Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T14:36:22.968Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Remoteness of Damages and Judicial Discretion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Robin Cooke
Get access

Extract

The law about remoteness of damage in contract and tort is in a strangely unsettled state. Pursuing justice in individual cases, the courts have felt driven into vacillations on points of general principle which have not shown our system of case law at its best. Yet there is perhaps no field of common law in which there have been so many attempts by judges, and at a high level of authority, to formulate principles or rules in exact terms. A glance over ground mainly very familiar may not be wasted if it happens to contribute anything towards attaining a more stable perspective.

Type
Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , November 1978 , pp. 288 - 300
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 (1854) 9 Ex. 341.

2 Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co. [1921] 3 K.B. 560.Google Scholar

3 Liesbosch Dredger v. Edison S.S. (Owners) [1933]Google Scholar A.C. 449.

4 Monarch Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) [1949]Google Scholar A.C. 196, 223–224.

5 Mr. Raymond Kidwell Q.C. and Mr. M. L. T. Harvey.

6 Vol. 12, para. 1144, nn. 4 and 5.

7 [1949] A.C. at pp. 232–233.

8 British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. [1912]Google Scholar A.C. 673, 688–689. Viscount Haldane L.C. said inter alia that the quantum of damage was a question of fact and that the only guidance which the law could give was to lay down general principles which afforded at times but scanty assistance in dealing with particular cases.

9 (1860) 6 H. & N. 211, 221.

10 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. [1949] 2 K.B. 528.Google Scholar

11 In The Heron II [1969] 1 A.C. 350.Google Scholar

12 Asquith, L.J. cited Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co. [1911]Google Scholar A.C. 301, a case on causation.

13 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. [1961]Google Scholar A.C. 388, 422.

14 E.g., The Wagon Mound (No. 2) [1967] 1 A.C. 617Google Scholar, 641, per Lord Reid; The Heron II [1969] 1 A.C. 350Google Scholar, 410 per Lord Hodson.

15 [1963] A.C. 837.

16 Ibid., p. 847.

17 [1967] 1 A.C. 617.

18 Ibid., p. 644.

19 [1951] A.C. 850.

20 C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos [1969] 1 A.C. 350.Google Scholar

21 (1877) 2 P.D. 118.

22 Lord Reid at p. 385, Lord Hodson at p. 411, Lord Pearce at p. 413, Lord Upjohn at pp. 422 and 425. Lord Morris did not specifically discuss this question.

23 H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd. [1978] 1 All E.R. 525Google Scholar, 532; [1977] 3 W.L.R. 990.

24 Supra, n. 7.

25 [1969] 1 A.C. at p. 397.

26 [1970] A.C. 1004.

27 Ibid., p. 1030.

28 Ibid., p. 1034.

29 Ibid., pp. 1053 and 1055.

30 Ibid., p. 1070.

31 Supra, n. 23.

32 (1959), pp. 281–287.

33 [1977] 2 Ll.Rep. 522, 525.

34 Supra, n. 7.

35 Supra, n. 8.

36 For some of the consequences, see McGregor on Damages, 13th ed., Chap. 39.

37 [1977] 2 All E.R. 492, 498. Lords Diplock, Simon of Glaisdale and Russell of Killowen expressly agreed with Lord Wilberforce's speech. Lord Salmon spoke to the same effect at pp. 507–508.

38 [1970] A.C. 1004, 1052.

39 Which must serve as an excuse for not adding references to the wealth of scholarly writings on this subject. It would be wrong, however, to omit specific mention of the valuable article by Mr. R. W. M. Dias, “Trouble on Oiled Waters,” in [1967] C.L.J. 62, wherein at p. 76, dealing with carelessness, he speaks of “…tomorrow's principle that a negligent person shall be liable according as the court thinks reasonable in the circumstances.”