¹ Bentham, J., “Rationale of Judicial Evidence,” in Works (ed. Bowring) (Edinburgh, 1843), Vol. vii, p. 167.Google Scholar

² Contra, Williams, “Defence of Necessity” [1953] C.L.P. 216; ibid., Criminal Law—The General Part, 2nd ed. (London, 1961), pp. 724Google Scholaret seq., approved by the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in London Borough of Southwark v. Williams [1971]Google Scholar Ch. 734. In his Criminal Law—The General Part, Professor Williams, Glanville first says (p. 724)Google Scholar “it will here be submitted somewhat confidently that the defence [of necessity] is recognised in English Law,” and then later (at p. 728) “The peculiarity of necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibility of formulating it with any approach to precision. Much of what would otherwise be covered by the doctrine is specially provided for by law, whether statute or precedent; the general doctrine needs to be invoked only in the unprovided case”

³ A person over 16 in charge of a child under that age may himself be guilty of an offence (Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s. 1) if he neglects to do what he can to prevent a third person committing an offence against the child; a police constable may commit an offence if he fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the commission of a crime; and any person with a right to control the conduct of another may be held to be an accomplice in the other's crime if his failure to exercise that right can be construed as an encouragement to the other to commit the offence: Baldessare (1930) 22 Cr.App.R. 70.Google Scholar

⁴ English law also recognises a doctrine of martial law (though it has only applied it in Ireland and South Africa), the effect of which is to recognise that when the civil courts are no longer able to function the necessity of the situation provides a defence to the military in taking steps to restore order which would not otherwise be justified. But martial law is a subject of its own, and it is not proposed to refer to it further here.

⁵ ss. 2 and 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (defence of prevention of crime) in certain circumstances render lawful the arrest and use of force against suspected offenders and will therefore cover cases in which though the defendant will have thought that the behaviour of his victim made it necessary for him to act, neither his victim nor any other person will have been responsible for his mistake.

⁶ Pace Stephen who, somewhat perversely, it may be thought, was opposed to a defence of duress but advocated one of necessity: J. F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London, 1883), Vol. II, pp. 107–110.

⁷ Cf. note 5, above. No such distinction was made in Hanway v. Boultbee (1830) 1 M. & Rob. 15 (protection of person from attack by animal); Rose (1847) 2 Cox 329 (mutiny at sea); Stephen, J. F., A Digest of the Criminal Law, 6th ed. (London, 1904), p. 161Google Scholar (Art. 221, illustration 1).

⁸ s. 3 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides that “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.” A similar rule must, in fact, apply to all cases where person or property is endangered by the conduct of another. It would be very hard if the choice lawfully open to a person differed depending on whether the conduct which endangered him or others was, or was not, to his knowledge, criminal—a matter which, in the agony of the moment, he might well be unable to ascertain. See also Criminal Damage Act 1971, s. 5 (2) (b) (ii), III, note 52, below.

⁹ Andenaes, J., The General Part of the Criminal Law of Norway (South Hackensack, N.J., 1965), p. 165.Google Scholar And see Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 8, p. 9, where it is pointed out that Stephen (Digest, Art 33), who was followed in the British Code for Cyprus (1928) (Art. 18) did not make any distinction between the two cases.

¹⁰ Dadson (1850) 2 Den. 35 (C.C.R.).

¹¹ So the Model Penal Code: s. 3.02 (1), and Tentative Draft No. 8, p. 10. Cf. Williams, “The Law of Abortion” (1952) 5 C.L.P. 128 at 135.

¹² It would, for this reason, be unwise to accept at its face value the opinion of W. T. S. Stallybrass in “A Comparison of the General Principles of Criminal Law in England with the ‘Progetto Definitivo di un Nuovo Codice Penale’ of Alfredo Rocco” (in The Modern Approach to Criminal Law (ed. , Radzinowicz and , Turner) (London, 1945), at p. 390Google Scholar) that “Article 58 of the Progetto definitivo … clearly affords a defence in many cases in which the plea of necessity would not be accepted in England” (p. 432).

¹³ s. 1 of the Sunday Observance Act 1677 provides that “… noe tradesman artificer workman labourer or other person whatsoever shall doe or exercise any worldly labour, business or worke of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's Day or any part thereof (workes of necessity and charity onely excepted …).”

¹⁴ This is an offence under section 4 (1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 unless done with “reasonable excuse.”

¹⁵ Reniger v. Fogossa (1551) 1 Plowden 1, per Pollard Serjt. at f. 19 (though the case contains much argument in support of both views); Stratton (1779) 21 How.St.Tr. 1045, per Lord Mansfield C.J. at 1223, 1231 (though at pp. 1224–1225 the analogy he draws is with acting in defence of persons or property); 4 Bl.Com. 27–31; T. B. Macaulay, “Notes on the Indian Penal Code,” Note B in Works, ed. Lady Trevelyan (London, 1897), Vol. xi, pp. 57–61; , Stephen, History, Vol. II, p. 108Google Scholar; Kenny, C. S., Outlines of Criminal Law, 12th ed. (Cambridge, 1926), pp. 70, 75Google Scholar; Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, 1960) p. 416Google Scholar; Packer, H. L., The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford, California, 1969), pp. 117–118Google Scholar; Morris, T. and Blom-Cooper, L., A Calendar of Murder (London, 1964), pp. 289–290Google Scholar; Howard, C., Australian Criminal Law (Melbourne, 1965), pp. 361, 369, 371Google Scholar; and cf. s. 25, Queensland and Western Australia Codes.

¹⁶ The view expressed by Wills J. in Tolson (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168 (at p. 172), that in a necessity situation, such as where “a municipal regulation be broken to save life,” there was no mens rea, because no intention to do what was morally wrong, has had little influence.

¹⁷ “The Elements of the Common Laws of England” (London, 1630), in Works (ed. Montague) (London, 1831), Vol. XIII, p. 131 at p. 160. Cf. Fourth Report of H.M. Commissioners on Criminal Law, Parl.Pap. (1839), xix, Art. 40, Extenuated Homicide.

¹⁸ Williams, “Law of Abortion” (1952) 5 C.L.P. 128, 135; Criminal Law—The General Part, pp. 743, 745; Model Penal Code, Art. 3, and see Tentative Draft No. 8, p. 8, who were, however, anticipated by Lord Mansfield C.J. in Stratton (1779) 21 How.St.Tr. 1045 at pp. 1224–1225.

¹⁹ Criminal Law—The General Part, p. 745; similarly, Smith, J. C. and Hogan, B., Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (London, 1969), p. 141.Google Scholar

²⁰ , Stephen, History, Vol. II, pp. 108–109.Google Scholar

²¹ 1 Plowden 1. Details of the plaintiff's colourful career may be found in Connell-Smith's, G.Forerunners of Drake (London 1954)Google Scholar, passim.

²² (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 444.

²³ Judgment was never given because the Council released the defendant from all liability—however, all but two of the judges were said to be in favour of the defendant: f. 20b.

²⁴ Per Atkins, apprentice, f. 10a.

²⁵ Per Pollard, Serjt., f. 18.

²⁶ 1 Ed. 2 Stat. 2.

²⁷ YB. H. 15 Hen. 7, 2a, per Keble.

²⁸ Per Brook, Recorder of London, f. 13.

²⁹ (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 444 at 454–455, per Baggallay L.J

³⁰ (1955) 39 Cr.App.R. 66.

³¹ Provided for by Road Traffic Act 1960, s. 25.

³² Not expressly provided for by statute. In Buckoke v. G.L.C. [1971]Google Scholar Ch. 662, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) accepted (without giving any reasons for doing so) the submissions of counsel for both parties that the driver of a fire-engine would commit an offence even though (i) there was no risk of a collision with other vehicles, and (ii) crossing against the lights would appreciably increase the fire brigade's chance of saving life and property. The case, though technically not a decision on the point, is indicative of current judicial attitudes. The court, which called for the amendment of the statute to give the driver a defence may have been influenced by the firemen's union's opposition to the fire authority's request that the Home Office should promote such legislation, and the likelihood that it would be desirable for the defence to be made subject to certain qualifications and safeguards: see, especially, Sachs L.J. at 677 and Buckley L.J. at 679.

³³ Convicted by a stipendiary magistrate.

³⁴ Theft Act 1968, s. 1.

³⁵ Cf. Williams, “Law of Abortion” (1952) 5 C.L.P. 128.

³⁶ Indictments for common law offences have been similarly construed: see Vantandillo (1815) 4 M. & S. 73, discussed at VI, note 1, infra.

³⁷ [1939] 1 K.B. 687.

³⁸ p. 691.

³⁹ p. 694. This had been assumed to be the law at least as early as 1846: Second Report of H.M. Commissioners for Criminal Law, Parl.Pap. (1846), xxiv, Chap. II, Section 7, Art. 16, note, but later legislation had neglected the Commissioners' proposal that it would be expedient to have an explicit provision to this effect.

⁴⁰ s. 1 (1) and (2).

⁴¹ ss. 1 (3) and 2.

⁴² s. 1 (4).

⁴³ Some of which were discussed in Williams, “Law of Abortion” (1952) 5 C.L.P. 128.

⁴⁴ See also II, note 32, above.

⁴⁵ Williams, “Defence of Necessity” (1953) 6 C.L.P. 216.

⁴⁶ (1909) 26 T.L.R. 139.

⁴⁷ Pace Edmund, Davies L.J., London Borough of Southwark v. Williams [1971]Google Scholar Ch. 734, 746A.

⁴⁸ Humphries v. O'Connor (1864) 17 Ir.C.L.R. 1, per O'Brien J. at p. 7.

⁴⁹ The General Part of the Criminal Law of Norway, p. 169.

⁵⁰ Below, VI, note 34.

⁵¹ We can (see IV, note 68, below) safely exclude liability for the theft (or robbery) of the blood.

⁵² subs. (2): “A person charged with an offence to which this section applies shall, whether or not he would be treated for the purposes of this Act as having a lawful excuse apart from this subsection, be treated for those purposes as having a lawful excuse—(a) if at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed that the person or persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction of or damage to the property in question had so consented, or would have so consented to it if he or they had known of the destruction or damage and its circumstances; or (b) if he destroyed or damaged or threatened to destroy or damage the property in question or, in the case of a charge of an offence under s. 3 above, intended to use or cause or permit the use of something to destroy or damage it, in order to protect property belonging to himself or another or a right or interest in property which was or which he believed to be vested in himself or another, and at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed—(i) that the property, right or interest was in immediate need of protection; and (ii) that the means of protection adopted or proposed to be adopted were or would be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.”

Subs. (3): “For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or not if it is honestly held.”

⁵⁴ Head v. Coles (1891) 56 J.P. 119.

⁵⁵ Dyer (1952) 36 Cr.App.R. 155.Google Scholar See also Lewis v. Arnold (1830) 4 Car. & P. 354: an occupier of land may use such force as is necessary to remove trespassers from his land, even though he knows they intend to remain only a short time (duration of theatre performance).

⁵⁶ Cf. s. 5 (2) (b) (i) and (ii) (note 52, above) with the language of Buckley, L.J. in Cope v. Sharpe (No. 2) [1912] 1 K.B. 496Google Scholar at 504: “the test is not whether, if the defendant had not done those acts, the danger would in fact have resulted in injury. The test, I think, is whether having regard to the rights of the [defendant] there was such real and imminent danger to [him or] his property as that he was entitled to act, and whether his acts were reasonably necessary in the sense of acts which a reasonable man would properly do to meet a real danger” (following Kirk v. Gregory (1875) 1 Ex.Div. 55; see also Cresswell v. Sirl [1948] 1 K.B. 241Google Scholar; Goodway v. Becher [1951] 2 All E.R. 349Google Scholar).

⁵⁷ Jura [1954] 1 Q.B. 503Google Scholar; Evans v. Wright [1964]Google Scholar Crim.L.R. 466.

⁵⁸ Wuyts [1969] 2 Q.B. 474.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Solesbury v. Pugh [1969]Google Scholar Crim.L.R. 381.

⁶⁰ Other examples of legislation incorporating these phrases are: (i) “without lawful authority or reasonable excuse”—Criminal Law Act 1967Google Scholar, s. 4 (1): Firearms Act 1968, s. 19; (ii) “without lawful authority or excuse”—Forgery Act 1861, s. 34; Forgery Act 1913, ss. 8–10; Coinage Offences Act 1936, ss. 6–10; Sexual Offences Act 1956, s. 20; (iii) “without reasonable excuse”—Wireless Telegraphy Act 1967Google Scholar; Firearms Act 1968, s. 20; (iv) “without just excuse”—Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965, s. 3 (1).

⁶¹ e.g., Forgery Act 1861, s. 34; Forgery Act 1913, s. 8; Coinage Offences Act 1936, ss. 6–10; Prevention of Crime Act 1953, s. 1 (and see Grieve v. McLeod, 1967Google Scholar S.L.T. 70); Firearms Act 1968, ss. 17 (2), 19, 20.

⁶² e.g., Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687 at 695.Google Scholar

⁶³ J. C. Smith [1969] Crim.L.R. 374.

⁶⁴ Barnard v. Evans [1925] 2 K.B. 795Google Scholar, per Avory and Shearman JJ. at pp. 797–798.

⁶⁵ III, note 34, supra. And see infra, V, for the statutory defence to a charge of, inter alia, theft provided by Sexual Offences Act 1956, s. 24 (3).

⁶⁶ Theft Act 1968, s. 1.

⁶⁷ s. 5 (2) (a) (III, note 52, above).

⁶⁸ The Theft Act also makes criminal unlawful borrowing (i.e., where there is no intention of permanently depriving the owner of his property) in two cases: section 11 (objects exhibited in places open to the public) and section 12 (vehicles, boats and other conveyances). Here the word “dishonestly” is not used: the sections require instead that the taking should be “without the consent of the owner or other lawful authority” (s. 12 (1)), and this is elaborated in s. 12 (6): “A person does not commit an offence … by anything done in the belief that he has lawful authority to do it or that he would have the owner's consent if the owner knew of his doing it and the circumstances of it.” “Lawful authority” has no precise meaning, and there can be no doubt that, e.g., a person who took another's boat to save someone from drowning could, whether or not the owner of the boat had, to his knowledge, refused his consent, rely on this subsection.

⁶⁹ s. 5 (2) (b) (ii) (II, note 52, above).

⁷⁰ Stephen, Digest, p. 164 (Art. 226).

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 165 (illustration 3). Cf. Humphries v. O'Connor (1864) 17 Ir.C.L.R. 1, per O'Brien J. at p. 7.

⁷² Williams, “The Defence of Necessity” (1953) 6 C.L.P. 216.

⁷³ Which had statutory force. Another example (though one unlikely to give rise to a necessity plea) is burglary contrary to section 9 (1) (a) of the Theft Act 1968.

⁷⁴ [1947] K.B. 997.

⁷⁵ p. 1006.

⁷⁶ Cf. Professor Williams', Glanville discussion of this case in his The Mental Element in Crime (Jerusalem, 1965), pp. 21–23.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See also Hale's opinion on the scope of treason in aiding the Queen's enemies, referred to at VI, note 96, infra.

⁷⁸ Supra, III, notes 40–44.

⁷⁹ s. 5 (2).

⁸⁰ Abortion Act 1967, s. 5 (1).

⁸¹ See the comments on Kitson (1955) 39 Cr.App.R. 66 at II, note 30, supra.

⁸² See, too, Road Traffic Act 1960, s. 73 (3) and (8) (exceptions to restriction on driving hours of drivers of lorries and public service vehicles); the inordinately detailed exceptions to the “no-waiting” and “double white lines” rules in the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 1964 (S.I. 1964/1857), Reg. 23 (3) and (4); Antarctic Treaty Act 1967, s. 2 (2), and comment on Brown v. Dyerson [1969] 1 Q.B. 45Google Scholar at VII, note 64, below.

⁸³ s. 1 (2).

⁸⁴ s. 2.

⁸⁵ s. 4 (1).

⁸⁶ Hicklin (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, per Blackburn J. at pp. 376–377, and per Lush J. at p. 378; De Montalk (1932) 23 Cr.App.R. 182Google Scholar; Stephen, Digest, p. 133 (Art. 191, submission).

⁸⁷ [1969] 1 Q.B. 151.

⁸⁸ p. 171E.

⁸⁹ p. 172B.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Midwives Act 1951, s. 9; Obscene Publications Act 1959, s. 4: Calder & Boyars Ltd. [1969] 1 Q.B. 151Google Scholar, 171A (the 1959 Act may, therefore, be harder on the defendant than was the common law); Road Traffic Act 1960, s. 18 (3); Antarctic Treaty Act 1967, s. 2 (2).

⁹² e.g., Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s. 1 (1); Education Act 1944, s. 39 (2); Road Traffic Act 1960, s.25; Abortion Act 1967, s. 1.

⁹³ Supra, III, notes 61–63.

⁹⁴ Cf., e.g., Road Traffic Act 1960, s. 18 (3) (driving elsewhere than on roads) and s. 25 (speed limits).

⁹⁵ For assault, see III at notes 45–51.

⁹⁶ Sir Matthew Hale noted (Historia Placitorum Coronae (London, 1736), Vol. I, pp. 56–58) a case recorded in the King's Bench rolls for 1321 on the scope of treason at common law, in which it had been held lawful and not a treason in aiding or adhering to the King's enemies when the County Palatine of Durham was invaded by pillaging Scots “with a power too strong to resist,” for a composition to be made with them to induce them to depart without further plundering. The decision, thought Hale, would be the same under the Statute of Treasons 1351, “1. In respect of the extreme necessity. 2. Because it is a less detriment to the country, and a less supply to the enemy than the plunder would be.”

⁹⁷ (1779) 21 How.St.Tr. 1045.

⁹⁸ Per Ashhurst J. at p. 1283.

⁹⁹ pp. 1224–1225.

¹ 4 M. & S. 73.

² Referred to with approval by Blackburn J. in Hicklin (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 at 376–377.

³ Although nowadays almost invariably prosecuted summarily under statute (Highways Act 1959, s. 121, “without lawful authority or excuse …wilfully obstructs”; Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s. 28; Metropolitan Police Act 1839, s. 54 (6); Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1963, reg. 90, “shall cause any unnecessary obstruction”) there is nothing in these statutes affecting the point made in the text. See, generally, Brownlie, I., The Law Relating to Public Order (London, 1968), pp. 77–82.Google Scholar

⁴ See, e.g., Clarke [1964] 2 Q.B. 315Google Scholar; Scarfe v. Wood [1969]Google Scholar Crim.L.R. 265.

⁵ , Bracton, De Legibus, f. 120b (ed. , Thorne) (Cambridge, Mass., 1968)Google Scholar, Vol. II, p. 340; Britton, ed. F. M. Nichols (Oxford, 1865), pp. 15, 113.

⁶ W. Staunford, Les Plees del Coron (London, 1583), ff. 13E, 14A, 15A; F. Pulton, De Pace Regis et Regni (London, 1609), f. 112a; M. Dalton, The Countrey Justice (London, 1635), Chap. 98, pp. 248–251; Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae, Vol. I, pp. 52, 478–491; M. Foster, Crown Law (Oxford, 1762), p. 273; 4 Bl.Com. 30; W. Eden, Principles of Penal Law (London, 1771), pp. 190–192; E. H. East, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (London, 1803), Vol. I, pp. 220, 277, 285, 293.

⁷ “The Elements of the Common Lawes of England” (London, 1630), in Works (ed. Montague) (London, 1831), Vol. XIII, p. 131 at p. 160.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ There was some authority for the cases of stealing food (see note 42, infra) and escape from prison: Brooke, Coron 13; YBB 15 Hen.7, 2, per Keble; 14 Hen.7, 29, per Read.

¹⁰ p. 250.

¹¹ W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, in 7th ed. by T. Leach (London, 1795) at pp. 174–175.

¹² 4 Bl.Comm. 186.

¹³ Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I, p. 294.

¹⁴ W. O. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors (London, 1819), Vol. I, pp. 783–784.

¹⁵ Fourth Report, Parl.Pap. (1839), xix, Art. 39, “Homicide Justifiable for Self-Preservation.”

¹⁶ Parl.Pap. (1837–38), xlxi, p. 463; see especially Note B at p. 541 (reprinted in Works (ed. Lady Trevelyan) (London, 1897), Vol. Xl, pp. 54–61.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 57–61.

¹⁸ Art. 81.

¹⁹ Art. 94.

²⁰ See, e.g., Indian Law Commissioners, Report on the Indian Penal Code (Calcutta, 1846), paras. 163–172; J. M. Macleod, Notes on the Report of the Indian Law Commissioners, Dated 23 July 1846, On the Indian Penal Code (London, 1848), p. 11.

²¹ Second Report, Parl.Pap. (1846), xxiv, Art. 19, Note; followed in Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1853 (H.L. Papers 1852–53, note 58), cl. XCVIII (Lord St. Leonard's Bill).

²² (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.

²³ p. 286. See further below.

²⁴ Stephen, Digest, pp. 25–26, and especially p. 25, note 1 (Art. 33, illustration 2). Holmes, too, had accepted Bacon's rule: O. W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston, 1881), p. 47.

²⁵ This did not, however, stop him from arguing that such a killing was not merely excusable, like killing in self-defence, where the killer forfeited his goods and had to sue out a pardon “because the law intends it hath a commencement upon an unlawful cause, because quarrels are not presumed to grow without some wrongs either in words or deeds in either part” (p. 162) but was justifiable “without any pardon,” and therefore entirely lawful, in the same way as a killing to prevent the commission of a felony (p. 160).

²⁶ p. 279.

²⁷ p. 288.

²⁸ See, e.g., Fourth Report of H.M. Commissioners on Criminal Law, Parl.Pap. (1839), xix, Art. 40, “Extenuated Homicide”; Morris and Blom-Cooper, Calendar of Murder, pp. 289–290; Howard, Australian Criminal Law, pp. 368–369; Cross, R., “Necessity Knows No Law” (1968) 3 University of Tasmania L.R. 1, 5.Google Scholar

²⁹ p. 279. A similar point was made by Grove J. after the case was over: “If the two accused men were justified in killing [the lad], then if not rescued in time, two of the three survivors would be justified in killing the third, and of the two who remained the stronger would be justified in killing the weaker, so that three men might be justifiably killed to give the fourth a chance of surviving” (p. 288, note 1).

³⁰ p. 286.

³¹ Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, p. 138; Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, p. 434.

³² See, especially, Report of the Criminal Code Bill Commission, Parl.Pap. (1878–79), xx, pp. 10, 43–44, which thought it best to shelve the issue and recommend that the Code should not contain any express provision for a defence of necessity (as Stephen's draft had done: Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill 1878, s. 23 (Parl.Pap. (1878) ii)), but that there should instead be a general provision allowing all the common law defences to survive “except in so far as they are …altered or are inconsistent” with the provisions of the Code: s. 19. It would therefore have been for the judges to decide, in the fullness of time, whether there was, at common law, a defence of necessity.

³³ J. F. Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law of England, 2nd ed. (London, 1890), p. 77; Digest, p. 25 note. Similar cases have been put by, e.g., Price, T. W., “Defence, Necessity and Acts of Authority” [1954]Google Scholar Butterworth's S.A.L.R. 1, 17.

³⁴ Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. II, p. 110. This is, in essence, the example given in the Indian Penal Code of 1861: Art. 81, illustration (a). Cf. Williams, Criminal Law—The General Part, pp. 738–739.

³⁵ Williams, G. L., The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (London, 1958), pp. 284–290.Google Scholar

³⁶ Ibid., p. 284.

³⁷ Cf. Devlin, J. summing up in Bodkin Adams (1957)Google Scholar unrep., referred to by Williams, loc. cit., who demonstrates that his analysis in terms of causation is untenable.

³⁸ Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1969, cl. 1 (2).

³⁹ Elements of the Common Lawes of England, ed. cit., p. 160.

⁴⁰ The only authority he cites is Staunford, simpliciter. I have been unable to find in W. Staunford, Les Plees del Coron, any passage to support Bacon's proposition.

⁴¹ Cf. Britton, p. 42 (Chap. IX Of Burglars).

⁴² Ibid., p. 61 (Chap. XVI of Larcenies).

⁴³ Dalton, Countrey Justice, pp. 255–256, seems rather confused.

⁴⁴ Veall, D., The Popular Movement for Law Reform 1640–1660 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 135–136.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae, Vol. I, pp. 54–55, 565–566.

⁴⁶ Op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 54–55.

⁴⁷ Cf. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I, p. 213; East, Pleas of the Crown, Vol. II, pp. 698–699.

⁴⁸ 4 Bl.Comm. 31–32.

⁴⁹ Fourth Report, Parl.Pap. (1839), xix, p. lxi, Art. 1, note (f).

⁵⁰ Art. 26.

⁵¹ Cabbage R. & R. 292.

⁵² Supra, IV, notes 65–66.

⁵³ Cf. Williams, Criminal Law—The General Part, pp. 722–723.

⁵⁴ Historia Placitorum Coronae, Vol. I, p. 54: to the same effect, ibid., pp. 565–566.

⁵⁵ 4 Bl.Comm. 32.

⁵⁶ General View of the Criminal Law of England, p. 77. See also Macaulay, quoted in VI at note 17, supra, and the 1845 Criminal Law Commissioners at VI, note 21, supra.

⁵⁷ By L.J., Sachs in Buckoke v. G.L.C. [1971]Google Scholar Ch. 652, 670G.

⁵⁸ Home Office, Fire Service Circular 27/1949.

⁵⁹ Section 12 (1).

⁶⁰ Buckoke v. G.L.C. [1971]Google Scholar Ch. 662, per Lord Denning M.R. at 669; Sachs L.J. at 670–671; cf. Lundt-Smith [1964] 2 Q.B. 167Google Scholar, per Hinchcliffe J. (very doubtfully a necessity case, and one where the defendant pleaded guilty).

⁶¹ See, e.g., Walker, Nigel, Sentencing in a Rational Society (London, 1969).Google Scholar

⁶² Whittall v. Kirby [1947]Google Scholar K.B. 194.

⁶³ Cf. Bloom, H., “Disqualification— ‘Special Reasons’” (1970) 120 N.L.J. 29.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Brown v. Dyerson [1969] 1 Q.B. 45Google Scholar at 52E, per Bridge J. It is noteworthy that the court thus assumed that acting in a medical emergency would not excuse the driver from conviction; cf. also Lundt-Smith [1964] 2 Q.B. 167Google Scholar (causing death by dangerous driving).

⁶⁵ See, e.g., the comments on the problems created by mandatory disqualification in Bond [1968] Crim.L.R. 622; and Johnson [1969] Crim.L.R. 443. The problems have been reduced by the Road Traffic (Disqualification) Act 1970.