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Property Notions in the Law of Obligations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Geoffrey Samuel
Geoffrey Samuel
Affiliation:
Reader in Law, Lancaster University; Professeur Associé, Paris I & II. This article is a revised version of a paper written for the W.G. Hart Workshop, London, 1993.
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Extract

When the coach carrying Mr. and Mrs. Houghland from Ternhill to Cheshire arrived at its destination, Mrs. Houghland's suitcase could not be found. The suitcase had been loaded on to one of Low's coaches at Southampton, but this coach had broken down at Ternhill and the luggage had been transferred by the passengers to the luggage compartment of a relief vehicle which had arrived some three hours later. The coach company was unable to trace the case or to explain how it had disappeared and in a subsequent claim, either for its value or for damages for its loss, the County Court found in Mrs. Houghland's favour. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

Type
Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , November 1994 , pp. 524 - 545
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1994

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