1 John Gava, ‘Scholarship and Community” (1994) 16 Sydney L. Rev. 443, 443.

2 Fletcher, George P., ‘Two Modes of Legal Thought” (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 970, 970Google Scholar; Rhode, Deborah L., ‘Legal Scholarship” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1327.Google Scholar For an exception, see Kennedy, David, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box” (2000) 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L. and Pol. 335,Google Scholar though the purpose of this article was to discuss international law rather than legal scholarship generally. See also Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Corporations’ in Cane, Peter and Tushnet, Mark (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford 2003), 486, 501-507,Google Scholar which outlines in a summary way various themes developed in this paper.

3 On the volume of legal scholarship, see Birks, Peter, ‘The Academic and the Practitioner’ (1998) 18 Legal Stud. 397, 398;Google Scholar Zimmermann, Reinhard, ‘Law Reviews: A Foray Through a Strange World’ (1998) 47 Emory L.J. 659, 692-693;Google Scholar Daniel, Darla L., ‘Of Deckchairs, Icebergs and Gestalt Shifts: Unger, Kahn, and a Student of Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2001) 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 851, 852.Google Scholar On the literature on legal scholarship, see Beazley, Mary B. and Edwards, Linda H., ‘The Process and the Product: A Bibliography of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship’ (1998) 49 Mercer L. Rev. 741.Google Scholar

4 It is being assumed that the fact legal academics spend a lot of time thinking about scholarship provides sufficient justification for the analysis undertaken here. A different—and stronger—case could be made for undertaking this study if academic writing on law had a substantial influence on society at large. There no doubt has been legal scholarship which has had a significant impact on economic, political and social trends. Still, since most of what is published by legal academics is ignored outside legal circles, justifying a study such as this on the basis of the general significance of academic writing on law is not really tenable.

5 Bryden, David P., ‘Scholarship about Scholarship’ (1992) 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 641, 641.Google Scholar

6 See below notes 323 to 324 and accompanying text.

7 For a criticism of ‘congenial pluralism’ in the context of legal scholarship, see John C.P. Goldberg, ‘Twentieth Century Tort Theory’ (2003) 91 Geo. L.J. 513, 580-582.

8 There is a tendency to assume that everyone knows what is meant by scholarship in general and legal scholarship in particular: David Feldman, ‘The Nature of Legal Scholarship’ (1989) 52 Mod. L. Rev. 498, 498.

9 Lasson, Kenneth, ‘Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure’ (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 935;Google Scholar Rubin, Edward L., ‘Legal Scholarship’ in Patterson, Dennis (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) pp. 562, 562.Google Scholar

10 On this definition of theoretical legal scholarship and how it relates to writing about jurisprudence, see Cheffins, Brian R., ‘Using Theory to Study Law: A Company Law Perspective’ (1998) 58 Cambridge L.J. 197, 198.Google Scholar

11 Rubin, above note 9, at 564-566; Richard A. Posner, ‘The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship” (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1113, 1113-1116. On various sub-categories of doctrinal scholarship, see Kissam, Philip C., ‘The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship” (1988) 63 Wash. L. Rev. 221, 230-235.Google Scholar

12 Rubin, above note 9, at 564-566.

13 Cheffins, above note 10, at 197; Chesterman, Michael and Weisbrot, David, ‘Legal Scholarship in Australia” (1987) 50 Mod. L. Rev. 709, 722–724;Google Scholar Richard Posner, ‘Legal Scholarship Today” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1317, 1320.

14 Indeed, at least one author of a book on the subject has refrained from offering a definition: Mathiopoulos, Margarita, History and Progress—In Search of the European and American Mind (New York 1989)Google Scholar, 5 (saying that to ‘attempt to arrive at a conclusive definition of progress would be as presumptuous as trying to prove or disprove the existence of supernatural powers”).

15 On these questions, see Charles van Doren, , The Idea of Progress (New York 1967), 5–6, 1315, 23, 31-32, 261-263.Google Scholar

16 Ibid. at 6; Bury, John Bagnell, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth (London 1924), 2, 5.Google Scholar

17 van Doren, above note 15, at 324, 333; Nisbet, Robert, History of the Idea of Progress (London: Heinemann, 1980), 5;Google Scholar Michael D. Birnhack, ‘The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law” (2001) 1 Buff. Intell. Prop. J. 3, 13-14. Still, there are some who contend that cumulativity may not be an essential element of progress. See, for example, Laudan, Larry, Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method and Evidence (Boulder, Colo. 1996), 22–23.Google Scholar

18 Rubin Edward L., ‘Law And and the Methodology of Law” [997] Wis. L. Rev. 521, 526; Edwards, Carl N., ‘In Search of Legal Scholarship: Strategies for the Integration of Science into the Practice of Law” (1998) 8 So. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 21.Google Scholar

19 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘The Law and Society Movement” (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 763, 766.

20 Pera, Marcello, ‘In Praise of Cumulative Progress” in Pitt, Joseph C. (ed.), Changes and Progress in Modern Science (Dordecht 1985), pp. 267, 267;Google Scholar Beyea, Jan and Berger, Daniel, ‘Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures” (2001) 64 Law and Contemp. Probs. 327, 330–331.Google Scholar

21 Edwards, above note 18, at 24; Nancy Levit, ‘Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and Scientific Method” (1989) 58 Fordham L. Rev. 263, 266-272. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 590, where Justice Blackman observed that ‘(s)cience … is a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement …”.

22 For a classic statement of this version of scientific method, see Popper, Karl R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London 1959).Google Scholar Scientific method, however, can also be based upon observation and induction. On the distinction between the ‘deductive” and ‘inductive” approaches to science, see Spence, David B., ‘A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued'’ (2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 400–404.Google Scholar

23 The notion of ‘legal science'’ was a popular one throughout the 19th century in the United States but Langdell's approach constituted a substantial departure from earlier forms. See Howard Schweber, ‘The ‘Science’ of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education'’ (1999) 17 Law and History Rev. 421, 455-464.

24 Gordon, Robert W., ‘Lawyers, Scholars, and the ‘Middle Ground’ ‘’ (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2075, 2079-2080;Google Scholar Friedman, Lawrence M., American Law in the Twentieth Century (New Haven 2002), 490.Google Scholar

25 On Langdell's version of legal science, see Duxbury, Neil, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford 1995), 14–24;Google Scholar Grey, Thomas C., ‘Langdell's Orthodoxy’ (1983-1984) 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1;Google Scholar Kronman, Anthony T., The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Cambridge, Mass. 1993), 170–175.Google Scholar

26 Levit, above note 21 at 276; Sebok, Anthony J., Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (Cambridge 1998), 91–96.Google Scholar Still, the approach adopted by Langdell was not purely inductive. See Patterson, Dennis, ‘Langdell's Legacy’ (1995) 90 Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 196, 200, n. 22.Google Scholar

27 Duxbury, above note 25 at 24-25, 36-37, 79; John Veilleux, ‘The Scientific Model in Law’ (1987) 75 Geo. L.J. 1967, 1977-1978.

28 Kronman, above note 25, at 195-201; Horwitz, Morton J., The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York 1992), 209–211;Google Scholar Brian Leiter, ‘Is There an ‘American’ Jurisprudence?’ (1997) 17 Oxford J. of Legal St. 367, 377-378.

29 Kronman, above note 25, at 225-232, 240.

30 Posner, above note 11, at 1121-1122; Jason Scott Johnston, , ‘Law, Economics, and PostRealist Explanation’ (1990) 24 Law and Soc’y Rev. 1217, 1231–1232;Google Scholar Macey, Jonathan R., ‘Law and the Social Sciences’ (1997) 21 Harv J. L. and Pub. Pol’y 171, 172–173.Google Scholar

31 Daniel, above note 3, at 866-867; Posner, above note 11, at 1120-1121.

32 Friedman, above note 24, at 501; Werro, Franz, ‘Notes on the Purpose and Aims of Comparative Law” (2001) 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1225, 1229.Google Scholar Note, though, that scientific method, as described here, does not directly influence the Continental version of legal science. See Fletcher, above note 2, at 988-989.

33 See, for example, Veilleux, above note 27; Ziegler, Peter, ‘A General Theory of Law as a Paradigm for Legal Research” (1988) 51 Mod. L. Rev. 569;Google Scholar Alces, Peter A., ‘Contract Reconceived” (2001) 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39, 95–97.Google Scholar

34 John Baldwin and Gwynn Davis, ‘Empirical Research in Law” in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 880, 881-882; Michael Heise, ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism” [2002] U. Ill. Rev. 819, 821, 824-826, 831.

35 Thomas S. Ulen, ‘A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law” [2002] U. Ill. Rev. 875, 909-910, 912-916.

36 Ibid., at 894-895.

37 Ibid., at 895.

38 Ibid.

39 Edwards, above note 18, at 21-22; Rubin, above note 18, at 550; Daintith, Terence, ‘Legal Research and Legal Values” (1989) 52 Mod. L. Rev. 352, 357;Google Scholar Rakoff, Todd D., ‘Introduction” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1278, 1285–1286.Google Scholar

40 Edwards, above note 18, at 23-26; Rubin, above note 18, at 524-528, 542; Michael J. Graetz and Charles H. Whitbread, ‘Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a University Law School” (1981) 67 Va. L. Rev. 445, 455.

41 Friedman, above note 24, at 501; Cramton, Roger C., ‘Demystifying Legal Scholarship” (1986) 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 6–8;Google Scholar Eisenberg, Rebecca S., ‘The Scholar as Advocate” (1993) 43 J. Legal Educ. 391, 394;Google Scholar Brown, Graham, ‘Should Law Professors Practice What They Teach?” (2001) 42 So. Tex. L. Rev. 316, 335.Google Scholar

42 Rubin, Edward L., ‘On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship” (1992) 80 Cal. L. Rev. 889, 904.Google Scholar

43 Rubin, above note 18, at 540-541.

44 John Pheby, Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke 1988), 32-36; Daniel M. Hausman, ‘Kuhn, Lakatos and the Character of Economics” in Roger E. Backhouse (ed.), New Directions in Economic Methodology (New York 1994), 195, 208-210; Gregory S. Crespi, ‘The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias” (1991) 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 231, 232-233, 237-242.

45 For examples of those who have cast doubt on the scientific credentials of law and economics, see Levit, above note 21, at 282-285; Mark V. Tushnet, ‘Law, Science, and Law and Economics’ (1997) 21 Harv J. L. and Public Policy 47, 51-52. For a response, see Thomas S. Ulen, ‘The Prudence of Law and Economics: Why More Economics is Better’ (1996) 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 773, 788-793.

46 ‘You Can't Follow the Science Wars Without a Battle Map’ Economist, December 11, 1997, 109, 109-110.

47 Kuhn's seminal work was The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago 1996). The book has sold more than a million copies since its initial publication in 1962 and it has been described as ‘the most influential academic work of the second half of the twentieth century’: Mark Blaug, ‘Book Review’ (2001) 33 Hist. Pol. Econ. 855, 855.

48 To illustrate, a search of Westlaw's ‘JLR’ directory conducted in February 2004 with the query ‘’ ‘Thomas Kuhn’ and paradigm’ yielded 579 documents. This electronic database has wide coverage of US law reviews extending back to the early 1980s.

49 Summarising Kuhn is difficult, in part because Kuhn qualified many of his assertions after the first edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962). On this pattern, see Blaug, above note 47, at 855. For a thorough overview of Kuhn's work, see Paul Hoyningen- Heune, , Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science (Chicago 1993).Google Scholar

50 The shift away from the ‘paradigm’ terminology to ‘disciplinary matrix’ was an example of Kuhn qualifying his basic concepts as time progressed. See Kuhn, above note 47, at 182; Blaug, above note 47, at 855.

51 Kuhn, above note 47, at 102, 110, 112, 147-151.

52 Ibid, at 170-173, 206-207.

53 Many have inferred from Kuhn's work that one paradigm is just as good as another, but it is open to question whether he believed this: Ulen, above note 35, at 885.

54 Louis Menand, ‘Undisciplined’ Wilson Q., Autumn 2001, 51, 58-59.

55 Esther-Mirjam Sent, ‘Thomas Kuhn: The Wrong Person at the Wrong Time, by Steve Fuller’ (2001) 63 Review of Politics 390, 390.

56 Robert Fulford, ‘Paradigm: Putting the ‘P’ Word in Perspective’ Globe and Mail, June 5, 1999, at D9; Wade Roush, ‘Dwarf Standing on Giants’ Tech. Rev., Sept./Oct. 2000, 126 at 126.

57 Steven L. Winter, ‘‘Bull Durham’ and the Uses of Theory’ (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 639, 670, n. 162.

58 Alces, above note 33, at 79-87.

59 Martinez George A., ‘Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shift’ [2000] U. Ill. L. Rev. 517.

60 Stempel, Jeffrey W., ‘New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform’ (1993) 53 Brook. L. Rev. 659.Google Scholar

61 Juan F. Perera, ‘The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The ‘Normal Science’ of American Racial Thought’ (1997) 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1213.

62 As Kuhn observed: ‘I used to say that if you go through college in science and mathematics you may well get your bachelor's degree without having been exposed to the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. If you go through college in any other field you will read it at least once. That was not altogether what I wanted (quoted in Blaug, above note 47, at 855)’. See also Kuhn, above note 47, at 208-209.

63 Note, though, that Kuhn explicitly identified the use of precedent in judicial decisions as an example of paradigm elaboration: Kuhn, above note 47, at 23.

64 Above note 39 and accompanying text.

65 Ziegler, above note 33, at 573-574; Stempel, above note 60, at 699.

66 See above notes 40-42 and related discussion.

67 Daintith, above note 39, at 356-357; Rubin, above note 42, at 895-896; Charles W. Collier, ‘Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm’ (1993) 42 Duke L.J. 840, 842844.

68 See Laudan, above note 17, at 8-9, 14-17; ‘You Can't Follow …’ above note 46, at 110.

69 See, for example, Rubin, above note 42; Singer, Joseph W., ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’ (1984) 94 Yale L.J. 1. 33–35;Google Scholar John S. Elson, ‘The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?’ (1989) 39 J. Legal Educ. 343, 356-357, 362-364.

70 This follows the approach adopted by Kissam, above note 11, at 254-55. Still, it must be acknowledged that the working assumption is a somewhat heroic one, since entire volumes have been devoted to ascertaining the precise content of ‘truth’. See, for example, Campbell, Richard, Truth and Historicity (Oxford 1992).Google Scholar

71 See Priest, George L., ‘The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards’ (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1929. 1940–1942;Google Scholar Robert C. Ellickson, ‘The Market for ‘Law-And’ Scholarship’ (1997) 21 Harv J. L. and Public Policy 157, 164-170; Erwin Chereminsky and Catherine Fisk, ‘In Defense of the Big Tent: The Importance of Recognizing the Many Audiences for Legal Scholarship’ (1999) 34 Tulsa L.J. 667, 675-676.

72 Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937, (Cambridge, Mass. 1991), 346. On the more general proposition that the operation of market forces can yield intellectual progress, see van Doren, above note 15, at 95-97; Nisbet, above note 17, at 187-193, 299 (focusing primarily on the work of Adam Smith).

73 See Lasson, above note 9, at 948-949; Chereminsky and Fisk, above note 71, at 677-678.

74 Note, though, that consumer preferences in the legal scholarship market are not homogeneous: Michael D. McClintock, ‘The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study” (1998) 51 Okla. L. Rev. 659, 686-687.

75 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, ‘The Deprofessionalisation of Legal Teaching and Scholarship” (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921, 1925.

76 Eisenberg, above note 41 at 391-398, Richard B. Schmitt, ‘Rules May Require Law Professors to Disclose Fees” Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at B1; Richard Lippitt, ‘Intellectual Honesty, Industry and Interest Sponsored Professorial Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money, or is the Money Earning the Viewpoint?” (2001) 47 Wayne L. Rev. 1075, 1081-1085, 1094-1095.

77 Zimmerman, above note 3, at 692; David L. Gregory, ‘The Assault on Scholarship’ (1991) 32 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 993, 996-997, 1001.

78 Si Li and Hui Ou-Yang, ‘Incentives, Performance, and Academic Tenure’ (2003), unpublished working paper ( providing data indicating that the number of publications and number of citations generated by economists at leading American universities is much the same before and after tenure).

79 Ellickson, above note 71, at 169 (raising the possibility to cast doubt upon it).

80 Rhode, above note 2, at 1356; George L. Priest, ‘Triumphs or Failings of Modern Legal Scholarship and the Conditions of its Production’ (1992) 63 U. Col. L. Rev. 725, 726-729.

81 Peter Goodrich, ‘Of Blackstone's Tower: Metaphors of Distance and Histories of the English Law School’ in Peter B.H. Birks, (ed.), What are Law Schools For? (Oxford 1996), 59, 66.

82 Friedman, above note 24, at 493.

83 Gava, above note 1, at 461, 465; Rhode, above note 2, at 1331; Neil Duxbury, ‘When Trying is Failing: Holmes's ‘Englishness’’ (1997) 63 Brook. L. Rev. 145, 149-150. Not everyone agrees. See, for example, Gregory, above note 77, at 998.

84 Posner, above note 75, at 1928 (making this observation while characterising the production of legal scholarship in sociobiological terms).

85 See, for example, Rhode, above note 2, at 1333-1336, 1339-1342; Zimmerman, above note 3, at 677-681, 689-690; Lasson, above note 9, at 942-948; Friedman, above note 24, at 497-499.

86 Gava, above note 1, at 446.

87 Duxbury, above note 25, at 2-3.

88 Ibid.

89 Paul Brest, ‘Plus ca Change” (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1945, 1950.

90 Friedman, above note 19, at 766. For background on the law and society movement and Friedman's contribution to it, see Duxbury, above note 25, at 440-445.

91 Mark Tushnet, ‘’ ‘Everything Old is New Again’: Early Reflections on the ‘New Chicago School’ [1998] Wisc. L. Rev. 579, 579, 584-585.

92 Kennedy, above note 2, at 340, 376.

93 David S. Clark, ‘Nothing New in 2000? Comparative Law in 1900 and Today’ (2001) 75 Tul. L. Rev., 871, 894.

94 Van Doren, above note 15, at 21-22, 113-114; Birnhack, above note 17, at 9. There is a more pessimistic alternative—regression—which is not considered here. On ‘theories of regress’ see van Doren, above note 15, at 114-116, 119-121.

95 On the link between this phrase and a cyclical trajectory of ideas, see van Doren, above note 15, at 114.

96 For one of the many sources citing the quote, see John Willman, ‘Turning Back the Hands of Time’ Fin. Times, October 19, 2002, FT Weekend, at 4.

97 Still, there may well be scope for progress in such fields. See, for example, van Doren, above note 15, at 331-332.

98 Jim Chen and David Schultz, ‘Force Majeure in Legal Scholarship’ (1997) 14 Const. Comment. 427, 428.

99 Duxbury, above note 25, at 2-3.

100 Leiter, above note 28, at 372.

101 Hagan, John, ‘The New Legal Scholarship: Problems and Prospects’ 1 Can. J. L. and Soc. 35, 35, 37 (1986).Google Scholar

102 John H. Langbein, ‘Scholarly and Professional Objectives in Legal Education: American Trends and English Comparisons’ in Birks, above note 81, 1, 6. See also Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, ‘Introduction and Guide for the Reader’ in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, ix, x.

103 K.D. Kerameus, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Lawyers: Opening Remarks’ (2001) 75 Tul. L. Rev. 865, 870.

104 Virginia Nolan and Edmund Ursin, ‘The Deacademification of Tort Theory’ (1999) 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 59, 59 (quoting an American Association of Law Schools pamphlet but arguing that the sense of accomplishment was misplaced).

105 Ngaire Naffine, ‘In Praise of Legal Feminism’ (2002) 22 Legal Stud. 71, 71.

106 Richard A. Epstein, ‘Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future’ (1997) 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1167, 1172. For a similar verdict, see Thomas S. Ulen, ‘Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of Law’ [1997] Wisconsin L. Rev. 433, 434, 463.

107 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions’ (2001) 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1251, 1253.

108 Ibid. at 1251-1252, 1264.

109 See above notes 76-80 and related discussion.

110 Bikhchandani, Sushil et al., ‘‘Learning from the Behaviour of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades’ (1998) 12 J. Econ. Persp. 151. 160;Google Scholar David Hirshleifer, ‘Informational Cascades and Social Conventions’ in Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 2 (Basingstoke 1998), 300, 302.

111 Hirshleifer, above note 110, at 301, 303.

112 Academia had previously been identified as an environment where the literature seemed relevant: Hirshleifer, above note 110, at 305.

113 Sunstein, above note 107, at 1254-1256.

114 Ibid. at 1256-58. This is known as a ‘reputational cascade’. See Robert C. Ellickson, ‘The Market for Social Norms’ (2001) 3 Am. L. and Econ. Rev. 1, 26. Younger scholars do have an incentive to discover novel approaches, but arguably the legal academy's reward structure requires that their elders can appreciate an innovative move as continuing a tradition with which the elders are associated. See Tushnet, above note 91, at 581.

115 Sunstein, above note 107, at 1258-1261.

116 Ibid. at 1261-1263.

117 Ibid. at 1263-1264.

118 William Twining, ‘Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart’ (1979) 95 Law Q. Rev. 557, 569.

119 Neil Duxbury, ‘History as Hyperbole’ (1995) 15 Oxf. J. Legal Stud. 477, 487.

120 Neil Duxbury, ‘A Century of Legal Studies’ in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 950, 965.

121 Peter Cane, ‘Review of Executive Action’ in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 146, 157. See also Duxbury, above note 120, 964, 969-970.

122 Twining, above note 118, at 570.

123 On the notion that open v. closed networks can have an effect on the quality of legal scholarship, see Posner, above note 13, at 1325.

124 Kennedy, above note 2.

125 Ibid. at 398.

126 Ibid. at 399.

127 Under English law, ‘bankruptcy’ refers solely to insolvency proceedings involving individuals whereas corporate proceedings are referred to as ‘corporate insolvency’. See John Armour et al., ‘‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1699, 1736, n. 187.

128 See, for example, Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law: Studies in Hegelian Jurisprudence (Berkeley 1995); Peter Benson, ‘Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory’ (1989) 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077, 1095-1117; David Gray Carlson, ‘How to do Things With Hegel’ (2000) 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1377.

129 Posner, above note 13, at 1325.

130 For examples, see Jackson, Thomas H., The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, Mass. 1986), 11–16, 29-31, 57-63;Google Scholar Alan Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts’ (1992) 36 J.L. and Econ. 595.

131 Posner, above note 13, at 1325.

132 Rakoff, above note 39, at 1286-1287; Kaye, Judith S., ‘One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing’ (1989) 39 J. Legal Educ. 313. 318–321;Google Scholar Jean R. Sternlight, ‘Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications’ (1996) 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 707, 772-775.

133 Brown, above note 41, at 334.

134 Eisenberg, above note 41, at 393.

135 Ackerman, Bruce A., ‘The Marketplace of Ideas’ (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1131. 1135–1137;Google Scholar Meir Dan-Cohen, ‘Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and its Audience’ (1992) 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 569, 586-588.

136 Davies, Paul L., Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th ed. (London 1997), 36–46;Google Scholar Wegenast, F.W., The Law of Canadian Companies (Toronto 1931), 17–27.Google Scholar

137 Horwitz, above note 28, at 101.

138 Ibid. at 75; Mark M. Hager, ‘Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organisational ‘Real Entity’ Theory’ (1989) 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 575, 579-580.

139 Gregory A. Mark, ‘The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1441, 1465-1467.

140 Dewey, John, ‘The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality’ (1926) 35 Yale L.J. 655.Google Scholar On the impact of this article, see Hager, above note 138, 635-639; Bratton, William W., ‘Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn’ (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 737, 741–43.Google Scholar

141 William W Bratton, , ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History’ (1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1493;Google Scholar Pettet, Ben, Company Law (Harlow 2001), 53.Google Scholar

142 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Brunswick, New Jersey 1991; originally New York 1932).

143 See Mark, above note 139, at 1480-1481 as well as Horwitz, above note 28, at 166; Bratton, above note 140, at 743, 753-754; Mark, Gregory A., ‘Realms of Choice: Finance Capitalism and Corporate Governance’ (1995) 95 Colum. L. Rev. 969, 974-975.Google Scholar

144 On the ‘corporate revolution’ terminology, see Werner, Walter, ‘Corporation Law in Search of its Future’ (1981) 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1611. 1641–1642;Google Scholar Roy, William G., Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton 1997), 3, 176.Google Scholar

145 Berle and Means, above note 142, at 5.

146 Ibid. at 3.

147 Henry G. Manne, ‘The Myth of Corporate Responsibility or Will the Real Ralph Nader Please Stand Up?’ (1970) 26 Bus. Law. 533, 533.

148 Mason, Edward S., ‘Introduction’ in Mason, Edward S. (ed.), The Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge, Mass 1959), pp. 1, 4.Google Scholar

149 Carl Kaysen, ‘The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation’ (1957) 47 Am. Econ. Rev. 311, 316. See also Carney, William J., ‘The Legacy of ‘The Market for Corporate Control’ and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm’ (1999) 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 215, 221, 223Google Scholar (summarising the literature).

150 Bayless Manning, ‘Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform’ (1977) 41 Law and Contemp. Probs. 3, 14.

151 Elliot J. Weiss, ‘Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse’ (1981) 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 343, 414.

152 Eisenberg, Melvin A., ‘Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants’ (1975) 63 Cal. L. Rev. 375. 407–409.Google Scholar

153 J.A.C. Hetherington, , ‘Redefining the Task of Corporation Law’ (1985) 19 U. San. Fran. L. Rev. 229. 235.Google Scholar

154 Bratton, above note 140, at 761-762; Phillip I. Blumberg, ‘The Politicization of the Corporation’ (1971) 26 Bus. Law. 1551, 1556; Scott R. Bowman, The Modern Corporation and American Political Thought: Law, Power, and Ideology (University Park, Pennsylvania 1996), 186, 206.

155 Berle and Means, above note 142, Book I, ch. 3.

156 Ibid. at 309-313. It is somewhat ironic that Berle and Means’ work cast doubt on what was the received wisdom under American law, namely that generating profits for shareholders is the objective corporations should pursue. This is because Berle, in a well-known exchange with E.M. Dodd, expressed doubt whether the law was capable of expanding to accommodate the perceived public responsibilities of the modern corporation. For an overview of the debate, see Dalia Tsuk, ‘Corporations Without Labour: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law’ (2003) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1861, 1891-1896, 1899.

157 See, for example, Weiss, above note 151, at 344-346, 418-426; Abram Chayes, ‘The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law’ in Mason, above note 148, at 25, 38-45.

158 Romano, Roberta, ‘Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform’ (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923. 923.Google Scholar

159 Berle, Adolf A., ‘Modern Functions of the Corporate System’ (1962) 62 Colum. L. Rev. 433. 433.Google Scholar

160 Henry G. Manne, ‘Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of American Corporate Law’ in Gerard Radnitzky and Peter Bernholz, (eds.), Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field of Economics (New York 1987), 219, 223. For similar observations, see Robert Hessen, ‘A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model’ (1979) 30 Hastings L.J. 1327, 1329; George W. Dent, ‘Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation’ [1989] Wisc. L. Rev. 881, 881.

161 Bratton, William W., ‘The ‘Nexus of Contracts’ Corporation: A Critical Appraisal’ (1989) 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407. 415–416;Google Scholar Paddy Ireland, ‘Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the Public Company’ in John Parkinson et al. (eds.), The Political Economy of the Company (Oxford 2000), 141, 157-158.

162 The most influential paper in this movement was Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 307.

163 See ibid. at 311 (‘a nexus for contracting relationships’); Eugene F. Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 290.

164 Jensen and Meckling, above note 162 was the seminal contribution to the literature.

165 The economy theory of agency costs must be distinguished from the legal concept of agency: Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford 1997), 45.

166 Jason Scott Johnston, ‘The Influence of ‘The Nature of the Firm’ on the Theory of Corporate Law’ (1993) 18 J. Corp. L. 213, 234-235.

167 On this and other market-oriented constraints managers face, see Cheffins, above note 165, at 117-123.

168 Lynne L. Dallas, ‘Working Toward a New Paradigm’ in Lawrence E. Mitchell, (ed.), Progressive Corporate Law (Boulder, Colorado 1995), pp. 35, 37; Ross Grantham, ‘The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders’ [1998] C.L.J. 554, 554-555; Paddy Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 Mod. L. Rev. 32, 32, 48-49.

169 Fama, above note 163, at 290.

170 Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘’ ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law’ (1982) 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 917-918; Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green’ (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1428.

171 Cheffins, above note 165, at 54, 71, 87; Klein, William A., ‘The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 1521. 1538–1540;Google Scholar Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass. 1991), 67–68.Google Scholar For criticism of the thesis that shareholders constitute residual claimants, see Lynn A. Stout, ‘Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1189, 1193-1195.

172 Easterbrook, Frank H., and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘Voting in Corporate Law’ (1983) 26 J. L. and Econ. 395, 403. 406;Google Scholar Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm’ (1999) 24 J. Corp. L. 819, 833-834; Thomas A. Smith, ‘The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty’ (1999) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214, 215-217.

173 Easterbrook and Fischel, above note 171, at 38, 68; der Weide, Mark E. Van, ‘Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders’ (1996) 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 27. 57–66;Google Scholar Michael Bradley, et al., ‘‘The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at Crossroads’ (1999) 62 Law and Contemp. Probs. 9, 37-38.

174 Van der Weide, above note 173, at 35-55; Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P., ‘Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective’ (1993) 43 U. Toronto L.J. 401. 416419;Google Scholar Roberta Romano, ‘Corporate Law and Corporate Governance’ (1996) 5 Indus. and Corp. Change 277, 279-280.

175 Douglas M. Branson, ‘A Corporate Paleontologist's Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit’ (1989) 65 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 745, 745.

176 Allen, William T., ‘Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law’ (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1395, 1401. See also Johnston, above note 166, at 213. 231;Google Scholar Lewis A. Kornhauser, ‘The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel’ (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1449, 1449; William W. Bratton, ‘The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation’ (1992) 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 180, 180, 190.

177 J. Mark Ramseyer, ‘Corporate Law’ in Newman, above note 110, vol. 1, 503, 504.

178 Douglas M. Branson, ‘Corporate Governance ‘Reform’ and the New Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2001) 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 605, 619.

179 Allen, above note 176, at 1399 (saying that some of corporate law's ‘most respected minds remain among the unconverted”); G. Mitu Gulati et al., ‘‘Connected Contracts” (2000) 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 887, 947.

180 See, for instance, Orts, Eric W., ‘Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm” (1998) 16 Yale L. and Pol'y Rev. 265, 266-267, 298-299;Google Scholar Blair, Margaret M., and Stout, Lynn A., ‘Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioural Foundations of Corporate Law” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1737-1738;Google Scholar Maynard, Therese H., ‘Law Matters. Lawyers Matter” (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1501, 1507, 1528.Google Scholar

181 Coffee, John C., ‘Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151, 2151;Google Scholar Eisenberg, Melvin A., ‘Corporate Law and Social Norms” (1999) 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253, 1253-1254, 1291.Google Scholar

182 Edward B. Rock, and Michael L. Wachter, ‘Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1629-1630, 1638-1639.

183 Ibid. at 1621-1623. Rock and Wachter prefer, however, to refer to ‘nonlegally enforceable rules and standards” or ‘NLERS” rather than norms: ibid. at 1641.

184 Cf. Marcel Kahan, ‘The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1869, 1870, 1900.

185 On the wording, see Blair, Margaret M., and Stout, Lynn A., ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 278. They have developed their ideas further in Blair and Stout, above not. 180;Google Scholar Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, ‘Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board’ (2001) 79 Wash. U.L.Q. 403.

186 Blair and Stout, ‘Team’ above note 185, at 271-272, 275-285; Blair and Stout, ‘Director’ above note 185, at 411-422.

187 Blair and Stout, ‘Team’ above note 185, at 253, 286, 298-305; Blair and Stout, ‘Director’ above note 185, at 424 425.

188 David Millon, ‘New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law’ (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1001, 1005-1009, 1023-1024.

189 Blair and Stout, above note 180, at 1756-1757; Blair and Stout, ‘Team’ above note 185, at 283.

190 Blair and Stout, ‘Team’ above note 185, at 283-284, 316; Blair and Stout, ‘Director’ above note 185, at 436-443.

191 Blair and Stout, above note 180, at 1741, 1766-1774; Blair and Stout, ‘Director’ above note 185, at 439-440. Blair and Stout do not specifically mention ‘behavioural economics’. They rely sufficiently on the relevant literature, however, to be cited as authors who do so. See, for example, Kent Greenfield, ‘Using Behavioural Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool’ (2002) 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 581, 585, n. 9.

192 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Introduction’ in Cass R. Sunstein, (ed.), Behavioural Law and Economics (Cambridge 2000), 1, 8.

193 Arlen, Jennifer et al., ‘‘Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships’ (2002) 31 J. Legal Stud. 1. 2–4;Google Scholar for examples of corporate law scholarship where inferences have been drawn from behavioural economics, see Greenfield, above note 191, at 585, n. 9.

194 Arlen et al., above note 193, at 5-6, 33.

195 Hansmann, Henry, and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387;Google Scholar Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning’ (2000) 44 Eur. Econ. Rev. 807. See also John Armour and Michael J. Whincop, ‘An Economic Analysis of Shared Property in Partnership and Close Corporations Law’ (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 983.

196 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Essential’ above note 195, at 391.

197 Ibid. at 393-396.

198 Ibid. at 428-432; see also Cheffins, above note 165, at 39 40.

199 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Essential’ above note 195, at 406-423.

200 See above note 139 and related discussion.

201 Cheffins, above note 10, at 209.

202 Cioffi, John W, ‘State of the Art: A Review Essay on ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research’” (2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 501, 509.Google Scholar See also Foster, Nicholas H.D., ‘Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective: England and France’ (2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 573, 606-608.Google Scholar

203 Foster, above note 202 at 586-592; Rogerson, Pippa, ‘Book Review’ (1994) 53 Cambridge L.J. 601. 601;Google Scholar Paddy Ireland, ‘Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory’ (2003) 23 Legal Stud. 453, 453. There were occasional isolated exceptions to the dominant pattern, such as Hadden, Tom, Company Law and Capitalism (London 1972).Google Scholar

204 Stokes, Mary, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in Twining, William (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law (Oxford 1986), pp. 155, 155.Google Scholar

205 Lahey, Kathleen A., and Salter, Sarah W., ‘Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism’ (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 543. 557–569;Google Scholar Katherine H. Hall, ‘The Interior Design of Corporate Law: Why Theory is Vital to the Development of Corporate Law in Australia’ (1996) 6 Austl. J. Corp. L. 1, 1, 4-5; David Wishart, ‘Does the High Court Understand Corporations Law?’ (1996) 6 Austl. J. Corp. L. 424, 436-438 (acknowledging that some theoretical work had been done in Australia but arguing that it was superficial in orientation).

206 This is consistent with general trends. See David E. Van Zandt, ‘American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970: a History, by James E. Herget (Book Review)’ (1991) 28 Hous. L. Rev. 965, 968 (saying that foreign scholars increasingly want to learn more about American theories and approaches and see their own country's scholarship as too closely tied to practice).

207 Cioffi, above note 202, at 508-509.

208 Cheffins, above note 10, at 209; Foster, above note 202, at 593-594; Byran Horrigan, ‘Teaching and Integrating Recent Developments in Corporate Law, Theory and Practice’ (2001) 13 Austl. J. of Corp. L. 182, 185-186.

209 Cioffi, above note 202, at 509; Foster, above note 202, at 593; VanDuzer, J. Anthony, ‘Book Review’ (1998) 77 Can. Bar Rev. 567. 567;Google Scholar Michael Whincop, ‘Of Fault and Default: Contractarianism as a Theory of Anglo-Australian Corporate Law’ (1997) 21 Melb. U. L. Rev. 187, 188-189.

210 Grantham, above note 168, at 578-579; J.E. Parkinson, ‘The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder Interests’ in David Feldman and Frank Meisel, (eds.), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, (London 1996) 121, 121; Robert Yalden, ‘Book Review’ (1999) 31 Can. Bus. L.J. 479, 479; Michael Whincop, ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’ (1999) 19 Oxford J. Legal St. 19, 19-20.

211 Yalden, above note 210, at 479.

212 See, for example, Pettet, above note 141, at 78-81; Ireland, above note 203, at 454 456; Parkinson, above note 210, at 140-141; Dine, Janet, The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge 2000), 12–17.Google Scholar

213 John Lowry and Alan Dignam, Company Law, 2nd ed. (London 2003), 372-73; see also Pettet, above note 141, at 66, n. 105 (citing examples from the ‘immense’ stakeholder literature).

214 See above note 21 and related discussion.

215 Berle and Means, above note 142, Book I, chapters 4, 5.

216 For a careful effort to test and challenge Berle and Means’ empirical findings, see Burch, Philip H., The Managerial Revolution Reassessed: Family Control in America's Large Corporations (Lexington, Mass. 1972), 113–143.Google Scholar

217 Johnston, above note 166, at 220.

218 See, for example, Berle and Means, above note 142, Book II, chapters I-IV, VII.

219 Johnston, above note 166, at 219-229.

220 John C. Coffee, ‘Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response’ (1977) 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1109-1110.

221 See above notes 175-176 and related text.

222 See above note 30 and accompanying discussion.

223 Johnston, above note 166, at 239-240; McChesney, Fred S., ‘Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field” (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1530, 1538.Google Scholar

224 Lyman Johnson, ‘Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise” (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 2215, 2217-2218.

225 Lawrence E. Mitchell, ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law” (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1477, 1477.

226 Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, ‘Event Studies and the Law: Part II—Empirical Studies of Corporate Law” (2002) 4 Am. L. and Econ. Rev. 380, 381.

227 Ibid. at 382.

228 On the informational content of share prices and event studies, see Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, ‘Event Studies and the Law: Part I—Technique and Corporate Litigation” (2002) 4 Am. L. and Econ. Rev. 141, 143 (saying, though, that event studies may be useful even if share prices do not adjust rapidly to new information). On the fact that it cannot be taken for granted that share prices are a reliable indicator of firm value, see Shleifer, Andrei, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural Finance (Oxford 2000) 178–84.Google Scholar

229 For overviews of the literature, see Choi, Stephen J., ‘Law, Finance and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets’ (2002) 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1657. 1672–1673;Google Scholar Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell, ‘International Corporate Governance’ (2003) 38 J. Fin. and Quantitative Analysis 1, 20-26.

230 Fred S. McChesney, ‘Positive Economics and All That’ (1992) 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 272, 289-92.

231 Ibid. at 292.

232 See above notes 44-45 and accompanying text.

233 See above notes 54-56 and related discussion.

234 See sources cited below notes 235-236, 241 and accompanying text.

235 Nevertheless, ‘paradigm’ terminology has been used to describe the corporate personality debate. See, for example, Mark, above note 139, at 1466-1467, n. 66; Stephen Bottomley, ‘Taking Corporations Seriously: Some Considerations for Corporate Regulation'’ (1990) 19 Fed. L. Rev. 203, 206-213.

236 Examples of those who have described Berle and Means’ work in this way include Carney, above note 149, at 217, 224; Bratton, above note 176, at 180; Thomas Lee Hazen, ‘The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values’ (1991) 69 N.C. L. Rev. 273, 304.

237 See text following note 50.

238 Manne, above note 147, at 534. See also Hetherington, J.A.C., ‘Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (1969) 21 Stan. L. Rev. 248. 272;Google Scholar Robert Hessen, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal’ (1983) 26 J. L. and Econ. 273, 288.

239 On Manne's work on this topic, see Carney, above note 149, at 231-236.

240 On the fact that Manne deserves credit for a critique of existing orthodoxy rather than for developing an affirmative economically grounded theory of the corporation, see Allen Kaufman and Lawrence Zacharias, ‘From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920-1980’ (1992) 66 Bus. Hist. Rev. 523, 546-547, 553.

241 For examples of those who have described contractarian analysis in these terms, see Allen, above note 176, at 1401, 1406; Bratton, above note 176, at 180-181, 190; Whincop, above note 210, at 27; Robert John Schulze, ‘Can This Marriage be Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws’ (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1607, 1610.

242 Ulen, above note 35, at 886-887 (making the same point about economic analysis generally, referring to work which has been done in the field of behavioural economics).

243 See above note 65 and related discussion.

244 See above note 179 and accompanying text.

245 On the doctrinal focus outside the United States, see above notes 202-205 and related discussion. Note, though, that up to the 1980s much American corporate law scholarship was in fact doctrinally oriented: Johnson, above note 224, at 2217; Charles R.T. O’Kelley, ‘Foreword: The Many Passions of Teaching Corporations’ (2000) 34 Ga L. Rev. 423, 426. Also, it would have been somewhat perverse if Berle and Means’ work had set the agenda outside the US since a separation of ownership and control is not the norm elsewhere. See Rafael La Porta et al., ‘‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 15.

246 See above notes 208, 210, 211 and related discussion.

247 See above notes 207, 212 and accompanying text.

248 See above note 70 and related discussion.

249 See above notes 73-75 and accompanying text.

250 See above notes 81-85 and related discussion.

251 Arnold S. Jacobs, ‘An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’ 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 209 (1987), which also has some 4800 footnotes. On its status as the longest law review article, see Rhode, above note 2, at 1334-1335; Lasson, above note 9, at 937-938.

252 Bayless Manning, ‘The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker’ (1962) 72 Yale L.J. 223, 245, n. 37.

253 Romano, above note 158, at 923.

254 Lahey and Salter, above note 205, at 569.

255 Lowry and Dignam, above note 213, at 371; Caroline Bradley and Judith Freedman, ‘Changing Company Law” (1990) 53 Mod. L. Rev. 397, 398; C.A. Riley, ‘Gower: Still a Blueprint for Curriculum Reform in Company Law?” (1993) 13 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 271, 271.

256 Cioffi, above note 202, at 509.

257 Prentice, D.D., ‘Some Observations on the Teaching of Company Law” in Birks, P.B.H. (ed.), Examining the Syllabus: Beyond the Core (Oxford 1993), 33, 35.Google Scholar

258 Yalden, above note 210, at 479. See also Bauman, Richard W., ‘Liberalism and Canadian Corporate Law” in Devlin, Richard F. (ed.), Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto 1991), 75, 75.Google Scholar

259 Romano, Roberta, ‘Preface” in Romano, Roberta (ed.), Foundations of Corporate Law (Oxford 1992) v, v.Google Scholar

260 Richard M. Buxbaum, ‘New Owners and Old Managers: Lessons from the Socialist Camp” (1993) 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 867, 868.

261 Deborah A. DeMott, ‘Trust and Tension Within Corporations” (1996) 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1308, 1308, 1335.

262 Yalden, above note 210, at 479.

263 Prentice, above note 257, at 35.

264 Johnston, above note 166, at 219.

265 Johnson, above note 224, at 2217. On his scepticism towards economics, see ibid. at 2217-2218.

266 Romano, above note 259, at v; Buxbaum, above note 260, at 868; DeMott, above note 261, at 1312, 1335. See also Mitchell, above note 225, at 1477, 1481-1482; O’Kelley, above note 245, at 426.

267 See above notes 77, 79-80 and accompanying text.

268 See above notes 86-93 and related discussion.

269 A.A. Sommer, ‘Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later’ (1991) 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 33, 33. See also William T. Allen, ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation’ (1992) 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 278281; Eric W. Orts, ‘The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law’ (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1565, 1571.

270 Elliott Goldstein, ‘Future Articulation of Corporation Law’ (1984) 39 Bus. Law. 1541, 1541.

271 Allen, above note 269, at 280-281.

272 On the ‘contractual/association’ thesis, see above note 138 and accompanying text. On the link with the nexus of contracts model, see Bratton, above note 141, at 1472-1473, 15131515, 1526; Gregory A. Mark, ‘Some Observations on Writing the Legal History of the Corporation in the Age of Theory’ in Mitchell, above note 168, 67, 72-73.

273 On the fiction theory of the corporation, see above note 138 and related discussion. On Hansmann and Kraakman's asset partitioning characterisation of the corporation, see above notes 195-199 and accompanying text. For additional arguments that the fiction theory might have contemporary relevance, see Fiona Macmillan Patfield, ‘Challenges for Company Law’ in Fiona Macmillan Patfield (ed.), Perspectives on Company Law, vol. 1 (London 1995), 1, 89; Jennifer Hill, ‘Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” (2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 39, 56-57.

274 Note, though, that Hansmann and Kraakman downplay links between their asset-oriented analysis on the one hand and theories of juridical personality on the other: Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Essential’ above note 195, at 438-439.

275 The cyclical quality of debates on these issues has been recognised elsewhere. On managerial accountability, see Bratton, above note 140, 755-756; Bratton, above note 176, 182; David Millon, ‘Redefining Corporate Law’ (1991) 24 Ind. L. Rev. 223, 225. On corporate goals and responsibilities, see Branson, above note 178, at 635-639; Sommer, above note 269, at 33-36; Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?’ (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 534, 535-543.

276 See above notes 145-146 and related discussion.

277 See above notes 147-152 and accompanying text.

278 See above notes 164-165 and related discussion.

279 Carlton, Alfred P., ‘21st Century Corporate Responsibility—Evolution, Revolution, or Back to the Future’ (2002) 54 Mercer L. Rev. 671. 672–673;Google Scholar for a plea that a ‘pendulum-like movement’ be avoided, see Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan, ‘The State of US Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?’ J. Applied Corp. Fin., Spring 2003, 8, 20.

280 Stout, above note 171, at 1189-1190, 1208; C.A. Harwell Wells, ‘The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century’ (2002) 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 77, 78-79, 82.

281 See above note 154 and related discussion.

282 See above notes 157 and accompanying text.

283 See above notes 188, 213 and related discussion. On the team production model as a component of the long-standing debates on corporate social responsibility, see Stout, above note 171, at 1195; Wells, above note 280, at 136-139.

284 See, for example, Bratton, William A. ‘Never Trust a Corporation’ (2002) 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 867, 867Google Scholar (‘corporate responsibility is a problem that never goes away … from policy agendas in academic corporate law’).

285 Kuhn, above note 47, at 153, 169. On the other hand, a cyclical account does not square fully with the Kuhnian characterisation of science, since he argued that scientific development should be ‘a unidirectional and irreversible process’: ibid. at 206.

286 See above note 94 and accompanying text.

287 The same point can potentially be made in relation to corporate goals and responsibilities: Stout, above note 171, at 1208 (arguing that even if the debate about the purpose of the corporation which has been going on since the 1930s has not been resolved, ‘there has been some progress in our understanding of it’).

288 Bratton, above note 176, at 182, n. 18.

289 Johnston, above note 166, at 231-241.

290 See above notes 238-239 and related discussion.

291 DeMott, above note 261, at 1335.

292 Cf. Sunstein, above note 107, at 1252 (making the same point about legal scholarship generally).

293 Ibid.

294 Ibid.

295 Ibid. at 1262.

296 Tsuk, above note 156, at 1883; Walter Werner, ‘Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered’ (1977) 77 Colum. L. Rev. 388, 394-395.

297 George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, ‘The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means’ (1983) 26 J.L. and Econ. 237, 241-242.

298 Hessen, above note 238, at 279; Werner, above note 296, at 395; Joseph L. Weiner, ‘The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation’ (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1458, 1461.

299 Sunstein, above note 107, at 1262.

300 See above notes 161-163 and related discussion.

301 Elaine A. Welle, ‘Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement’ (1999) 56 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 519, 524-525.

302 Bratton, above note 141, at 1524-1525; Tsuk, above note 156, at 1904; Cynthia A. Williams, ‘Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency’ (1998) 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265, 1287-1288.

303 Thompson, Robert B., ‘The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation’ (1990) 15 J. Corp. L. 377. 388;Google Scholar Robert A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Theories of Contract Law (Dordrecht 1997), 98-99. For examples of deregulatory bias, see Hetherington, above note 153, at 251-254, 257; McChesney, above note 223, at 1544, 1548; Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1442.

304 See above note 117 and related discussion and text following note 122.

305 Bratton, above note 176, at 197; Johnson, above note 224, at 2218; Douglas M. Branson, ‘The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority in Corporate Governance and Corporate Law’ in Mitchell, above note 168, 93, at 105.

306 Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘Contractarianism Without Contracts: A Response to Professor McChesney’ (1990) 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1331. He was certainly not the only sceptic. See above note 179 and accompanying text.

307 See above note 180 and related discussion.

308 Eisenberg, above note 172, at 818, 823, 827, 829.

309 See above note 123 and related discussion.

310 See above notes 127-131 and accompanying text.

311 Cheffins, above note 10, at 214-215.

312 Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship” (1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, 858-859.

313 Thomas Ulen, ‘The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics” (1993) 18 J. Corp. L. 301, 331.

314 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 153), (London 1998), Part 3.

315 DeMott, above note 261, 1335. See also Lyman Johnson, ‘New Approaches to Corporate Law’ (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1713, 1723.

316 DeMott, above note 261, 1335.

317 Kissam, Philip C., ‘The Decline of Law School Professionalism’ (1986) 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251. 297;Google Scholar Charles W. Collier, ‘The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship’ (1991) 41 Duke L.J. 191, 203; Joseph P. Tomain and Paul L. Caron, ‘The Associate Dean for Faculty Research Position: Encouraging and Promoting Scholarship’ (2001) 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 233, 237.

318 See above note 291 and related discussion.

319 Baldwin and Davis, above note 34, at 884-885; Allen, Ronald J., ‘Two Aspects of Law and Theory’ (2000) 37 San Diego L. Rev. 743. 745;Google Scholar Friedman, Barry, ‘The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship” (2001) 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 933, 933, 951-952.Google Scholar

320 Heise, above note 34, at 826.

321 Livingston, Michael A., ‘Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy” (1998) 83 Cornell L. Rev. 365, 383;Google Scholar Beverley I. Moran, ‘Taxation” in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 377, 385-387.

322 Johnson, above note 315, at 1721.

323 See above notes 252-254 and related discussion.

324 Livingston, above note 321, at 385 (acknowledging that corporate law scholarship is, in key respects, significantly ahead of tax scholarship).