetorical function? Five functions are suggested, some of which are more contentious and problematic than others. It is argued that it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the “only when it is safe” rider is part of a deliberate obfuscation aimed at hiding the full implications of the arguments made about the ethics of gene editing and their underlying philosophical justifications.

Keywords

gene editinggene modificationgene therapyharmnonidentity problemprinciple of procreative beneficencereproductive libertysafetywrong
Type
Special Section: Genome Editing: Biomedical and Ethical Perspectives
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , January 2019 , pp. 100 - 111
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

Notes

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