Extradition from the United Kingdom, save to the Republic of Ireland, is now governed by the Extradition Act 1989. It repealed the Extradition Act 1870 and the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967.

In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), decided on 14 February 2002, the International Court of Justice held that an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs was immune from criminal proceedings before a foreign domestic court, even if the charges involved crimes against humanity. Human rights advocates might well regard this decision as a serious setback. Decided against a widespread euphoria brought forth by, and largely due to a neglect of an important dictum in, the historic holding in Pinochet No. 3 [2000] 1 A.C. 147, the case serves further to clarify a crucial point of State immunity in current international law. The Pinochet case dealt with the immunity of a former, as opposed to a serving, Head of State. While the majority of the Law Lords only mentioned in passing that the immunity enjoyed by a serving Head of State ratione personae was absolute, the International Court of Justice stated, in unambiguous language, that:

The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Al-Adsani v. UK (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 273 does not openly reject the view that torturers have become enemies of all mankind. It does however affirm that they can protect themselves abroad with a magic weapon that neither pirates nor slave traders usually possessed. This is the shield of sovereign immunity, which prevents State torturers from being tried before courts of a foreign State. In Al-Adsani, the ECHR, by a bare majority of 9 votes to 8, decided that States and their officials can invoke immunity even where they are accused of breaches of peremptory norms of international law (ius cogens), i.e. norms which, by definition, admit of no derogation (Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

The House of Lords has now ruled in favour of the Local Government Finance auditor in the well-known “homes for votes” saga involving Dame Shirley Porter and Mr. Weeks, leader and deputy leader of the Conservative Party of Westminster City Council: Porter v. Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 37. It will be remembered that the auditor found Dame Shirley and Mr. Weeks jointly and severally by their wilful misconduct to have caused the Council to lose approximately £31 million, for which they were liable under the Local Government Finance Act 1982, s. 20. His decision was upheld by the Divisional Court but reversed by the Court of Appeal (Kennedy and Schiemann L.JJ., Robert Walker L.J. dissenting): [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1420. Two sets of issues arose for decision by the House of Lords: procedural issues relating to the conduct of the auditor’s enquiry (on which the leading speech was delivered by Lord Hope) and substantive issues relating to the findings of the auditor and the lower courts (dealt with by Lord Bingham). Three of these issues are of particular interest.

Mary Cooper was one of thousands of investors who advanced funds to Eron Mortgage Corporation, a licensed British Columbia mortgage broker specialising in large syndicated loans. When Eron went out of business it owed the investors over $180 million more than it was able to pay. Unable to recover from Eron, the investors turned their attention to Robert Hobart, the statutory official in charge of regulating mortgage brokers. The investors alleged that Eron had used their money for unauthorised purposes such as funding interest payments on non-performing mortgages. They further alleged that Hobart had been aware of these problems, all serious violations of statute, but that he had delayed in suspending Eron’s licence and had failed to notify investors that he was investigating Eron. Cooper therefore sought to bring a class action on behalf of the investors against Hobart and the provincial government.

In Bradford-Smart v. West Sussex County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 07, Leah Bradford-Smart, a former pupil of a school maintained by West Sussex County Council, based her claim for damages for psychiatric injury and consequent loss on the school’s failure to prevent fellow pupils bullying her outside the school. It is clear that “a school is under a duty to take reasonable care for the health and safety of the pupils in its charge” (Van Oppen v. Clerk to Bedford Charity Trustees [1990] 1 W.L.R. 235, 250), and that it also assumes responsibility for a pupil’s educational needs (X v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 A.C. 633, 766, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Phelps v. Hillingdon London Borough Council [2000] 2 A.C. 619). In Bradford-Smart, the Court of Appeal held that a school is generally responsible for its pupils only when they are inside the school, but that exceptional circumstances might arise when failing to take reasonable steps to combat bullying occurring outside the school would give rise to a breach of its duty of care to a pupil.

Carlo Vellino, who had numerous convictions for burglary, theft and other offences, received frequent visits in his second-floor flat from the police. To their knowledge, he often sought to evade arrest by leaving through a window, normally lowering himself to the ground from a balcony. In September 1994 three police officers arrested him in the flat for failure to appear in court. In circumstances of which there was conflicting evidence, the two officers who were holding Vellino let go of him, and he leaped out of the window, fracturing his skull when he hit the ground. He claimed damages for the resulting brain damage and tetraplegia, alleging that the Chief Constable was vicariously liable for the officers’ negligence. The Court of Appeal (Schiemann L.J. and Sir Murray Stuart-Smith, Sedley L.J. dissenting) upheld Elias J.’s decision to dismiss the claim, on the grounds that: (i) the police owed an arrested person no duty to take care that he was not injured in a foreseeable attempt to escape from lawful custody; (ii) the claimant was the author of his own misfortune; and (iii) as a matter of policy he should not be allowed to base a claim on his own criminal act of escaping from lawful custody (ex turpi causa non oritur actio): Vellino v. Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police [2001] EWCA Civ 1249, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 218.

It is well established that in the tort of private nuisance an occupier of land is liable not only for those nuisances which he has created, but also for those which he has continued. An occupier continues a nuisance which exists on his land if, with actual or constructive knowledge of its existence, he fails to take reasonable steps to eliminate it. Two recent decisions, in the rather different contexts of root encroachment by a London plane tree and flooding from a sewer, have provided guidance on the legal consequences of continuing a nuisance.

You receive information that someone you know is having an affair. Do you tell the person’s spouse? It is not an easy question. Should you think, “This is none of my business?” But the spouse might rightly blame you for not telling him or her. Whatever you think, however, you are unlikely to conclude that you should ring a newspaper and sell it the story for several thousand pounds. As a way of informing the wronged spouse, it lacks a certain fitness for purpose.

In 1993 Leggatt L.J. said in Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co. v. Product Star Shipping Ltd. (The Product Star) [1993] 1 Lloyds Rep. 397, 404:

The doctrine of mistake in contract law has had a chequered history. Indeed, its very existence has been questioned (see, e.g., Slade, (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 385 and Atiyah and Bennion, (1961) 24 M.L.R. 421). But, like a bad penny that will not go away, the doctrine remains stubbornly embedded in the contractual landscape and has in fact witnessed a small revival of sorts in recent years (see, e.g., Clarion Ltd. v. National Provident Institution [2000] 2 All E.R. 265 (noted Phang, (2002) 1 J.O.R. 21)).

Two fraudsters persuaded Dextra Bank to draw a cheque for $US2,999,000 payable to the Bank of Jamaica (“BOJ”). They led Dextra to believe that BOJ wished to borrow the money as a loan. BOJ, however, was a victim of the same fraud and knew nothing of the loan. The fraudsters had caused it to believe that Dextra was selling US currency to it. BOJ’s foreign currency agents received Dextra’s cheque, and forwarded it to BOJ which duly received payment on it. Shortly before the agents received Dextra’s cheque—and the timing was significant—they had drawn Jamaican dollar cheques on BOJ’s behalf, payable to the supposed sellers of the US currency. In this they acted on the fraudsters’ instructions. Most of the payees of the cheques were fictitious, and once the proceeds had been paid into the relevant accounts, the fraudsters appropriated them.

Despite the absence of fraud on the part of the beneficiary of a letter of credit, is the issuing or confirming bank entitled to refuse to pay the beneficiary on the ground that a tendered document is a “nullity” in the sense that it was forged by a third party or has been executed without the authority of the person by whom it purports to be issued?

Here we are concerned with two cases involving the same parties. The first is reported as Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd. [1997] Ch. 23, [1998] Ch. 495, and was noted in [1997] C.L.J. 257 and [1998] C.L.J. 22. Cosslett, an engineering firm, had brought two large coal-washing machines on to a site belonging to the local council pursuant to a contract to reclaim land on which colliery waste had been dumped. Cosslett ran into financial difficulties and abandoned the work, and was later put into administration. The council, acting under a power conferred by the contract, used the machines to finish the job (employing a second contractor, Burrows). The first action was brought by Cosslett’s administrator under the Insolvency Act 1986, s. 234, demanding summarily that the machines be handed over to him. The Court of Appeal held that the contract did indeed authorise the council to use the machines in this way, and that so long as the work was continuing the administrator’s claim must fail. But there was a second point. Another provision in the contract (Clause 63) gave the council power to sell the abandoned machines and use the proceeds to discharge any debts owed to it by Cosslett. The Court of Appeal held that this clause created a floating charge which, not having been registered under the Companies Act 1986, s. 395, was void in the ensuing administration. However, this did not affect the council’s right to use the machines, and judgment was given in favour of the council.

In three judgments delivered on 27 September 2001 (Cases C-63/99 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Gloszczuk and Gloszczuk; C-235/99 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Kondova; C-257/99 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Barkoci and Malik), the ECJ ruled on the legal effects of provisions in the so-called “Europe Agreements” (EAs), Association Agreements concluded in the early 1990s between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and certain Eastern European countries, of the other part, with a view to promoting harmonious economic development with and within these countries and to acknowledging the ultimate political objective on the part of these States eventually to become Members of the European Union.

A Question which is increasingly asked is whether there is a right to be a parent. The recent decision of the House of Lords in Re B (Adoption: Natural Parent) [2002] 1 F.L.R. 196 may provoke some debate about whether there is a right not to be one.

In R. v. Quereshi [2002] 1 W.L.R. 518 the defendant, who was Asian, was convicted of arson with intent to endanger life, for which he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. A few days after the verdict a juror made a series of allegations to the court administrator which the administrator later summarised as follows:

On hearing this, Quereshi unsurprisingly appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to have the allegations properly investigated.

It has long been recognised that Industrial and Intellectual Law is territorial. A comparison with laws relating to landed property led English courts to conclude that they should refrain from exercising jurisdiction when any such foreign laws are involved. The Brussels Convention has eliminated this self-restraint. However it has been overrruled that in reality a special choice of law is in issue. The territoriality of legislation has a positive as well as a negative effect. Negatively no foreign law will be applied locally. Choice of law is replaced by a division of laws territorially.

It has been a traditional requirement of rescission (ab initio), even as a response to fraudulent misrepresentation, that it must be possible to restore both parties to the relevant contract to some equivalence of their pre-contract positions. A line of cases involving rescission of guarantees has, however, permitted a surety to be entirely released from the guarantee even though the creditor has relied on it by supplying credit to the principal debtor. The suggested rationalisation is that the traditional requirement is confined to cases where rescission in specie is being sought and the innocent party can be adequately protected by a claim for damages. The article also addresses the relevance to rescission of the restitutionary concepts of change or position and counter-restitution.

This article analyses Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins [2001] UKHL 43, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 806 in which, for the first time, the House of Lords considered the meaning of the word “dwelling” (an essential ingredient of security under the Rent Act 1977 and the Housing Acts of 1985 and 198) and overturned the previously accepted proposition that premises cannot be a dwelling unless cooking facilities are provided. The implications of the decision are considered not only in the context of the private rented sector but also in relation to secure tenancies granted by local authorities and certain other public landlords.