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Making some Sense of Self-Induced Intoxication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Alan R. Ward
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Extract

In Majewski the House of Lords handed down a decision which was intended to determine, authoritatively, the position of the defendant who pleads not guilty to a criminal offence on the basis that he was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. Their Lordships unanimously accepted the existence of a rule of law to the effect that in crimes of “basic intent,” such as the assaults with which Majewski was charged, intoxication, where it was self-induced, could provide no defence; only where the crime involved required a “specific intent” could self-induced intoxication ground a plea of not guilty based on a lack of the necessary mens rea.

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Articles
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , July 1986 , pp. 247 - 261
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1986

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References

1 [1977] A.C. 443.

2 Assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s.47. Offences against the Person Act 1861 and assault on a police constable in the execution of his duty under s.51(l). Police Act 1964.

3 Smith, & Hogan, . Criminal Law. 5th ed. (1983). p. 193.Google Scholar

4 [1977] A.C. 443 al 471.

5 [1976] A.C. 182 at 216.

6 [1977] A.C. 443 at 476 (Lord Diplock), 480 (Lord Kilbrandon) 486–487 (Lord Edmund Davies).

7 Ibid., at 479.

8 Sec Robinson, Paul H.. “Imputed Criminal Liability” (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 609. at 639–642.Google Scholar

9 [1977] A.C. at 474–475. 479. 487 and 498.

10 [1947] K.B. 997.

11 [1977] A.C. 443 at 478. It was argued, by Sellers: “Mens Rea and the Judicial Approach to ‘Bad Excuses’ in Criminal Law” (1978) 41 M.L.R. 245 at 259, that the two approaches should be read together, but this option is no longer open since they produce different results when applied to the same crime—as the history of the Criminal Damage Act offences reveals: sec nn.26–36 infra and accompanying text.Google Scholar

12 [1977] A.C. 443 at 479–480.

13 See also Lord Salmon, Ibid., at 480–481.

14 [1968] 1 Q.B.421.

15 Ibid., at 426.

16 [1975] A.C. 55.

17 [1985] A.C. 905 (See also R. v. Hancock [1986] 1 All ER 641).

18 Ibid., at 928 (emphasis added).

19 Ibid., at 926–927, approving Lord Hailsham's arguments in Hyam.

20 [1950] 2 K.B. 237 at 253.

21 See Smith & Hogan, loc. cit., n.3, supra.

22 On the need for this elaborate formulation to avoid ambiguity as to the scope of the mental element, see Deborah M. Weiss, “Scope, Mistake, and Impossibility: The Philosophy of Language and Problems of Mens Rca” [1983] Col.L.R. 1029.

23 Satnam S., Kewal S., (1984) 78 Cr.App.R. 149.

24 Cunningham [1957] 2 Q.B. 396.

25 [1982] A.C. 341.

26 The Act creates two main offences:

s. 1(1): A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property whether belonging to himself or another—(a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damaged; and (b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered; shall be guilty of an offence.

(3) An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson.

27 [1979] 1 O.B. 695. Overruled in Caldwell.

28 [1977] 65 Cr.App.R. 54.

29 [1979] 1 Q.B. 695 at 704. (The report refers erroneously to “the Act of 1977”.)

30 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1050. Overruled in Caldwell.

31 Ibid., at 1054.

32 [1982] A.C. 341 at 354–355.

33 See. for example. Smith & Hogan. op. cit., n.3. supra, pp. 54–56 and Glanville Williams. Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (1983). pp. 102–114.Google Scholar

34 See n.9 supra and accompanying text.

35 [1982] A.C. 341 at 355.

36 E.g. the offences under ss. 18 and 20. Offences against the Person Act 1861: see nn.14 and 15. supra and accompanying text.

37 See [1977] A.C. 443 at 478 (Lord Simon), 484 (Lord Salmon) and 498 (Lord Russell).

38 Comment at 9, Tent. Draft No.9, Model Penal Code 1959. See Robinson, loc. cit., n.8. supra.

39 [1977] A.C. 443 at 474–475 (Lord Elwyn Jones L.C.).

40 Ibid., at 480 (Lord Simon).

41 S.2.08(2). See [1977] A.C. 443 at 475. per Lord Elwyn Jones L.C.

42 Self-induced intoxication is “intoxication caused when the actor knowingly introduces into his body [substances causing intoxication], the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such duress as would afford a defense to a charge of crime”: s.2.08(5)(b).

43 [1984] 3 All E.R. 848.

44 Ibid., at 853.

45 Ibid.

46 [1984] 3All E.R. 842.

47 S.2, Road Traffic Act 1972.

48 [1982] A.C. 510.

49 Ibid., at 526–527.

50 [1984] 3 All E.R. 842 at 847.

51 Ibid., at 846–847.

52 In Lipman [1970] I Q.B. 152. for example, the defendant was held liable for manslaughter despite his plea that the effects of a hallucinatory drug had led him to believe he was grappling with snakes at the centre of the earth when he was in fact suffocating his girlfriend with a blanket. The argument that this was “involuntary conduct” got short shrift. See also Majewski, passim.

53 [1983] 1 W.L.R. 760.

54 S.20. Offences against the Person Act 1861.

55 S.18. Offences against the Person Act 1861.

56 [1983] 1 W.L.R. 760 at 765.

57 Ibid., at 765.

58 (1843) 10 CI. & Fin.200, 8 E.R. 718.

59 See n.41. supra and accompanying text.

60 Upon which nothing seems to turn.

61 [1982] AC. 341 at 355.

62 [1983] 1 W.L.R. 939.

63 Ibid., at 945.

64 In Wilson v. Colchester Justices [1985] A.C. 750. the House of Lords stated that the grant or refusal by an Appeal Committee of leave to appeal is in no way to be taken as implying disapproval or approval of the decision of the court below. Among the reasons for which leave may be refused is that “the facts of the particular case may not be suitable as a foundation for determining some question of general principle”: [1985] A.C. 750 at 753.

65 See Treimann. “Recklessness and the Model Penal Code” (1981) 9 Am.J.Crim.Law 281 at 360–361: cf. Robinson, op. cit., n.8. supra, at 661.

* The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments received during the preparation of this article from Mark Thompson of Leicester University and Jennifer Temkin of the London School of Economics.