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New Light on Slade's Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

J. H. Baker
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Extract

The number of extant reports of Slade's Case, by different hands, indicates the significance which the case possessed for contemporary lawyers. Its subsequent significance was assured by its inclusion in Coke's Reports, an honour which entitled it to all the attention which posterity is obliged to bestow on leading cases; but, for three centuries, the more that was written about it the more difficult it became to remember or to imagine what it had meant when it was decided. The case has been partially redeemed from its oblivion by recent studies, but it is becoming plain that it is still not understood, and perhaps will not be fully understood for some years to come. It is hoped that the publication of some of the leading arguments in the case, in the last issue of this Journal, will help to bring understanding within closer reach. Those arguments, however, presuppose a familiarity with the problems the case was intended to solve. Although part of the background may be learned from the published reports and Year Books, the story which they reveal is neither complete nor clear. The older cases are too sparse, too badly reported and cover too many years for any safe general conclusions to be drawn from them. They are relevant to the investigation in so far as they formed part of the Elizabethan lawyers' common education, providing a starting point for further discussion, and a recourse for those who sought authority for everything in their old books. But the burning questions in the minds of those who awaited the final pronouncement in Slade's Case were not Year Book questions, or ancient moot points, but new questions which had only come to the fore in the preceding ten or fifteen years.

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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , November 1971 , pp. 213 - 236
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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1971

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References

1 Baker, J. H., “New Light on Slade's Case, Part I: The Manuscript Reports” [1971]Google Scholar C.L.J. 51.

2 This word will be used here in the sense in which it was used in and before the sixteenth century: i.e., a transaction re creating a debt.

3 See Whitehed v. Elderton (1530), Baker, supra, p. 58, note 44.

4 Hughes v. Robotham (1593) Poph. 30, at p. 31, per Gawdy J. In forbearance assumpsit the general declaration was considered good even in the Common Pleas: Smyth v. Bocher (M.1595) B.M. MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 119v, per Anderson C.J.

5 81 L.Q.R. at pp. 551 et seq., 82 L.Q.R. at pp. 85 et seq.

6 Moo. 667. See also 10 Rep. 68b.

7 Woodford v. Deacon (p.1608) Cro.Jac. 206 (said to have been a unanimous decision). See also Gardiner v. Bellingham (1614) Hob. 5, 1 Ro.Rep. 24.

8 See Lücke in 81 L.Q.R. at pp. 437–445. Cf. Sheffield v. Rise (M.1594) Moo. 367, where it was said that the words adtunc et ibidem made the contract “entendible al temps del assumpsit,” notwithstanding the difference in tenses. See the question argued by the judges in Pillesworth v. Feake (P. 1602) as reported in B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 479. Anon. (1572) Dal. 84, affords further proof that a change of tense was not equivalent to the use of the word “postea.”

9 81 L.Q.R. at p. 422.

10 Cf. Milsom, S. F. C., Historical Foundations of the Common Law (1969), p. 297Google Scholar: “debt was still the staple of the common pleas, and more than intellectual symmetry was visibly at stake over this development in the king's bench.”

11 Ibid., p. 302: the Common Pleas “sought … to defend what it no doubt still regarded as its own property.”

12 4 Inst. 99.

13 Although he conformed, he came from a Catholic family and was believed to harbour recusant sympathies: see Brigg, M., “The Walmsleys of Dunkenhalgh” (1969) Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, pp. 73–82.Google Scholar The present writer is indebted to Miss Brigg for supplementary information on this point.

14 Anon. (1582) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1084, f. 59 The plaintiff declared on a promise to pay £40 for wine, the jury found a promise to pay £20, and this was held to be a verdict for the defendant: “pur ceo que il doit prover un assumpsit absolutement et precisement en cest accon come il ad count, et nient semblable al dett sur contract I'ou le plaintiff recovera dett solonque ceo que est trove pur lui.” Cf. Simpson in 74 L.Q.R. at p. 381.

15 Infra, pp. 228–230. These are the “two difficulties” to which Blackstone ascribed the eclipse of debt by case: Bla.Comm. iii, 154.

16 This was no new suggestion: see Orwell v. Mortoft (1505) 20 Hen. 7, 8, pl. 18, per Kingsmill J.: P. 14 Hen. 8, 31, pl. 8, per Brooke J.; Pickering v. Thorough-good (1533) B.M. MS.Harg. 388, f. 67v, 74 L.Q.R. at p. 383. Cf. Jordan's Case (1536) M. 27 Hen. 8, 24, pl. 3, per curiam.

17 Paramour v. Payne (M.1595) B.M. MS.Harl. 4552, f. 92 (translated). The example was probably taken from the Year Books: cf. M. 20 Hen. 7, 8, pl. 18, per Frowicke C.J.

18 Plucknett attributed the doctrine to Lambard: 31 Columbia Law Review at p. 781. The relevant passage is in W. Lambard, Archeion (1635), p. 61; it is not in the pirated edition of D. Frere, entitled Archion (1635). Lambard may have taken it from a case of 1553 in Dalison's Reports, B.M. MS.Harl. 5141, f. 13 (Lambard's copy), where the statute was alluded to as enabling the clerks to devise an action not in the Register. Lambard's views would have been known to the profession in the 1590s.

19 Wade v. Braunch (1596) 2 And. 53. Lücke's argument (81 L.Q.R. at p. 428) that the reasoning in this case was fallacious, is not entirely acceptable—Elizabethan lawyers would not have regarded the statute as spent when the first writ on the case was sealed, because each action on the case was different and had to be warranted by the statute.

20 Williams v. Williams (P.1596) B.M. MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 188, MS.Harg. 51, f. 78, per Anderson C.J. The first MS. is a volume of Common Pleas reports (T.1594–T.1599) attributed by Edward Umfreville to Humfrey Were: see 9 C.B. at p. 193. Were was a Reader of the Inner Temple (Lent 1613), not a Serjeant, as Umfreville states. There are several inferior copies in the British Museum and Lincoln's Inn. The second MS. is a less significant volume of reports by Nicholas Duck, Reader of Lincoln's Inn (Lent 1617).

21 Ibid., Were's version, per Walmsley J.

22 Ibid., per Anderson C.J.; Turgys v. Becher (T.1596) as reported in B.M. MS.Lansd. 1084, f. 120v, MS.Harl. 1631, f. 55, MS.Harl. 1697, f. 107v, U.L.C. MS.Gg. iii. 25 f. 80 (“c'est nudum pactum eo que il que fist le promise n'ad benifitt per ceo”), MS.Ii. v. 13, f. 59 (“quant il promise de payer ceo sur le contract, n'est pluis que ceo que le ley voet sans son promise, et un n'est de aver remedy per accon sur le case, mes ou le ley n'ad provide a luy ascun auter remedy”).

23 Turgys v. Becher (T.1596) as reported in B.M. MS.Lansd. 1084, f. 120v, per Anderson C.J.: “le del esteant due devant, il fuit chose execut sur que assumpsit ne veut estre mainteyn.” Cf. Were's report (MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 204): “Mes s'il fuit un promise fait apres le bargayne ou contract donques Walmesley et auters semble que le ley voet estre auterment…” See also S.C., B.M. MS.Harl. 1624, f. 298v; Michell v. Dunsden (P.1595) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1076, f. 153v, MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 84, MS.Add. 25211, f. 97v, U.L.C. MS.Ee. iii. 2, f. 60.

24 See Lücke in 81 L.Q.R. at pp. 543–545, as to pleading delivery of goods as consideration for a promise to pay for them. This, apparently, did not necessarily indicate that a contract had been made. See also Taylor v. Lodington (M.1593) B.M. MS.Harl. 1588, f. 183v.

25 Williams v. Williams (P. 1596) B.M. MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 188, per Owen J.; Turgys v. Becher (T.1596) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1084, f. 120v, MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 204, U.L.C. MS.Ii.v. 13, f. 59; Paine v. Perramour (M.1596) Inner Temple MS.Barr. 7, f. 10; Michelbourne v. Burrell (P.1597) U.L.C. MS.Gg.vi. 29, f. 135.

26 Baker, supra, p. 66, note 81.

27 Infra, pp. 225–230.

28 Simpson, in 74 L.Q.R. at p. 382. The present writer respectfully agrees with Milsom, op. cit., p. 296: “the mere availability of debt was not in itself a bar to assumpsit, so long as there was some basis for the assumpsit action apart from the debt itself.”

29 Pecke v. Redman (P.1555) Dyer 113, semble; Anon. (T.1557) Bro.N.C. 6, Action sur le case pl. 108; Tanfeild's Case (ante 1574) cited Linc.Inn. MS.Mayn. 77, f. 325; Hunt v. Sone (M.1587) Cro.Eliz. 118; Anon. (P.1594) U.L.C. MS.Li.iii 9, f. 400v; Anon. (1599) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1074, f. 287; Taylor v. Foster (H.1601) Cro.Eliz. 776, 807. Since debt did not lie until all the instatments had been incurred, hardship could result if an action on the case were not allowed. See also Rudder v. Price (1791) 1 Hy.Bl. 547, where the old cases are reviewed and criticised.

30 See Bacon's argument in Baker, supra, pp. 62–63.

31 Whorwood v. Gybbons (P.1587) Goulds. 48; Sturges v. Beecher, next note; infra, notes 36 and 37.

32 Sturges v. Beecher (T.1596) U.L.C. MS.Gg. iii. 25, f. 80: “le esteant in dett n'est consideration sur que de grounder assumpsit sans doner de longer jour, ou abatinge de part del debt.” For examples from the records, see Kiralfy, A. K., The Action on the Case (1951), pp. 184–185.Google Scholar

33 Norman v. Some (M.1594) B.M. MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 37 and U.L.C. MS.Ee. iii. 2, f. 34: “Nota per curiam que accion de dett ne serra convert en action sur le case si le plaintiff n'ad susteyne damage pluis que ordinarye, come pur wares ou frument vend et nemi deliver et les marketts ryse etc. Car en tiels speciall cases de extraordinarye damages susteyne dette poit estre convert en assumpsit.”

34 “Frisland's Case (H.1596) B.M. MS.Harg. 51, f. 66v and MS.Harl. 1631, f. 210, per Walmsley J.: “il doit aver monstre ascun extraordinary endamagement sicome pur non deliverance del wheate ses children fueront famished.”

35 For examples from the King's Bench rolls, see Kiralfy, A. K. R., op. cit., p. 169.Google Scholar

36 Lutwich v. Hussey (P.1583) Cro.Eliz. 19; Sackford v. Phillips (P.1594) Cro.Eliz. 455, Owen 109; Purslowe v. Tisdale (P.1600) Inner Temple MS.Barr. 6, f. 56v, Cro.Eliz. 758.

37 Milles v. Raynton (M.1600) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 244v, per Walmsley, J. See also Inner Temple MS.Barr. 6, f. 86v, MS.Barr. 7, f. 16v. His brethren were divided as to a forbearance for a week out of term time.

38 Frisland's Case, supra, note 34.

39 See, e.g., Milsom, op. cit., at p. 299.

40 Anon. (P.1596) B.M. MS.Harg. 51, f. 82. Accord Duppa v. Jones (T.1602) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1074, f. 413, per Anderson C.J. and Walmsley J.: infra, p. 231. Cf. the argument in Baker, supra, p. 62, note 65.

41 May v. Alvares (P.1595) Cro.Eliz. 387; Palmer v. Randz (P.1599) Hetley 62, B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 63, MS.Add. 35951, f. 86.

42 Estrigge v. Owles (T.1588) 3 Leo. 200, at p. 201; Barkley v. Foster (P.1597) Inner Temple MS.Petyt 516/5, f. 102. Cf. Norwood v. Read (1558) 1 Plo. 180.

43 Edwards v. Burre (1573) Dalison 108, per Wray C.J.; Escrigg v. Owles (1589) as reported in B.M. MS.Lansd. 1104, f. 119.

44 Coleman's Case (M.1595) U.L.C. MS.Gg. v. 3, f. 46: “En accon sur le case damages solement sont demand, et ceux doient estre asses per le jurors, et nient obstant que appiert que le plaintiff duist aver x li. si l'assumpsit fuit performe, uncore le jurors poient done meindre some s'ils voile, et est bon.” In Barkley v. Foster (H.1597) B.M. MS.Harl. 4552, f. III, Popham C.J. said that “le plaintiff icy in l'accion sur le case ne recovera in damages forsque tant come il est prejudice per le non payment al jour lymit.” The reporter added: “Mes quere coment il ceo intend.”

45 Sometimes only 6d. or 1s. above the debt was awarded: e.g., K.B. 27/1336, mm. 79, 126. In Slade's Case the sum awarded was equal to the sum owed.

46 Shackleton v. Grene (H.1596) K.B. 27/1336, m. 68: “Ideo consideratum est quod J. S. recuperet versus H. G. debitum suum predictum necnon viginti solidos pro dampnis suis.…”

47 (M.1596) B.M. MS.Harl. 1697, f. 121v, U.L.C. MS.Gg. iii 25, f. 124v.

48 Barkley v. Foster (P.1597) U.L.C. MS.Gg. vi 29, f. 69 (translated). Even this argument is false, because the implied promise doctrine nowhere appears on the record, and so there were no “precedents” of the kind referred to.

49 Barkley v. Foster (P.1597) B.M. MS.Harl. 4552, f. 110 (translated). See the other reports in B.M. MS.Lansd. 1071, f. 230, MS.Lansd. 1104, f. 166v, MS.Harl. 4558, f. 25, and Inner Temple MS.Petyt 516/5, f. 102.

50 Cf. (1) (Detinue and case). Eason v. Newman (M.1596) Cro.Eliz. 495, Moo. 460, Goulds. 152; Hyne v. Tanner (M.1597) Inner Temple MS.Petyt 516/5, f. 138v; Anon. (M.1599) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1074, f. 325; Holcroft v. Beard (M.1600) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 251v. (2) (Nuisance and case). Alston v. Pamphyn (P.1596) Cro.Eliz. 466; Beswick v. Cunden (M.1596) Cro.Eliz. 520, Moo. 450; Crattendon's Case (M.1599) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1074, f. 332v; Cantrell v. Church (T.1601) Cro.Eliz. 845, Noy 37. (3) (Account and case). Holiday v. Hicks (1598–1600) Cro.Eliz. 638, 661, 746. There are numerous additional reports of the leading cases in manuscript.

51 By the 27 Eliz. 1, c. 8, as amended by the 31 Eliz. 1, c. 1.

52 81 L.Q.R. at p. 556.

53 Beecher v. Sturges (T.1596) B.M. MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 204 (translated). Owen was not then a judge, but he had taken the coif in 1589, and was a fellow member with Wray of Serjeants' Inn Fleet Street.

54 Anon. (P.1592) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1067, f. 170: “Accon sur le case port sur apprompt, et per curiam ne gist, car partie avera accon de dett. Mes per Glanvill aliter tenetur in Banco Regis.”

55 May v. Cardwydin (M.1593) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1071, f. 260: “Nota que est dit que mults breve d'error sont pendantes en le chequer chamber sur tiels judgments dones en bank le roi.” For the dispute over executors, see below, pp. 232–234.

56 Trin. 37 Eliz. 1, K.B. 27/1334, m. 606: “quod cum W. B. … indebitatus fuit [to the intestate T.] in [£30] adtunc remanentis eidem T. insolutis per W. B. pro c. quarterüs tritici predicio W. B. per ipsum T. tunc prius venditis, predictus W. B. adtunc … in consideracione inde super se assumpsit [to pay].” And another similar sale of wheat for £25. The plaintiff had judgment for £60 and costs.

57 B.M. MS.Harg. 7, pt. i, f. 204: “Anderson noluit audire argumentum del contrary part, car il dit la ne poit estre ascun reason fait a mainteiner ceo.” The only printed report (Moo. 694) is quite inadequate. Other reports are B.M. MS.Harl. 1624, f. 298v, MS.Harl. 1631, f. 55, MS.Harl. 1697, f. 107v. MS.Harl. 4998, f. 177v, MS.Lansd. 1084, f. 120v, Inner Temple MS.Barr. 7, f. 8 Line. Inn MS.Misc. 490, f. 706v, U.L.C. MS.Dd. x. 51, f. 78, MS.Ee. vi. 17, f. 112v, MS.Gg. ii. 5, ff. 431v, 469, MS.Ii. v. 13, ff. 59, 102.

58 Myles v. Smythe, Mich. 37 & 38 Eliz. 1, K.B. 27/1335, m. 742. This was an action on a promise to pay £7 for a pack of wool bargained, sold and delivered to the defendant at his request. The plaintiff recovered £7 10s. damages. There is a note on the record that the writ of error was received on 23 January 1596.

59 Mich. 37 & 38 Eliz. 1, K.B. 27/1335, m. 664. This was an action on a promise to pay separate sums of money for divers goods sold and bargained to the defendant at his request. The jury found part of the claim false, but the plaintiff had judgment for the remainder. The writ of error was received on 16 February 1596.

60 The only printed report (Moo. 703) is unhelpful. Other reports are: B.M. MS.Harl. 1631, f. 71v, MS.Harl. 4552, f. 92, Inner Temple MS.Barr. 7, f. 10, U.L.C. MS.Dd. x. 51, f. 52, MS.Gg. ii. 5, f. 444v.

61 Hil. 38 Eliz. 1, K.B. 27/1336, m. 305. The record is accurately printed in 4 Rep. 91, except that the promise was laid expressly as having been made to the plaintiff: insert “eldem Johanni” before “adtunc et ibidemfideliter promisit.”

62 Cf. the special verdict in Eason v. Newman (M.1596) Moo. 460.

63 His father was a Barnstaple merchant; he (the lawyer) was buried (not far from Bracton) in Exeter Cathedral, where his effigy may still be seen. He was later a judge of the King's Bench; but in 1597 he was still an utter barrister, aged 42.

64 Reader of the Inner Temple; later Chief Baron. His argument is printed in Baker, supra, pp. 54–59.

65 Bencher of Gray's Inn and the Queen's counsel extraordinary; later Lord Chancellor.

66 Referred to in 4 Rep. 93a.

67 Burley v. Wisse (1601) Bodl.Lib. MS.Rawl. A. 415, f. 15.

68 Baker, supra, pp. 60–66.

69 Ibid., p. 66; 4 Rep. 94a, Moo. 667. Popham did not invent the phrase: cf. note 42, supra.

70 In Cambridge by Professors Winfield and Hollond: lecture notes in the Squire Law Library. In Oxford by Professor Holdsworth: History of English Law, Vol. 3 (3rd ed., 1923), pp. 445, 451. In London by Professors Jenks, Potter and Kiralfy: Jenks, E., Short History of English Law (6th ed., 1949), p. 305Google Scholar; Potter, H., Historical Introduction to English Law (4th ed., 1958), p. 465Google Scholar; Kiralfy, A. K. R., The English Legal System (4th ed., 1967), p. 69.Google Scholar See also Dawson, J. P., Oracles of the Law (1968), p. 71Google Scholar (who incorrectly blames Plucknett).

71 By Professors Plucknett and Milsom. See also Simpson in 74 L.Q.R. at p. 391.

72 See Ames, J., Lectures on Legal History (1913), pp. 150–152Google Scholar (still an important passage); Plucknett, op. cit., pp. 644–646; Milsom, S. F. C., “Not Doing is No Trespass” [1954] C.L.J. 105, at pp. 111–112Google Scholar; Lücke, op. cit., 81 L.Q.R. at pp. 553–554; Milsom, S. F. C., Historical Foundations of the Common Law (1969), pp. 303–304.Google Scholar Much of the difficulty stems from Anon. (1572) Dal. 84, where it it said that a subsequent promise must be pleaded; but it is not said that a subsequent promise would be implied by the court. It cannot be taken as representing the later King's Bench view. Plucknett incorrectly read the word “subsequent” into Edwards v. Burre (1573) Dal. 104, and Slade's Case itself. With respect to Lücke's persuasive argument (82 L.Q.R. at p. 82), adtunc et ibidem cannot mean the same as postea, notwithstanding the change of tense: see Sheffield v. Rise, note 8, supra; and Anon. (1572) Dal. 84. We can avoid some of the difficulties if we ask, not whether the promise had to be subsequent to the contract, but whether it had to be separate from it.

73 W. F. Finlason, note to J. Reeves, History of English Law (1869 ed.), Vol. 3, p. 751. Reeves did not make this mistake himself, but most subsequent writers have assumed that the imported promise was a King's Bench fiction.

74 Coke actually altered the word “implied” to “imported,” which conveys the meaning more precisely. See his draft in B.M. MS.Harl. 6686.

75 Accord. J. Reeves, History of English Law (1869 ed.), Vol. 3, p. 752; Ames, op. cit., p. 152; Winfield, P. H., The Law of Quasi-Contract (1952), pp. 6–7Google Scholar; Wilson, J. F., Principles of the Law of Contract (1957), pp. 9–10Google Scholar; Simpson, 74 L.Q.R. at pp. 394–395. There remains the difficulty whether the implied assumpsit is the same assumpsit as that expressed in the declaration. Lücke argued that it was not, but the argument leads to insuperable difficulties: 81 L.Q.R. at pp. 554–555. On the view advanced here, there is no objection to holding the contrary; the jurors did not find the assumpsit not proved, only that there was no promise apart from the contract.

76 Baker, supra, p. 55, note 23.

77 Supra, p. 56, note 27; 74 L.Q.R. at p. 394. Coke dismissed the point as deserving no discussion, and gave it little prominence in his report.

78 Ibid., pp. 56–57; 4 Rep. 92b.

79 This was stated by Anderson C.J. at Serjeants' Inn, and apparently not contradicted: Baker, supra, p. 60.

80 B.M. MS.Harl. 6809, f. 46. Dodderidge was a leading light in the Elizabethan Society of Antiquaries.

81 Plucknett, op. cit., p. 647. Simpson says it was “a mere perversion of authority” (74 L.Q.R. at p. 393). Lord Loughborough C.J. attacked Coke's arguments on similar grounds as long ago as 1791: Rudder v. Price, 1 Hy.Bl. 547, at pp. 550–551.

82 Anon. (P.1587) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1076, f. 122v, Goulds. 51. Reeves represented the dispute leading to Slade's Case as being entirely about wager of law: History of English Law (1869 ed.), Vol. 3, p. 750.

83 See A True Collection of the King's offices and Fees (temp. Jac. 1), B.M. MS.Harl. 829, f. 116v: “there is an officer in the Common Place will gett yow them to fill up the number which be called knights of the post.” The name derives from the post, or pillory, a professional hazard encountered by such men. See also E. S., The Discoverie of the Knights of the Poste (1597) S.T.C. 21489; New English Dictionary, s.v. “post-knight”; Partridge, E., A Dictionary of Slang (1963), p. 460.Google Scholar

84 T. Powell, The Attorneys Academy (1623), p. 132: “But there is an officer heere for the case of the subject, who will furnish … twelve such compurgators as occasion shall require.” Such assistance was needed when the defendant wished to do his law instanter to prevent a non-suit; he would fail if he did not produce 12 hands at once: Anon. (T.1595) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1076, r. 184v.

85 See the reports on court fees in G. T., Attourney of the Court of Common Pleas (1648), pp. 85, 86, 103, 146 and 173. (The fees were claimed as having been received since 1569 at least.) If the defendant paid the fee for 12, and the officer only produced eight, his law failed: Anon. (temp. Eliz. 1) U.L.C. MS.Gg. v. 4, f. 87v.

86 Bamham and Cartwright v. Barrett (T.1602) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1074, f. 410. In Easter Term 1609 it was reported that “ore le court ad fait ordre, que ou le summe est petit et ne amount al 40 li. ou pluis il avera 6 al meins, et ceux doient estre de ses neighboures queux melieux conusont le person de luy que jure”: Petit's Reports, collected by T. Toumeur, MS. penes Sir John Neale, p. 301.

87 Cf. S. E. Thorne, “Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change” (1951) 26 N.Y.U.L.R. 10, at pp. 19–21.

88 Loc. cit., supra, note 53.

89 S.C., B.M. MS.Harl. 1624, f. 298v.: “Et Owen dit que le inconvenience fuit grand pur le chapmen que buy wares dell Londoners car ills sera arct de prover le payment de chescun particuler some que ills ont paid.”

90 Anon. (1603) Cary 27.

91 Co.Litt. 295a.

92 See Plucknett, op. cit., p. 160; McGovern, W. M., “Contract in Medieval England: Wager of Law and the Effect of Death” (1968) 54 Iowa Law Review 19, at p. 38Google Scholar, notes 125–129.

93 4 Rep. 95a; B.M. MS.Harl. 6686, f. 530 (“les judges sans bone admonition et due examination del partie ne admitt luy a [ley gager]”). In 1647 it was said that “the judges will admonish him to be well advised, and tell him the danger of taking a false oath”: W. Style, Practical Register (1657), p. 349. See also McGovern, op. cit., at pp. 27–28.

94 Anon. (1587) Goulds. 57, B.M. MS.Lansd. 1076, f. 123v; Millington v. Burges (1587) Goulds. 65; Anon. (1588) 3 Leo. 212; Anon. (1588) 4 Leo. 81; Sanderson v. Ekins (1588 or 1590) 3 Leo. 258, Goulds. 80; Arnold Rutton's Case (P.1592) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1076, f. 148v; Anon. (M.1594) ibid., f. 178v; Blocke's Case (H.1597) B.M. MS.Harg. 7, pt. ii, f. 65; Flower v. Flower (M.1597) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1076, f. 166, MS.Harl. 1631, f. 271; Oliver Hagger's Case (1598) U.L.C. MS.Li. iii. 10, f. 60v. In Flower's Case the defendant “monstre al court le veritie del case, cravinge lour advise s'il poet jure safement.”

95 74 L.Q.R. at p. 392.

96 4 Rep. 93.

97 Baker, supra, p. 66; Moo. 667.

98 Maylard v. Kester (M.1599) Moo. 711; Powell v. Preston (H.1601) Inner Temple MS.Barr. 6, f. 126; Simcocke v. Payne (P.1601) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 320, MS.Lansd. 1067, f. 184v, Inner Temple MS.Barr. 6, f. 166, Cro.Eliz. 786. The point was taken in the Exchequer Chamber by Altham as late as Easter Term 1602: Pillesworth v. Feake, as reported in B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 479v.

99 Simcocke v. Payne (P.1601) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 320.

1 Duppa v. Jones (T.1602) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1074, f. 413, Linc. Inn. MS. Mayn. 87, f. 309. Was this an attempt to divert attention from the imported promise point, which they had lost?

2 Moo. 433.

3 Simcocke v. Payne, supra, note 98.

4 Turgys v. Becher, supra, note 56; Paramour v. Payne (M.1596) U.L.C. MS.Gg. vi. 29, f. 133v; Stubbings v. Rotheram (M.1595) Cro.Eliz. 454. In the first case, he hesitated but did not actually dissent.

5 Paramour v. Payne (M.1596) U.L.C. MS.Gg. vi. 29, f. 133v.

6 Anon. (probably Milles v. Raynton) (M.1600) as reported in B.M. MS.Lansd. 1074, f. 363v, Linc. Inn MS.Mayn. 87, f. 253v; Simcocke v. Payne, supra, note 98.

7 Churche v. Cantrell (M.1601) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 395. The reporter said of their dissent “non multum contradixerunt.” The decision was not regarded as final: see Gamford v. Nightingale (1605) Noy 112; three cases in Rolle Abr., Vol. 1, p. 104.

8 Cleymond v. Vincent, M. 12 Hen. 8, 11, pl 3; Norwood v. Read (M.1557) Plo. 180; Cottington v. Hulett (M.1588) Cro.Eliz. 59; May v. Cardwydin (M.1593) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1071, f. 260; Hughes v. Robotham (T.1593) Poph. 30, at p. 32, per Popham C.J.; Harper v. Belfield (H.1594) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1071, f. 269; Anon. (M.1595) U.L.C. MS.Gg. v. 3, f. 45v; Gaywood v. Gent (H.1596) B.M. MS.Harl. 1697, f. 96v, MS.Add. 35950, f. 93v, (sub nom. Gawod v. Bankes) MS.Harl. 1624, f. 291, (sub nom. Gawoode v. Binkes) U.L.C. MS.Gg. v. 3, f. 99v, (sub nom. Camond v. Jent) U.L.C. MS.Ee. vi. 17, f. 61v, U.L.C. MS.Gg. iii. 25, f. 55v, Rolle Abr., Vol. 1, p. 14, (sub nom. Gowode v. Binkes) Owen 56; Thorneton v. Kempe (T.1596) U.L.C. MS.Gg. iii. 25, f. 79v; Perke v. Loveden (H.1601) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 285, MS.Lansd. 1067, f. 195; Hogg v. Jackson (M.1601) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 396; Wright v. Green (P.1602) Linc. Inn MS.Mayn. 82, f. 36v.

9 Anon. (M.1571) B.M. MS.Add. 25211, f. 10v; Anon. (P.1580) B.M. MS.Lansd. 1084, f. 54v. Fitzherbert J. had attacked the King's Bench practice in 1535: T. 27 Hen. 8, 23, pl. 21. See also 37 Hen. 8, Bro.Ab. Action sur le case, pl. 4.

10 Gawdy J. referred in 1588 to a recent judgment to this effect: Owen 95. Cf. Edwards v. Burre (1573) Dal. 104: sed quaere whether the reporter's note is contemporaneous. The later view was affirmed in Anon. (T.1594) U.L.C. MS.Ii. v. 25, f. 7.

11 The first reported case is Griggs v. Helhouse (M.1595), cited Cro.Eliz. 454, Moo. 691; reported (under various titles) in B.M. MS.Lansd. 1084, f. 114, MS.Harl. 1631, f. 144v, U.L.C. MS.Ee. vi. 17, f. 57, Inner Temple MS.Petyt 516/5, f. 26, MS.Barr. 7, f. 6. See also Stubbings v. Rotheram (M.1595) Cro.Eliz. 454, Moo. 691; Jordan's Case (H.1596) Owen 57; Serle v. Rosse (H.1596) Cro.Eliz. 459; Mathew's Case (1595) Moo. 702. All these cases are more fully reported in MSS.

12 Payne v. Hyde (M.1596) B.M. MS.Harl. 1697, f. 118, U.L.C. MS.Gg. iii. 25, f. 112, Goulds. 154.

13 Perke v. Loveden (H.1601) B.M. MS.Add. 25203, f. 285: “Gawdy dit a Fenner, si nous done judgment pur le plaintiff … voet estre reverse en l'eschequer chamber.”

14 Yelv. 20.

15 Baker, supra, p. 67.

16 See Kercher's Case (1611) Godb. 176. He may have absented himself from the discussion in Pinchon's Case; his name is not included in Coke's list of the judges present.

17 Meane v. Peacher (P.1611) Ro.Ab. i. 14; Pinchon's Case (M.1611) 9 Rep. 86; Kercher's Case, last note. There was little debate in Pinchon's Case, but Coke “voet les students pur observer que ceo est adjudge per touts les justices et barons de touts les courts”: Line. Inn MS.Mayn. 62, f. 148. One is tempted to add “(by way of contrast to Slade's Case).”

18 Kercher's Case (1611) Godb. 176.

19 Supra, p. 214, note 7. By this time Coke had become Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.

20 Some books treat this problem as having been solved in Slade's Case: e.g. Chitty on Contracts (23rd ed., 1968), s. 115, note 51, s. 117; Anson's Law of Contract (23rd ed., 1969), p. 89.

21 The difficulty was aired in Hodge v. Vavisour (M.1612) 3 Bulst. 222, 1 Rolle Rep. 413, and the common form of count was approved. But Rolle was dissatisfied with the decision, since there was no consideration for the new promise. The problem was still worrying the House of Lords in 1922: Spencer v. Hemmerde [1922] 2 A.C. 507, at p. 524Google Scholar, per Lord Sumner.

22 Street, T. E., Foundations of Legal Liability (1906), Vol. 3, p. 187Google Scholar; Holdsworth, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 446–447; Plucknett, op. cit., p. 648; Wilson, J. F., Principles of the Law of Contract (1957), pp. 8–9Google Scholar; Stoljar, S. J., Law of Quasi-Contract (1964), pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Goff, R. and Jones, G., Law of Restitution (1966), pp. 6–8Google Scholar; Anson's Law of Contract (23rd ed., 1969), pp. 616, 621. Cf. Jackson, R. M., The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law (1936), pp. 39Google Scholaret seq.

23 See City of London v. Goree (1676) 3 Keb. 677; Howard v. Wood (1679) 1 Freem. 473, at p. 479, per Pemberton J.; Shuttleworth v. Garrett (1689) Comb. 151, per Holt C.J. The references to Slade's Case are obscure.

24 Accord. Fifoot, op. cit., pp. 361–362; W. J. V. Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History (2nd ed., 1949), p. 121.

25 Hanbury, H. G., English Courts of Law (1944), p. 93.Google Scholar

26 Lücke, op. cit., 82 L.Q.R. at pp. 94–95.

27 Cf. Simpson, op. cit., 74 L.Q.R. at p. 389.

28 Edgecomb v. Dee (1670) Vaugh. 89, at p. 101; Anon. (1673) 1 Mod. 163, per Vaughan C.J. He said Slade's Case was an “illegal resolution … grounded upon reasons not fit for a declamation, much less for a decision of law.” Lord Mansfield appears to criticise the decision, in Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 5 Burr. 1005, at p. 1008.