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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 August 2016
It is often said that English law does not impose “remedial” constructive trusts because it is manifestly inappropriate and fundamentally unjustified to impose trusts through the exercise of judicial discretion and with retrospective effect. This paper observes the definitional deficiencies in this understanding, and reanalyses constructive trusts in terms of the rights which they give effect to. This understanding reveals that English law sets its face against the exercise of discretion in relation only to some “remedial” constructive trusts and not others, and that the perceived difficulties with remedial constructive trusts are often exaggerated. It ends by noting some crucial implications of the re-analysis for the future development of the law.
1 London Allied Holdings Ltd. v Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch), at [273]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, at [84].
2 C. Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (Oxford 2002), 13.
3 Pound, R., “The Progress of the Law 1918–1919” (1920) 33 Harv.L.R. 420 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 420–21. The term “institutional” was substituted for “substantive” in Maudsley, R.H., “Proprietary Remedies for the Recovery of Money” (1959) 75 L.Q.R. 234 Google Scholar, at 237.
4 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. [1996] A.C. 669, 714. See also D.D.M. Waters, M. Gillen and L. Smith, Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto 2012), 508.
5 The Right Hon Millett L.J., “Equity – the Road Ahead” (1995–1996) 6 K.C.L.J. 1 Google Scholar, at 18.
6 Millett, “Equity”, p. 18; Lord Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust – Fact or Fiction”, speech at the Banking Services and Finance Law Association Conference, Queenstown, 10 August 2014, available at <http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf>, at [27].
7 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust”, at [7]; Millett, “Equity”, p. 18.
8 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669, 714. See also Fortex Group Ltd. v MacIntosh [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 171, 172.
9 Commonwealth Reserves v Chodar [2001] 2 N.Z.L.R. 374, at [19].
10 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669, 714.
11 Crossco No. 4 Unlimited [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, at [84]; Turner v Jacob [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch), at [85]; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669, 714.
12 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust”, at [28]; Millett, “Equity”, p. 18; L. Tucker, Nicholas le Poidevin, and J. Brightwell (eds.), Lewin on Trusts, 19th ed. (London 2015), 7–26.
13 Birks, P., “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29 U.W.A.L.R. 1 Google Scholar, 6.
14 A. Butler (ed.), Equity and Trusts in New Zealand, 2nd ed. (Wellington 2009), at [13.3.1].
15 Millett, “Equity”, p. 19. See also Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. (in receivership) [1995] 1 A.C. 74, 104.
16 Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) No. 2 [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 830; Re Sharpe (a bankrupt) [1980] 1 W.L.R. 219, 225. See also Fortex Group Ltd. [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 171, 175; Commonwealth Reserves [2001] 2 N.Z.L.R. 374, 383.
17 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669, 714–15; Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 451.
18 London Allied Holdings Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch), at [274].
19 Land Registration Act 2002, s. 116(a).
20 Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3, at [65]; Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, 198.
21 See e.g. Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990; Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159; Ottey v Grundy [2003] EWCA Civ 1176; Henry [2010] UKPC 3.
22 Land Registration Act 2002, s. 116(a). This section merely confirms what was already the norm: see Law Com. No. 271.
23 Carty v London Borough of Croydon [2005] EWCA Civ 19; [2005] E.L.R. 104, at [25].
24 Rawluk v Rawluk [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, 92. See also Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) No. 2 [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 823; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, at [84].
25 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust”, at [15]. This led Lord Neuberger to question whether “remedial” constructive trusts imposed by the Australian courts are in fact “institutional” in nature: ibid., at para. [22].
26 Birks, P., “The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust?” (1998) 4 T.L.I. 202 Google Scholar, 205–06.
27 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669, 714, emphasis added.
28 Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) No. 2 [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 830, emphasis added.
29 Ultraframe (UK) Ltd. v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), at [1515], emphasis added.
30 Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism”, 3–6. See also R. Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified (Oxford 2009), chs. 2–4.
31 Collins, B. Q.C., “The Remedial Constructive Trust ‘Between a Trust and a Catch-Phrase’” (2014) 10 Trusts & Trustees 1055 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 1058.
32 Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co. [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409.
33 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, at [80], emphasis in original.
34 Where A has a right against B, B has a correlative or equivalent duty towards A: W. Wheeler Cook (ed.) and W. Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, reprint ed. (New Jersey 2010), 36, 38. We can therefore speak of rights and duties interchangeably.
35 An “order” includes “judgments, decrees, orders, and pronouncements”: Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 44.
36 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 17. See e.g. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1st ed. (London 1768), vol. 3, 396; Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism”, p. 5; and the cases and commentators cited in Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, pp. 17, 44.
37 For an overview of the different analyses commonly made, see Nolan and Robertson, “Rights and Private Law” in D. Nolan and A. Robertson (eds.), Rights and Private Law (Oxford 2014), 18–21.
38 R. Campbell (ed.) and J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 5th ed. (London 1885), 762. Hohfeld, too, was of the view that, quite apart from a primary right/duty relationship, a new, secondary right/duty relation arises when a primary right is infringed: see discussion in Nolan and Robertson, “Rights and Private Law”, p. 19.
39 See generally J. Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Oxford 2002), 32–63.
40 Birks, P., “Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26 U.W.A.L.R. 1 Google Scholar, 14.
41 P. Finn, “Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies” in W.R. Cornish, R. Nolan, J. O'Sullivan et al. (eds.), Restitution Past, Present and Future (Oxford 1998), 268–70.
42 Nolan and Robertson, “Rights and Private Law”, p. 20.
43 White and Carte (Councils) Ltd. v McGregor [1962] A.C. 413.
44 Millett, Sir P., “Equity's Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 214, 225–27Google Scholar. Apparently, a different approach is taken in relation to cases involving bare commercial trusts: AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co. Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58, at [70], [106]; but see J.E. Penner, “Falsifying the Trust Account and Compensatory Equitable Compensation” in S. Degeling and J. Varuhas (eds), Equitable Compensation and Disgorgement of Profit (Oxford 2016).
45 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 55. Zakrzewski also labels remedies which give effect to secondary rights as “replicative” remedies. This is, however, misguided: see text to note 55 below.
46 L. Smith, “The Measurement of Compensation Claims against Trustees and Fiduciaries” in E. Bant and M. Harding (eds.), Exploring Private Law (Cambridge 2010), 373.
47 Photo Production Ltd. v Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827, 349.
48 Mitchell, C., “Equitable Rights and Wrongs” (2006) 59 C.L.P. 267 Google Scholar, 283–84.
49 Birks, “Equity in the Modern Law”, p. 12.
50 Judges also have so-called “discretion” to determine whether a case before the court is sufficiently identical to a previous case in order for the previous case to be binding by making factual findings in order to bring cases within, or push cases without, the scope of a rule (for a discussion of this point in relation to the family homes context, see Liew, Y.K., “The Secondary-Rights Approach to the ‘Common Intention Constructive Trust’” (2015) 79 Conv. 211, 215–16Google Scholar). But such “discretion” also applies regardless of the type of remedy in question and so has no bearing on the present discussion concerning the nature of remedies.
51 See e.g. Smith, S.A., “Duties, Liabilities, and Damages” (2011–2012) 125 Harv.L.R. 1727 Google Scholar.
52 A. Beever, “Our Most Fundamental Rights” in Nolan and Robertson, “Rights and Private Law”, 81.
53 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, pp. 166–67, emphasis added.
54 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 203, emphasis added.
55 Smith, S., “Why Courts Make Orders (and What This Tells us About Damages)” (2011) 64 C.L.P. 51 Google Scholar, 74. See Edmunds v Lloyds Italico & l’Ancora Compagnia di Assicurazione e Riassicurazione SpA [1986] 1 W.L.R. 492, 496.
56 The award of replicative remedies in certain contexts may also require an exercise of “liquidation”, for instance where A’s right to a contractual debt due is couched in terms of a “reasonable price” (see generally Zakrzewski, R., “The Nature of a Claim on an Indemnity” (2006) 22 J.C.L 54 Google Scholar). But these cases are distinguishable from those presently discussed: they do not provide courts with any discretion as to the extent to which the defendant will be liable, since this is determined by the primary relationship between the parties and all that is left to do is to render certain the uncertain term. In particular, no assessment of the remoteness of loss or gain is necessary.
57 Gardner, J., “What Is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30 Law & Philosophy 1, 40CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also R. Stevens, “Rights Restricting Remedies” in A. Robertson and M. Tilbury (eds.), Divergences in Private Law (Oxford 2016), 160–61.
58 Finn, “Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies”, p. 269.
59 Finn, “Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies”, p. 270.
60 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 203.
61 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 102.
62 Chapman v Chapman [1954] A.C. 429, 446.
63 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1(2).
64 Zakrzewski, Remedies Reclassified, p. 98.
65 Again, the doctrine of precedent may constrain the exercise of such discretion in practice, but this does not detract from the fact that it is inherent in the nature of transformative remedies that they allow for discretion as to the goal and content of the remedy to be exercised.
66 Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196.
67 Swadling, W., “The Fiction of the Constructive Trust” (2011) 54 C.L.P. 399 Google Scholar.
68 W. Swadling, “The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucauld v Boustead” in C. Mitchell (ed.), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Oxford 2010). See also P.H. Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, 11th ed. (Oxford 2009), 98; P. Matthews, “The Words which Are Not There: A Partial History of the Constructive Trust” in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts; J.E. Penner, The Law of Trusts, Core Text Series, 9th ed. (Oxford 2014), at [6.10].
69 Chambers, R., “Constructive Trusts in Canada” (1999) 37 Alberta L.Rev. 173, 183Google Scholar. See also R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford 1997), 220ff.; P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, revised ed. (Oxford 1989), 65.
70 The relevant statutory formality requirements are: in the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead, Law of Property Act 1925, s. 53(1)(b); in the secret trusts context, Wills Act 1837, s. 9.
71 Swadling, “The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucauld v Boustead”, p. 113; Matthews, “The Words”, p. 89.
72 S. Gardner, “Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts” in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts, p. 64–65.
73 Examples of such cases are Rochefoucauld [1897] 1 Ch. 196 and De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519; [2010] 2 F.L.R. 1240. In these cases, no one owned the property absolutely at the outset in order to be capable of declaring an express trust over the entire beneficial interest in the property, which was what the ultimate beneficiary under the trust was held to be entitled to. For an analysis of this point in relation to the case of Rochefoucauld, see Y.K. Liew, “Rochefoucauld v Boustead” in Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in Equity (Oxford 2012). This point has recently found approval in B. McFarlane and C. Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell: Text, Cases and Materials on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, 14th ed., (London 2015), para. 15–03.
74 See e.g. Costigan, G.P. Jr., “The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and Constructive” (1913–14) 27 H.L.R. 437 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Youdan, T.G., “Formalities for Trusts of Land, and the Doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead ” (1984) 43 C.L.J. 306 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thompson, M.P., “Using Statutes as Instruments of Fraud” (1985) 36 N.I.L.Q. 358 Google Scholar; G. Elias, Explaining Constructive Trusts (Oxford 1990), 108; Critchley, P., “Instruments of Fraud, Testamentary Dispositions, and the Doctrine of Secret Trusts” (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 631 Google Scholar; McFarlane, B., “Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt of Property Sub Conditione ” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 667 Google Scholar; A.J. Oakley, Parker and Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts, 9th ed., (London 2008), para. 10–273; Gardner, “Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts” in Mitchell, Constructive and Resulting Trusts, p. 68.
75 In the context of the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead, see Taylor v Davies [1920] A.C. 636, 650–51; Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All E.R. 133, 136; Re Densham (A Bankrupt) [1975] 3 All E.R. 726, 732; Chattey v Farndale Holdings Inc (1998) 75 P. & C.R. 298, 316; Paragon Finance plc [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409; Banner Homes Holdings Ltd. (formerly Banner Homes Group Plc) v Luff Developments Ltd. [2000] Ch. 372, 383–84; J.J. Harrison (Properties) Ltd. v Harrison [2001] EWCA Civ 1467, at [36]; Samad v Thompson [2008] EWHC 2809 (Ch), at [128]; Staden v Jones [2008] EWCA Civ 936, at [31]; De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519, at [51]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, at [94]; Groveholt Ltd. v Hughes [2012] EWHC 3351 (Ch), at [14]. In the secret trusts context, see Kasperbauer v Griffith [2000] 1 W.T.L.R. 333, 343.
76 Paragon Finance plc [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 408.
77 Banner Homes Group Plc [2000] Ch. 372, 399. This case reflects the doctrine in Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch. 43, which Millett L.J. in Paragon Finance plc [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409, also cited as a doctrine falling within the same category as the doctrine in Rochefoucauld v Boustead and secret trusts.
78 Rochefoucauld [1897] 1 Ch. 196, 212.
79 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555 (Ch), 1579.
80 Crabb [1976] Ch. 179, 198.
81 Henry [2010] UKPC 3, at [65].
82 Bright, S. and McFarlane, B., “Proprietary Estoppel and Property Rights” [2005] C.L.J. 449, 458CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
83 Campbell [2001] EWCA Civ 990; Jennings [2002] EWCA Civ 159; Ottey [2003] EWCA Civ 1176; Henry [2010] UKPC 3.
84 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed. (Oxford 2010), 622.
85 Edelman, J., “Equitable Torts” (2002) 10 Torts L.J. 64 Google Scholar, text between footnotes 56 and 57.
86 Edelman, Gain-Based Damages, p. 5.
87 A. Robertson, “Estoppels and Rights-Creating Events: Beyond Wrongs and Promises” in J.W. Neyers, R. Bronaugh and S.G.A. Pitel (eds.), Exploring Contract Law (Oxford 2009), 219; S. Wilken Q.C. and K. Ghaly, Wilken and Ghaly: The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel, 3rd ed. (Oxford 2012), at [11.53].
88 M. Spence, Protecting Reliance: The Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel (Oxford 1999), 2.
89 Spence, Protecting Reliance, p. 2.
90 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, at [29].
91 Land Registration Act 2002, s. 116(a).
92 K. Gray and S.F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed. (Oxford 2009), at [9.2.89].
93 E.g. Muschinski (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583; Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 C.L.R. 137.
94 Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 C.L.R. 101.
95 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No. 2) [2012] F.C.A.F.C. 6.
96 Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd. (in liquidation) [2003] NSWCA 71. Cf. Wambo Coal Pty. Ltd. v Ariff [2007] N.S.W.S.C. 589, at [42], where it was suggested by White J. that a constructive trust imposed on a mistaken payment where the recipient knew of the mistake and still retained the money was an “institutional” trust.
97 Bathurst C.C. v PWC Properties Pty. Ltd. (1998) 195 C.L.R. 566, at [42]; Giumelli (1999) 196 C.L.R. 101, at [4]; John Alexander's Clubs Pty. Ltd. v White City Tennis Club Ltd. [2010] H.C.A. 19, at [128]; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd. v Say-Dee Pty. Ltd. (2007) 230 C.L.R. 89, at [200].
98 Muschinski (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 451.
99 Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 83.
100 Muschinski (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 436.
101 Grimaldi [2012] F.C.A.F.C. 6, at [505], [509].
102 Grimaldi [2012] F.C.A.F.C. 6, at [505], [511].
103 John Alexander's Clubs Pty. Ltd. [2010] H.C.A. 19, at [131], [139].
104 Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty. Ltd. (in liquidation) [2003] N.S.W.C.A. 71, at [77].
105 Muschinski (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 451.
106 For this reason, Lord Neuberger's suggestion that remedial constructive trusts imposed in Australia are in fact institutional in nature (noted in note 25 above) is misguided.
107 John Alexander's Clubs Pty. Ltd. [2010] H.C.A. 19, at [131]–[132].
108 Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 848; Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 987; Garland v Consumers' Gas Co. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629, at [30]; Kerr v Baranow [2011] 1 R.C.S. 269, at [36]–[45]. It should be noted, however, that this does not entail a “pure juristic reasons approach” (see Smith, L., “Demystifying Juristic Reasons” (2007) 45 Can.Bus.L.J.281, 291 Google Scholar) but one where there is a mix between “juristic reasons and reasons for restitution” (Smith, ibid., at p. 290). This is obvious from the Supreme Court's decision in Garland (at [44]–[46]). It was held that this element of the claim is to be made out by reference to a list of established categories of juristic reasons and, although the list was said to be closed, it remains possible to expand that list by adding “other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations” (Garland, at [44]) or by the defendant's attempt to rebut the claimant's claim through relying on “the reasonable expectations of the parties” or “public policy concerns” (Garland, at [46]).
109 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 241.
110 Soulos [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 238.
111 Rawluk [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, 107; Peter [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 988.
112 Soulos [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 241. See also Sun Indalex Finance v United Steelworkers [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271, at [228].
113 Soulos [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217.
114 Soulos [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, at [49].
115 Soulos [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, at [50].
116 Soulos [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, at [51].
117 Kerr [2011] 1 R.C.S. 269, at [50].
118 LAC Minerals Ltd. v Int Corona Resources Ltd. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 678.
119 All the above-mentioned points are found in LAC Minerals Ltd. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 678–79.
120 Peter [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 999.
121 Rawluk [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, 92.
122 Metall Und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 Q.B. 391, 479; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669, 716; London Allied Holdings Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch), at [273]–[274]; Clarke v Meadus [2010] EWHC 3117 (Ch), at [82].
123 Re Sharpe (a bankrupt) [1980] 1 W.L.R. 219, 225; Lonrho plc v Fayed (No. 2) [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1, 9; Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. (in receivership) [1995] 1 A.C. 74; Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) (No. 2) [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 827, 831; Ultraframe (UK) Ltd. [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), at [1515], [1546]; Turner [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch), at [85]; De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519, at [47]–[48]; Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. (in administrative receivership) [2011] EWCA Civ 347, at [37]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, at [84]; FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, at [47]. Bailey v Angove's PTY Ltd [2016] UKSC 47, at [27].
124 London Allied Holdings Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch), at [273]; Crossco No. 4 Unlimited [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, at [84].
125 Lonrho plc [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1, 9; London Allied Holdings Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch), at [273].
126 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. (in receivership) [1995] 1 A.C. 74, 104.
127 Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) (No. 2) [1998] 3 All E.R. 812, 831.
128 Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust”, at [26]: “property rights are a matter of strict law not discretion.”
129 London Allied Holdings Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch), at [273].
130 See Section II above.
131 Paragon Finance plc [1999] 1 All E.R. 400, 409.
132 Coulthard v Disco Mix Club Ltd. [2000] 1 W.L.R. 707 (Ch), 731.
133 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669, 714.
134 London Allied Holdings Ltd. [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch).
135 Aspden v Elvy [2012] EWHC 1387 (Ch), at [99].
136 Gardner, “Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts”, p. 79.
137 Gardner, S., “The Remedial Discretion in Proprietary Estoppel – Again” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 492, 507Google Scholar.
138 D. Waters, “The Constructive Trust: Two Theses – England and Wales, and Canada”, available at <http://www.step.org/constructive-trust-two-theses-%E2%80%93-england-and-wales-and-canada>.
139 Wright, D., “Third Parties and the Australian Remedial Constructive Trust” (2013–2014) 37 U.W.A.L.R. 31, 48Google Scholar.
140 Waters, “The Constructive Trust”, p. 1.
141 Mason, K., “Deconstructing Constructive Trusts in Australia” (2010) 4 Journal of Equity 1, 45Google Scholar.
142 R.P. Austin, “Constructive Trusts” in P.D. Finn (ed.), Essays in Equity (London 1985), 240.
143 M. Bryan, “Constructive Trusts: Understanding Remedialism” in J. Glister and P. Ridge (eds.), Fault Lines in Equity (Oxford 2012), 235.
144 In Muschinski (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 450–51, Deane J. took the view that, since constructive trusts were historically “remedial” and because the law in Australia had not outgrown its formative stages, therefore all constructive trusts in the modern law remain “remedial” in nature.
145 FHR European Ventures LLP [2014] UKSC 45, at [47].
146 See e.g. Muschinski (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583, 452.
147 See e.g. Pettkus [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 859.
148 Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286, 1290.
149 Soulos [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, at [34]. See also Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 87.